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REMARKS BY DEAN SPONG 
FRIDAY AFTERNOON, FEBRUARY 9, 1979 
Please be seated. I want to congratulate you hardy souls who have 
made it through the snow to begin with us on time. I want to present, 
and it is a pleasure to do so, the President of the College of William and 
Mary, Dr. Thomas A. Graves, Jr. 
President Graves: Thank you, Dean Spong. This weekend, as I am 
sure many of you know, we arc celebrating the 286th birthday of the 
College of William and Mary in Virginia, which makes us, by some 
counts, the second oldest university in the country. We're also cele-
brating the 200th anniversary of the establishment of the first Chair of 
Law in America as part of our Charter Day Convocation. That means, 
of course, that we arc going to be focusing an enormous amount of at-
tention on the Marshall-Wythe School of Law this weekend. 
Under the leadership of Dean Spong, our law school at William and 
Mary has been rapidly moving into the front ranks of legal education in 
America. I think it is especially appropriate, therefore, that this week-
end, as part of that celebration, our law school is sponsoring a Con-
ference on one of the major problems that confronts the legal profession 
in our society and our economy, having to do with environmental law. 
I do not know a great deal about the law as I am not a lawyer. I do 
know some things about the environment because at the moment our 
campus is in a process of some debate upon what may happen to our 
environment if we expand our football stadium. 
But leaving that aside, at least for a moment, I do want to welcome 
all of you to this Conference and to the College of William and Mary. 
For those of you especially who have braved the storm and come from 
some distances, we are especially pleased to have you here. 
As I look at your program, it promises to be a very stimulating one 
and a very worthwhile one. I wish I could stay for it. I cannot because 
I am involved in a lot of Charter Day activities. We also have on 
campus with us today the President's Council, which is a group of our 
major donors to the College of William and Mary, and I think you 
understand why I must be with them. 
But I do want to say that I hope you enjoy your stay, especially 
those of you from afar who are not familiar with our campus or with 
this very special community of Williamsburg. Our entire campus is open 
to you. We have 1200 acres, 6,000 students, 500 faculty and 100 
buildings. Although your program looks so tight I cannot imagine when 
you arc going to have time for anything else, I want you to know that 
you're very welcome here. The hospitality of the College of William 
and Mary is yours for the asking. Please enjoy yourselves and come 
back often. 
Thank you. 
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Dean Spong: On behalf of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law I'd 
like to add my word of greeting to you. We have many on the way by 
Eskimo dogsled and otherwise to join this Conference. 
If you've had a chance to look at your program, you are aware that 
it is structured around five panels of speakers. This afternoon, the 
speakers will be directing their remarks toward the question "How Ef-
fective Are the Laws Regulating Toxic Substances in Virginia?" Tomor-
row, and beginning this evening at the dinner, we will turn to looking at 
the effectiveness of laws regulating toxic substances from the federal 
perspective. 
In each instance the format is the same. We will have a speaker. Then 
we will have three or four responses, and then the floor will be open 
to questions. The sessions will be moderated by different members of 
this faculty and we encourage as much audience participation as time 
will allow. 
Now, for the first session this afternoon, the moderator will be 
Professor Denis Brion. Professor Brion is a graduate of Northwestern 
University and of the Law School of the University of Virginia. He is 
a member of this faculty, but this year is visiting at Washington and 
Lee University. He is not a stranger to the subject before us. Aside 
from teaching subjects that relate to the environment, be served with 
distinction for a number of years as a member of the State Water Con-
trol Board and, in 1976, served as its Chairman. So I'd like to present 
Professor Denis Brion. 
I 
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE VIRGINIA'S LAWS REGULATING 
HAZARDOUS AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES? 
INTRODUCTION BY ASSISTANT PROFESSOR DENIS J. BRION, 
MARSHAL L-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW 
Moderator of the Stale of Virginia Panel 
I am pleased to have this opportunity to moderate that portion of this 
symposium which deals with what the State of Virginia is doing to 
prevent the recurrence of a Kepone-type incident and more generally to 
protect the public health and the environment in Virginia against 
hazardous and toxic substances. We have a distinguished panel today and 
a heavy workload so without further ado it gives me great pleasure to 
introduce the Honorable Maurice B. Rowe, Secretary of Commerce and 
Resources for the Commonwealth who will provide us with an overview 
of state laws and regulations which address this problem. Secretary 
Rowe. 
OVERVIEW OF VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS 
Secretary Rowe: Thank you very much, Denis. 
Dean Spong and others, it is a pleasure to be here and particularly 
to see so many of my associates and friends with whom I have the 
pleasure of working and visiting so frequently across Virginia, and to 
note that there are others present from other areas of our nation, par-
ticularly our nation's capita]. I understand that my prepared statement 
has been distributed to many of you. Yet, since I'm present and I have 
it before me, I think it only appropriate that I should proceed to present 
it and deal with it in its content to the extent desirable. 
The stewardship of our environment is indeed a most important and 
far-reaching duty for all of us and especially for the Office of Com-
merce and Resources. I certainly wish to commend, and Governor 
Dalton has indicated this to Dean Spong, those responsible for planning 
and implementing this conference on Environmental Law. We are cer-
tainly the trustees of future generations. Yet it is a very important 
statement which should indeed be taken seriously. We function on the 
premise that we can continue to enjoy and use our natural resources 
and maintain and improve our quality of living. That's a premise on 
which I think we should base our goals and objectives for the future. 
Background and Direction 
In the early 1970s, Virginia's environmental direction seemed quite 
clear; strong laws were needed to end the deterioration which was 
taking place with respect to the Commonwealth's natural resources, and 
aggressive enforcement of these laws was needed to improve the quality 
of its air and waters. Many people in Virginia, and across the nation, 
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were convinced that we should pay any price to win the war against 
environmental pollution. Today I think it is appropriate that we evaluate 
carefully the results of these efforts. And those efforts have paid off. 
During the first half of the 1970s, Virginia's environmental agencies 
conducted a forceful regulatory program which has had considerable 
success in improving the quality of the State's air and water. 
But there is a growing awareness that regulations are no longer the 
only answer. Since clean air and water laws were written, new con-
straints have been added—energy shortages, transportation problems, 
economic recessions, rising demands for food, fiber, and other resources. 
The "energy crisis" made clear that high energy consumption will be-
come increasingly costly—and it brought home the interdependency of 
economic, environmental, and energy goals for Virginia. Because of 
this, a shift in emphasis toward a "quality of life" approach that focuses 
on balancing the costs and benefits of environmental regulation is de-
veloping and surfacing across this nation. 
It has become clear, too, that Virginia can no longer afford to deal 
with issues such as air and water pollution as if they exist in a vacuum. 
Environmental as well as economic and social concerns operate as a 
system within which different elements compete, conflict, and cooperate. 
The impacts of air and water pollution are highly interrelated with land 
use, for example, and efforts to control one must inevitably affect the 
others. The Commonwealth's regulatory system in which a number of 
agencies are operating separate programs, each concerned with only 
one aspect of the environment, must be adequately co-ordinated in 
order that Virginia can plan for wise use of its resources for the enjoy-
ment of all its citizens for years to come. Virginia must begin to deal 
with questions like "Where do we want to be 20 years from now, or for 
that matter only five years from now?", and "How are we going to get 
there?" and "What is it going to cost?" And in terms of costs this is 
total resources: time, money, people, etc. We can no longer simply react 
to problems and clean-up messes. What is needed now is farsighted 
planning, encompassing the broad picture and bringing together the 
pieces of the State's environmental effort into one comprehensive plan 
for development over the next two decades or so. 
Environmental Policy 
Now, moving on to what I hope will be "An Overview of Our State 
Environmental Laws and Regulations". Time will not permit a discus-
sion of all the areas that are actually in my opinion, deserving of recog-
nition. I will provide an overview of the more significant areas, starting 
with our environmental policy acts. 
The 1970s are being called the "environmental decade" for the 
multitude of environmental laws that have been enacted. 
On June 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act was signed 
into law giving our nation the first broad statement of environmental 
policy. The Act also gave us the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
—which has been the subject of many negative comments, many of 
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which have been deserved, but it is not always the law at fault when 
things go wrong. New federal regulations have been written that should 
improve interpretations of how environmental impact statements should 
be prepared and presented. We in Virginia today intend to try at least 
to use the EIS process as it is meant to he used. 
We also have the Virginia Environmental Quality Act and the Vir-
ginia Environmental Impact Reports Act. The Council on the Environ-
ment is making itself more and more effective in State government as it 
implements these laws. 
Land Use Management 
In moving from the overall policy area to more specific aspects of 
environmental management it might be appropriate to concentrate first 
on Virginia's land use management program and its various aspects. 
Virginia's agricultural and forest lands are among the State's most 
valuable resources. The benefits of such land for watershed protection, 
scenic beauty and recreation are also increasingly recognized. Never-
theless prime lands are continuing to be shifted to non-agricultural uses. 
The State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the 
Department of Conservation and Economic Development both have 
programs to preserve and enhance such lands. The Virginia Agricultural 
and Forestal District Law of 1977 enables local governing bodies to 
base tax assessments on agricultural use values in special districts set up 
at the request of land owners. Incentive will thereby be given landowners 
to preserve such lands. 
Under the topic of land use management I think it is appropriate to 
include the State's program of strip-mining control and reclamation. 
The General Assembly first acted to require reclamation of surface 
mined land in 1966 and the regulatory program has become increasingly 
intense since then. The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act was passed in 1977 and one of the priorities of my office has been 
to work with the Department of the Interior to develop reasonable regu-
lations to implement that Act. The Division of Mined Land Reclamation 
of the Department of Conservation and Economic Development is cur-
rently enforcing interim procedures adopted by the Department of the 
Interior and if Virginia so chooses, will implement a permanent pro-
gram to be adopted by the State in 1979. You're probably aware that 
this General Assembly is dealing with legislation which will indeed 
enable the Commonwealth to conform with the federal provisions and 
thereby be certified to administer this act. 
The Virginia Commission of Outdoor Recreation also is very much 
involved in land resources management and development. The Virginia 
Outdoors Plan, accelerated by bond sales, State and Federal funds, will 
add to and improve recreational facilities throughout the State. The 
Virginia Scenic River Act has attracted a lot of attention because of its 
stipulation that dams cannot be built on scenic rivers without the ap-
proval of the General Assembly. Basically what this act and the Scenic 
Highway and Virginia Byways Act do are to provide for greater recogni- 
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tion of these special resources and lessen the danger of their deteriora-
tion. 
Our historic and archeological places also are being identified and 
recognized under the program of the Virginia Historic Landmarks Com-
mission. The Commission participates in an advisory capacity pursuant 
to the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 in identifying sites 
eligible for inclusion on the Federal Register of Historic Places. There 
is also a State register. The General Assembly in 1976 created the Vir-
ginia Research Center for Archeology and passed the Virginia Antiqui-
ties Act in 1977, requiring permits for work on State owned or State 
designated archeological sites. 
Coastal Resource Management 
Somewhere between land use management and water resource man-
agement, fits coastal resource management, a major environmental con-
cern for the General Assembly this year. The Federal government 
enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972 to recognize and 
protect the particularly sensitive and unique coastal resources of the 
nation. The prospect of offshore oil being rapidly developed and in turn 
bringing development on shore played an important part in the passage 
of the Act. 
The Virginia Wetlands Protection Act, passed in 1972, has resulted 
in a sharply reduced number of wetlands being lost each year to destruc-
tion or misuse. Under this Act, local wetlands boards or the Virginia 
Marine Resources Commission (in localities which have not set up 
boards) review and permit projects in vegetated wetlands, which are 
very ecologically productive and important beyond their boundaries. 
With technical assistance from the Commission and from the Virginia 
Institute of Marine Sciences, most projects can be completed with mini-
mal damage to wetlands. 
Water Resource Management 
One of Virginia's greatest natural advantages is her seeming abun-
dance of water resources. Nevertheless, water is not always abundant 
where it is needed and of the quality required. Northern and south-
eastern Virginia in particular are concerned over the adequacy of their 
water supplies. The prevailing law in Virginia pertaining to the alloca-
tion of water from surface sources is the common law riparian doctrine, 
geared to individual property rights. The adequacy of the riparian 
system has come under question as societal rights sometimes appear to 
conflict with individual rights. A basic attribute of common law, of 
course, is that only the courts can decide controversies that do arise. 
While this issue is very complex and worthy of consideration by a 
group such as this, suffice to advise that a Joint Legislative Water Study 
Commission was created in 1978 to study the matter. And I understand 
that recommendations will be forthcoming later this year. 
The Executive Branch is working to identify problems and solutions 
without creating new problems. And indeed that is a challenge. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 11 
There is also the area of groundwater resources, which are much 
more difficult to manage. The Virginia Groundwater Act of 1973 gives 
the State Water Control Board the authority to determine when ground-
water aquifers are being threatened with overuse, to declare such areas 
to be critical groundwater areas, and to regulate new uses in such areas. 
The effectiveness of the law has been questioned because of loopholes 
for certain uses that may result in overuse themselves. 
In 1946, the General Assembly passed a comprehensive, forward-
looking water pollution control statute, The State Water Control Law, 
which charged the newly created State Water Control Board (SWCB) 
with the responsibility to improve and protect the quality of Virginia's 
waters. The law provided, among other things, that no person should 
discharge sewage or industrial wastes into Virginia waters without a 
certificate issued by the SWCB. This permit program has been modified 
and improved during the intervening years, most significantly by the 
passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, which for the first time imposed a federal requirement that all 
point source dischargers of wastewaters obtain a permit under the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). In 1975, the 
SWCB received authorization to administer the NPDES program in 
Virginia, an action which made it possible for Virginia localities and 
industries to apply for one State-issued permit, rather than having to 
apply for both Federal and State permits. 
Much of the improvement in water quality in recent years can be 
attributed to the construction of new and more advanced treatment 
facilities. The SWCB is responsible for administering the Federal grants 
program for construction of municipal sewerage facilities in Virginia. 
Another part of the Federal Clean Water Act deals with pollution 
from non-point sources, such as farms, roads and other construction 
projects. Under the guidance of the State Water Board, regional plans 
have been adopted to control such pollution through a program of best 
management practices. These are now moving toward a voluntary ap-
proach rather than regulatory at this time. 
The most well known of the SWCB's programs is probably oil spill, 
fish kill and pollution complaint investigations. The SWCB maintains a 
team of investigators on call around the clock in each of its six regional 
offices. 
The State Water Control Law gives the Board the authority to react 
to such complaints, provide for clean-up, and charge the responsible 
party or parties for damages as appropriate. 
Air Quality 
In 1966 Virginia passed the State Air Pollution Control Law, which 
has since been amended on several occasions. Originally the law re-
quired an assessment of air quality problems in the State. Today we 
sometimes feel that the biggest concern is not over the problem of air 
pollution but over the Federal program to control it. The 1970 Clean 
Air Act was directed primarily at the enforcement function which was 
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undertaken in Virginia by the State Air Pollution Control Board. The 
1977 Amendments are much broader and set forth more specific re-
quirements—including how and when certain steps are to be taken. The 
Virginia Air Pollution Control Board has submitted to EPA a State 
Implementation Plan showing what we will do to comply by 1987 with 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 
The main problem that Virginia will face will be with the control of 
volatile organic compound emissions, i.e. hydrocarbons. The State Im-
plementation Plan includes stationary source control measures for 
hydrocarbons for eleven categories of major industrial polluters. In 
addition, the Plan includes transportation control planning measures and 
strategies for the four major urban areas in the Commonwealth—
Northern Virginia, Richmond, the Peninsula and Southeast Virginia. 
One measure that is required to cut down mobile source emissions is an 
Inspection Maintenance requirement for automobiles. The Pollution 
Response Program (PREP) Teams can be dispatched day or night to 
respond to pollution complaints. A rapid rise in pollution complaints is 
due, at least in part, to increased awareness on the part of Virginians 
of the program and the service that is available. 
Toxic Substances 
Now that I have provided a broad overview of environmental laws, 
that we have in Virginia, I think it is appropriate to concentrate on toxic 
substances. To bring the problem into a better focus, over 300 miles of 
Virginia's rivers have been closed to the taking of fish for eating. I'm 
sure all of you are familiar with the Kepone incident. As a result of 
this incident the only fish now being commercially taken from the James 
River include shad, herring, and catfish. 
In addition, after the State Water Control Board conducted a 
sampling of fish and sediment in 1977, the State Department of Health 
closed 130 miles of the stream on the South River, South Fork of the 
Shenandoah River, and the Shenandoah River-27 years after the use 
of mercury was discontinued. 
The North Fork of the Holston River is also mercury contaminated 
and has been closed to taking of fish for eating. It is likely to remain 
contaminated for quite some time. 
Both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Federal government 
have adopted a web of regulatory programs governing toxic substances. 
Some programs are coordinated, some are not. 
In 1976, the Virginia General Assembly, partially as a response to 
Kepone spills in the James River, adopted the Virginia Toxic Sub-
stances Information Act. The Act requires reporting on the manu-
facturer, sales, use, or disposal of toxic substances in Virginia and 
provides for the dissemination of information collected from the reports 
that are filed pursuant to this Act. Severe problems developed in the 
initial implementation of the statute as some of you probably know. In 
1977, the General Assembly adopted major revisions to the Act to 
simplify compliance by those regulated and ease administrative burdens 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 13 
for the Statc Health Department. In September of 1977, the State Board 
of Health adopted its initial reporting regulations. These became effec-
tive on October 9, 1977. Basically—the Act enables the Department of 
Health to identify and "red flag" operations involving toxic substances. 
It then becomes the responsibility of other agencies or bureaus to guard 
against incidents. 
Chapter 4 of Title 62.1 of the Code of Virginia, Waters of the State-
Public Water Supply, places all public water supplies in the Common-
wealth under the general supervision and control of the State Board of 
Health. Additionally, the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act authorizes 
EPA to regulate all public water supplies in the United States. EPA has 
delegated its authority to regulate public water supplies in Virginia to 
the State Health Department. 
In May of 1977, the State Health Department adopted its water 
works regulations. These regulations create maximum contaminant levels 
for health-endangering biological and chemical contaminants potentially 
present in drinking water. The State Health Department also carries out 
a detailed engineering review of public water supplies and its regulations 
govern virtually every detail of the operations of the public water supply. 
I've already discussed Virginia water pollution control efforts. The 
State Water Control Board regulates all discharges into State waters, 
including industrial and municipal waters. The State Water Control 
Board and the State Department of Health exercise joint regulatory 
authority over sewage treatment plants. These efforts represent the 
major preventative measures taken in the area of toxic substances. 
The Bureau of Shellfish Sanitation of the Department of Health car-
ries out an extensive water quality sampling analysis program. The 
Bureau looks for radiological content, pesticides, heavy metals and 
other contents that would threaten human health. 
I've already mentioned the State Air Pollution Control Board pro-
gram. The Air Board's regulations specifically provide for the control 
of toxic air pollutants—primarily those identified by the EPA. When 
the Air Board suspects a danger of hazardous emissions, measures are 
taken to protect the public. 
Virginia laws regarding solid waste disposal grant the State Health 
Department power to adopt rules and regulations governing this action. 
The law specifically authorizes the Board to regulate "methods of dis-
position of toxic substances by any person, group of persons, corpora-
tion, partnership, association or the State or any political subdivision 
thereof." The Board has not, at this time, adopted regulations imple-
menting this provision. It does have these under consideration. It does 
have a regulation authorizing it to restrict disposal of hazardous wastes 
on a case by case basis. 
A new Federal law, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
requires EPA to promulgate a number of criteria for hazardous waste 
management programs required of the State. It is Virginia's intention 
to develop, administer, and enforce such a program within the Depart-
ment of Health. A draft management plan is currently being prepared 
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and will probably be the subject of a public hearing prior to submission 
for formal action by the State Board of Health and the General As-
sembly. The program will address the generation, transportation, treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. 
The Virginia Pesticide Law established a general regulatory scheme 
for pesticides. This program is implemented by the State Board of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services. These statutes govern misbranding, 
sample collection, and analysis, registration requirements, and labelling 
requirements for pesticides. The statutes establish procedures for the 
certification of pesticide applicators, both commercial and private. A 
pesticide advisory committee is created, and provisions for cooperation 
with the United States Government pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act are also set out. 
One aspect of the toxic substances issue that should be carefully 
considered, is that when damages are inflicted, the common law is the 
only means afforded to individuals and society to seek compensation, 
except in the case of oil or fish-kills. In most instances it is left to the 
courts to decide. Perhaps we shall hear later whether the courts can 
adequately address such questions. 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Virginia, as provided for in the Federal OSHA Act (P.L. 91-596), 
operates a State Occupational Safety and Health program that parallels 
the Federal OSHA program. Occupational Safety and Health regula-
tions are promulgated by the State Safety and Health Codes Commis-
sion pursuant to Section 40.1-22 of the Virginia Code. The regulations 
adopted by the Commission thus far are virtually identical to the 
Federal OSHA regulations. Enforcement of these regulations is gov-
erned by Section 40.1-49.2 of the Code. 
The Safety and Health parts of OSHA are divided in Virginia. The 
Virginia Department of Labor and Industry monitors compliance with 
safety regulations; the State Department of Health monitors compliance 
with occupational health regulations. Monitoring for the presence of 
toxic materials in the workroom environment is the responsibility of 
the State Department of Health. 
Unlike Federal OSHA regulations, the Virginia OSHA regulations 
are applicable also to state agencies. However, violations by state agen-
cies result normally in administrative orders for corrections instead of 
court orders. 
I have covered in the Overview a good many of our environmental 
laws and regulatory activities. There are still others of which some of 
you no doubt are aware. I would conclude, though, in suggesting as 
you proceed with your deliberations and discussions "Is it indeed wise 
for the welfare of the people to have all the laws and enforcement 
which we who are here believe are needed?" I think that needs some 
deep thought. 
Thank you. 
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Professor Brion: Thank you, Secretary Rowe. Are there any ques-
tions? 
Q: I'm Ed Grimsley from Richmond. I'd like to ask Mr. Rowe to 
possibly comment on what can be done, or what should be done, to 
accelerate the process of approving environmental projects such as the 
Portsmouth oil refinery? It now takes years for a project to get ap-
proval. They spend millions and millions of dollars and may never go 
into operation. It seems to me that this is criminal. I just wonder what 
the government can do to accelerate the process. Every time you turn 
around you are going back to the State Water Control Board, or you're 
going to Washington, or back to Richmond, or back to Washington. 
This goes on for month after month after month and we still don't 
have a refinery. We may never have one. They've spent several million 
dollars down there trying to comply with state regulations. 
Secretary Rowe: That is a good question and one that is of major 
interest. I think, not only for those who are keenly interested in the 
quality of their environment, but also for those who are interested in 
economic development and growth. There is a need for the develop-
ment of a set of criteria that would permit us to do a much better job 
of balancing off an industry of that type with the environmental in-
terests as well as the economic interests. 
I think one thing that has been done in the State has been to bring 
about a means of reviewing permits together in a forum with our state 
officials as well as federal representatives of the major agencies such 
as Corp of Engineers, Fish and Wildlife, EPA, and maybe one or two 
others. This has provided a forum for this type of permit application 
to receive an overview by all agencies in one sitting. And this is a 
major achievement. Because it takes a lot of effort to bring that about, 
to enter into discussions where compromising positions must be agreed 
upon. It's a challenge to get the right people involved, particularly with 
the federal agencies, and to get the right type of system in our state 
agencies where boards and commissions have the final policy decision 
to make and where staff people are participating in developing recom-
mendations. I can say to you that we are working at that very diligently. 
I think there is a genuine interest at the federal level. Some of you 
may have reference to a major facility siting process that is being looked 
at on the federal level as this type of siting pertains to major facilities, 
especially energy resource facilities. There would be others—nuclear 
power generating facilities or any type of major facility where there 
would be some process for a private entrepreneur to proceed to get 
answers promptly. 
I can recall back in 1973 when the Hampton Roads Energy question 
first was brought to the state level. Some of us said at that time, "You 
know it would be great to bring everyone together and bring in the 
private interests and sit around the table and discuss the issues and see 
if we can really program this to get a decision, certainly within a couple 
of months or so". And I recall we had a huge meeting room and I think 
there were some forty different state and federal representatives at that 
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meeting. And there was a presentation by the Hampton Roads Energy 
representatives. We are all "gung ho" to move forward. I must hasten 
to say to you that part of the problem was not with the governmental 
bureaucracy, rather it was with the private interests ability to develop 
the facts that were needed for a decision to be made. And often this 
occurs, that delay develops not necessarily because of the bureaucracy, 
but because of lack of proper data through the environmental impact 
statement process. It comes down to what type of commitment the 
private interests have in developing short term research work to develop 
the kind of data that is required for a decision making process. 
Suffice it to say we're not satisfied. We're working to improve this 
process. I am pleased to see some of the directions that are developing 
at the federal level. Whether the Congress of the United States will 
recognize this and give it the kind of emphasis, approval and commit-
ment we must have, regardless of what we do in Virginia, is the ques-
tion. We can further modify, improve, and develop a more consolidated, 
coordinated approach to review of these types of permits. But we must 
also be aware of those required at the federal level which have, indeed, 
been a delaying element in the case of the Hampton Roads Energy 
Corporation. 
Q: Professor Scott C. Whitney, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. I 
wonder if Secretary Rowe could briefly summarize quite specifically 
what is new and different in Virginia today since the Kepone incident 
that would prevent the recurrence of that kind of incident. And, how 
effective do you think those new and different measures arc, if they 
exist? 
Secretary Rowe: I believe that several references were made to legisla-
tive action since the Kepone incident specifically the Toxic Substances 
Act which I think is an important piece of legislation that is indeed 
being administered. There were some problems encountered initially, 
but I feel confident that today the Department of Health is doing and 
performing a very commendable job in that area. 
The Hazardous Substances Act, also, and the Hazardous Waste Pro-
gram is another program that has come into being since that incident. 
I think, though, that I should emphasize that as a result of the Kepone 
incident, there has been created a great deal of sensitivity among our 
environmental regulatory agencies to be more alert to the potential of 
such incidents occuring in the future. The OSHA program has under-
gone considerable revision as it has taken on greater significance both 
in the Department of Labor and Industry and especially in the Depart-
ment of Health as a result of that incident. There are a lot of things of 
that type that have indeed occurred, but overall I think the sensitivity 
and alertness of the agencies, in my judgment, is doing more to guard 
against this type of danger in the future. 
Professor Brion: Thank you, Secretary Rowe. We will now hear from 
the commentators. The first commentator will be William R. Moore, 
Past President of the Virginia Association of Counties. 
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Mr. Moore: Thank you, Denis. Ladies and gentlemen, when Senator 
Spong invited me to attend this Conference and join with you in dis-
cussing the issues at hand, frankly, I scratched my head and I wondered, 
"What is a geologist, country merchant, local government person doing 
with all these lawyers and professional environmentalists? What could I 
possibly do to stir your mind or allay your sting or what have you?" I'm 
awfully sorry that Mr. Fidler and Mrs. Rattley are not here, because I 
know that they would have many good comments to make about Secre-
tary Rowe's paper. And I'm not in a position to comment on his paper 
directly, except in one instance. 
But perhaps the greatest thing that can make my presence at all use-
ful to you today is as a fairly longterm member of a local governing 
body in Virginia who, like members of City Councils and Town Councils 
and Boards of Supervisors throughout the state, is in the real front lines 
of the type of thing that Dr. Graves is talking about when he mentioned 
his "Shall we build the stadium or not" issue. The day-to-day things 
that people, not lawyers and not professional people, but just people in 
general are talking about and considering. I think the way that Proposi-
tion 13 burst upon the people of America and some of the half-baked 
reactions to it (and I'm not referring to the one in Virginia, but across 
the nation) has given us all pause for thought. And this pause has got 
to have a moment when we consider how to respond to what the people 
want, because, frankly, by the time they make their wishes known 
(especially on the state and federal level) with the type of force that 
it takes to get our attention, namely a club, we've already gone, I'm not 
going to say past the point of no return, but we've certainly gone a long 
way down the slicky and slidy plane to get it there. 
I think Virginia in its law in many respects, as I can see it, has 
infuriated in many instances environmentalists and consumers and 
manufacturers and farmers and merchants pretty much equally and all 
to some great degree. And to me, I guess, as a local government 
practitioner, that tells me a little something. And that one little some-
thing is if you can keep them from killing, sometimes if you find out 
that what you're doing is making everybody involved a little bit mad, 
then maybe you're working down some alley that offers solutions. 
But anyway, I'd like to make my response to one point of Secretary 
Rowe's presentation. He indicated that perhaps the time has come 
when the doctrine of riparian rights, in which you know, of course, the 
land owner in the watershed has certain rights that are denied to people 
beyond his watershed, may have served its usefulness and perhaps a 
change is necessary. I might agree. But, I do want to caution that at 
least the doctrine of riparian rights keeps water in the watershed. You're 
not going to make an irrevocable mistake by leaving it there. It's there 
so that the next generation can come along and say "This bunch, they 
were dumb, but we know how to do it." You know how much smarter 
each generation gets. If you have kids you know what this is about. 
Having spent a considerable length of my geological lifetime in 
Wyoming, I know, as you all do, that western water does not operate 
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under riparian rights. It operates under various doctrines (you lawyers 
know them all): prior usage, agreements, statutory involvements and 
what have you. But frankly, I think in many ways their experience and 
where they are headed as a result of what they have done and have not 
done, is much worse than ours. And, of course, they have less water per 
capita, and per square mile too. I remember how infuriated the citizens 
of Wyoming were to see ninety-five percent of the water of the North 
Platte going to Nebraska. And so I would offer caution, but not blind 
obstacle, to what ever is done to the doctrine of riparian rights. 
Local government, individuals in local government, and let's speak of 
individuals because that's all we are. People trying to do a job at this 
front line. And if you don't believe it is the front line of elected govern-
ment in the country, just look at the turnover rate of incumbents in 
local government, the state level and the federal level and you'll all know 
to whom the people turn first to vent their wrath when they are dissatis-
fied with the way things are going. They'll eventually get around, but 
the local people catch it first. And basically what I'm hearing, to put it 
in a nutshell, from the local farmers, merchants, workers, managers, and 
on up and down the line, if I could put it all in one big apple and mix 
it up so that each slice looked the same, which you can't do, but try to 
do that, then I would say to you as you look at all laws and think in 
your own minds what suggestions and what efforts can be done to im-
prove the situation, I don't believe and I know the people of Virginia 
don't want and will do virtually anything within reason to avoid a 
Kepone or Kepone-like situation again, or mercury or what have you. 
But also I'd like to leave you with the thought that I don't believe they 
want a snail darter situation either. 
Thank you. 
Professor Brion: Thank you. Our next commentator will be Mrs. 
Louise Burke, Executive Director of the Conservation Council of Vir-
ginia. 
Mrs. Burke: Thank you, Professor Brion. What I missed most in 
Secretary Rowe's address was a clear and firm commitment on the part 
of State government to prevent the toxic contamination of Virginia's 
environment from reaching levels dangerous to living systems, including 
human safety. I hope this was implicit in his remarks as it really is the 
basis for all state action, including the coordination of State action. 
Article XI of the Virginia Constitution expresses the environmental 
quality goals of the Commonwealth very simply: clean air and pure 
water. Unfortunately, it is too late already to reach these goals. Per-
sistent toxics have pervaded Virginia's environment, irretrievably. We 
blew it. The best we can do now is fall back on objectives geared to 
safe levels of contamination. This at least we must do. 
At the present time for the most part State decision makers rely on 
minimum EPA standards for safe concentrations of the various toxic 
substances in air and water when making specific decisions. As far as I 
know, however, no overall objectives for toxic substance controls have 
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been adopted, probably owing to our fragmented approach to toxic 
substance control. 
I would suggest that we consider two objectives: (1) to prevent the 
risk of accidental spills, including oil spills, in vulnerable areas, (2) to 
prevent the gradual escape of toxic substances, especially persistent 
toxics, into the environment to the greatest possible extent. Two simple 
objectives encompassing all the programs and complex law and pro-
grams in Virginia. 
Citizens who understand the dangers in toxic substances escaping 
into the environment have two overriding concerns. They are not so 
much concerned about how the State goes about it: they want toxics 
kept out of the environment and they want state government to accept 
the responsibility for accomplishing this. Not just as a response to 
federal prodding, but through the driving force of commitment to a 
safe environment. 
These objectives recognize that there will be some escape of toxic 
substances into the environment as a result of unavoidable accidents, 
human error, and illegal action, but they would not permit conscious 
decisions to invite risks or allow toxic discharge or seepage that can be 
prevented by reasonable measures. 
Unless we reach these objectives, the most likely calamity we can 
expect in the coming decade is a series of oil spills, some of them 
catastrophic, in the Chesapeake Bay, and if the Portsmouth Refinery is 
built, in the Elizabeth River; and the most likely calamity facing Vir-
ginia in the Iong run is the gradual buildup of persistent toxics in the 
environment until concentrations are reached that make chronic ex-
posure increasingly hazardous. 
Trusteeship in toxic substance control call for State government to 
unequivocably accept the responsibility for meeting these objectives 
through what E. M. Forester once called "good laws, rightly applied." 
There is, however, one prerequisite to the enactment of good laws 
and their right application. That is a clear policy guide for legislative 
and administrative decision makers, including in Virginia environmental 
boards and commissions. There is a ranee of discretion between mini-
mum and maximum and it is in this range that the results will be deter-
mined. 
It is the policy of the Commonwealth, as expressed in Article XI of 
the Constitution, to protect its atmosphere, lands and waters from 
pollution. Unfortunately to my knowledge we have neither in the Con-
stitution nor in law any overall criterion for applying this policy to 
decisions relating to toxic substance controls, except where minimum 
federal standards apply. 
To what degree should State government protect the environment 
from toxic pollution? When choices have to be made between effective 
controls and conflicting objectives, which has priority? What exactly 
is meant by the term "balance" used with respect to the State's position 
regarding environmental decisions? When we weigh matter we use 
measures. When we weigh decisions we need criteria. There are no 
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criteria. There are no clear answers in law for this range of discretion. 
Almost any decision can be justified in terms of balance, whether it 
protects the environment or temporarily abdicates trusteeship. This is 
a major weakness in the State's posture toward control of toxic sub-
stances from point and non-point sources in Virginia. 
By way of contrast, consider the policy statement of the California 
Environmental Quality Act, that the long term benefit of the environ-
ment shall be the guiding criterion in all public decisions affecting the 
environment. Because the long term integrity of the environment de-
pends upon the minimization of toxicity, this criterion applies to toxic 
control systems specifically as well. Rather than balance, California has 
an approach which calls for economic development to be compatible 
with a liveable environment in the future. If you have reservations about 
this policy, consider the alternative. (That the long term benefit of the 
environment shall not be the guiding criteria in all public decisions af-
fecting the environment!) I would be interested if anyone wants to pick 
up on this in discussion of the applicability of this policy to the Virginia 
situation. 
There is a school of thought that contends that economic development 
cannot take place under conditions that favor environmental protection. 
disagree. There are those who contend that the quality of life is some-
how more important than the quality of the environment. I submit that 
the quality of the environment is basic to the quality of life, if not life 
itself. If it were not, we would not be talking about trusteeship, and 
there would still be no Conservation Article in the Constitution. You 
can't have it both ways. 
It seems to me that hardship in compliance with toxic substance 
controls could be dealt with in law by improving technical and financial 
assistance programs, including economic incentives, and that a better 
climate for compliance could be created with more encouragement and 
recognition for achievement in this direction. The ability of the private 
sector to respond to the challenge should not be underestimated. 
I also missed any reference in Secretary Rowe's address to the role of 
the citizen in toxic substance control planning and decision making (or 
perhaps this isn't fair because I don't think it was asked of him). I don't 
mean citizen boards, because their membership is highly selective and 
seldom representative of the environmentally concerned community. 
What I mean is citizens at the grass roots level, who might be called the 
ultimate consumers of environmental conditions. 
Federal environmental laws require public participation in their im-
plementation, and several State agencies have programs for this pur-
pose. However, these are not meeting their intent. Very few citizens in 
Virginia are being kept informed of toxic substance problems, programs, 
issues, and opportunities for public participation. Citizen involvement is 
very limited, and when it occurs is seldom factored into decisions. 
Public participation is not just valuable to the citizens, but also to 
the agencies that invite such participation. Informed citizens provide 
information and viewpoints that are often of value. And perhaps most 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 21 
valuable of all, they provide public support for government programs 
they find to be important and on the right track. They want to be in-
formed and involved, they care about the outcome, and they want their 
concerns to matter. 
Improving public participation programs should be an important 
element in any effort to improve toxic substance control programs. 
With that, and with greetings from the citizens I represent, I thank 
you for this opportunity to be involved on this occasion on their behalf. 
I hope these comments, their views, will matter as conclusions are 
reached in this workshop. 
Professor Brion: Thank you. Are there any questions? 
Q: (unidentified citizen) Mrs. Burke, is there a release that citizens 
can get, particularly about Virginia, which keeps them informed? You 
said we needed to be informed. 
Mrs. Burke: There are a number of agency publications, each of 
which deals with the program of that particular agency. I think if 
you're interested only in water control—call the Water Control Board; 
if only air, you can call the Air Pollution Control Board. Some areas 
of toxic substances control fit under the Health Department, so you do 
have to run around to several agencies to get information. There is no 
all-over publication that keeps citizens informed on environmental is-
sues in Virginia, including those relating to toxic substances. 
Q: Warren Braun, Virginia Water Control Board. I'd like to make 
some comments. One particularly addressed to Mrs. Burke. 
Mrs. Burke, I would submit that the composition of the citizens 
boards in Virginia are perhaps quite representative of the cross-section 
of the public, albeit it's composition may not meet the test of the par-
ticular emphasis you would like to see, representing solely "the en-
vironmental concern". I recall one recent major issue which the Water 
Board members wrestled with, resulting in a vote split right down the 
middle of a very important environmental issue—that being the refinery 
in Portsmouth. That is certainly indicative of a balanced environmental 
concern. 
My experience on environmental boards, which goes now some thir-
teen years in both air and water, has shown that, by and large, the 
governors of Virginia have appointed individuals who have a very broad 
environmental perspective, and, I honestly believe, a very balanced one 
within what is achievable. 
I think that there is a great danger, and you did touch on it, that we 
need to have laws that are achievable. When the laws are not achievable, 
we must still enforce them until they are repealed or changed. And in 
that respect, I think that Virginia's system of quasi-judicial boards is an 
excellent one for dealing with such complex topics. And I applaud it, 
not because I serve on them, but because I believe it is an excellent 
concept as opposed to a bureaucratic substitute. 
Now, with regard to comments that were made just a moment ago 
about where Virginia's laws are with regard to preventing an episode 
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like the kepone incident, I would like to reflect on another incident that 
happened in another state to show how, in some respects, major en-
vironmental disasters may never really be brought to heel. It may be 
quite difficult to find the culprit after the fact. Witness the Morris Fore-
man waste treatment plant in the city of Louisville in which a company 
came in one night and surreptitiously dumped some very heinous 
chemicals into the sanitary sewer system. They did it by removing a 
manhole cover and dumping it into the system which caused the plant 
to become inoperative, poisoning the Ohio River and caused the sewage 
plant to receive substantial damage which will probably take several 
tens of millions of dollars to repair. 
A body that I sit on now (ORSANCO) is trying to determine where 
the fault lies, and why that plant is not fully operative today. But the 
principal causative factor was someone who deliberately came into that 
community, came in in a surreptitious fashion, obviously an illegal act, 
and is long since gone. The daisy chain of individuals who were involved 
in this event are some of the most socially irresponsible types of com-
panies who dispose of chemicals which otherwise are very difficult and 
expensive to dispose of in an environmentally sound manner. 
Now the question is, "How can we get a law that will deal with people 
like that?" —People who have no social conscience—I don't know. 
There I don't have an answer. Perhaps that is what this Conference 
ought to deal with. 
Professor Brion: Thank you, Warren. The previous commentator was 
Mr. Warren Braun of Harrisonburg, Virginia who is a member of the 
Virginia State Water Control Board. 
The Louisville problem he was referring to has been repeated, if you 
noticed in the press in the past years, for instance in New Jersey. If you 
happen to be embarrassed by having some highly toxic substances, and 
if the laws say that you incur strict liability if you dump them anywhere 
in the environment, there are plenty of fly-by-night operators who will 
contract (under the table, of course) to dispose of them for you. And 
they do exactly what was done in Louisville—in the dark of night find 
a convenient manhold cover. And I suppose it is an ironic result of our 
strict water pollution control laws. You saw the tremendously broad 
range of laws that are on the books already from Secretary Rowe's 
address. There is a lot of law. There are a lot of penalties. And it is 
becoming more and more difficult to dispose legally of highly toxic 
substances. 
Any other questions? Yes? 
Q: I'm Devra Davis from the Environmental Law Institute in Wash-
ington. We've heard Proposition 13 referred to a few times this after-
noon. It is my understanding Proposition 13 had on that ballot a re-
striction on property taxes which the votes did support. But along with 
that they voted for increased validation for environmental improvement. 
And I would just like to call your general attention to the fact that the 
public when called indicated an interest in maintaining environmental 
quality and public health. So we shouldn't misinterpret the fact that 
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people arc tired of property taxes as an indication that they are neces-
sarily going to vote for restrictions upon funds that are going to be used 
for environmental and public health. 
Professor Brion: Even more broadly than that, I think a lot of our 
opinion polls lately have shown a very strong demand among the elec-
torate for lower taxes and at the same time a sustained demand for 
increasing government services. 
Unfortunately both Senator Herbert Bateman and Delegate Gerald 
H. Baliles, who were scheduled to present their views on special laws 
protecting Virginia's rivers, waters and marine environment, are unable 
to be here today due to pressing commitments in the State legislature. 
However, in their place we have two distinguished and knowledgeable 
state officials who will discuss this subject. The first of these is Mr. 
William F. Gilley, Director of Solid and Hazardous Waste Control in the 
State Department of Health. 
Mr. Gilley: Thank you very much, Denis. It's a real pleasure to be 
here this afternoon, even as a pinch-hitter for our two legislators who 
found it necessary to remain in Richmond this afternoon for a number 
of Committees they could not miss. 
This afternoon I do want to devote these few minutes to only a part 
of the state laws that deal with protecting Virginia's rivers, waters, and 
marine environment. As Secretary Rowe has given a comprehensive 
overview of all state environmental laws I will concentrate on three—
Toxic Substances Information, Solid Wastes, and Water Pollution Con-
trol Laws, and briefly relate them to other laws. One of comments that 
I received from Senator Bateman on the material that he had prepared 
for this presentation was that he felt that there is, in the total review of 
all of the special laws on the books today, and considering some of 
those that are also being recommended for enactment in this session of 
the General Assembly, an adequate legal basis for the protection of our 
waters. 
There are future needs, however. There are future needs to revise 
regulations, to improve the regulations—most particularly in the area 
of the profession with which I deal every day. We need to develop regu-
lations dealing with the transport and the disposal of hazardous ma-
terials. It's an area in which we have limited regulations, but we need 
better ones to provide guidance to both industry and the public, and to 
insure, in fact, that we have an adequate disposal system for these 
materials. I want to relate the Solid and Hazardous Wastes Manage-
ment Program and the laws dealing with solid and hazardous waste 
management to the water pollution regulations as well as the Toxic 
Substances Information Act. I think that these three legislative acts pro-
vide the key, or the basis, of our prevention of the introduction of toxic 
substances into state waters. 
In one of the comments earlier there was a comment about the public 
participation. I would only remind you that we do have under Title IX 
of the Code, the Administrative Processes Act, a provision that does 
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specify that before regulations, plans, rules or policies can be adopted 
there is a public participation phase through which these regulations, 
rules, and other documents must go. We have recently done that, or 
part of it at any rate, in developing the Hazardous Wastes Management 
Plan that Secretary Rowe referenced in his presentation. We have been 
developing for the last several months a rather detailed, extensive man-
agement plan to integrate all of the various Bureau, Department and 
Agency responsibilities in the total field of solid and hazardous waste 
management. In the course of developing it we have gone through a 
number of seminars and workshops where we have involved the public 
as much as we could through special invitations and public notices. We 
have also had a public hearing on the Solid Waste Management Plan 
and given preliminary approval by the Board of Health. This is the kind 
of plan that sets forth the coordination required between my division, 
the Toxic Substances Information Program of the Department of Health, 
and the Water Control Board. There are key responsibilities that exist in 
both agencies with responsibility in the Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Program. So there is this public participation phase which does take 
place. It needs to be expanded even more to inform the public, to make 
them better aware of what their responsibilities are. 
I'm not going to go into any detail on the Air Pollution regulations 
other than to state that there is a relationship between the Toxic Sub-
stances Information Act, the Solid and Hazardous Wastes Management 
Act that is presently being considered before the General Assembly, 
and the regulations dealing with water pollution. 
The Toxic Substances Information Act as you have heard was, in 
fact, born not totally, but partly, in response to the Kepone episode of 
1976. Title XXXII does provide for the identification or the means for 
identification of toxic substances either in use, being processed, manu-
factured, distributed, or disposed of. This is an extremely important Act 
because it provides early identification. Without identification, it be-
comes difficult to be alerted soon enough to prevent future Kepone 
episodes. It is a base, if you will—a starting point. It is a place where 
we can get inventories of materials that are being used: substances, 
compounds, quantities, where they are being used, and who is using 
them. 
One of the requirements of this particular Act, however, was to pro-
vide that this information be protected. We must protect the trade 
secrets of industries that do disclose the information to the Toxic Sub-
stances Information Act element of the Health Department. This pro-
tection is provided by law and this has been paramount and necessary 
for industry to freely and completely disclose the information for us to 
have an adequate inventory of information. 
One of the provisions of the Act authorizes the Board of Health to 
adopt regulations to designate compounds as Class I toxic substances 
that pose the greatest threat to health or the environment. Now this is 
the red flag that was referred to earlier. These are substances that are 
known by substantial evidence, by all of the information at hand, by 
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toxicological reports, and other information, to pose the greatest threat. 
These designations are made following public hearings and long study 
and result in a Class I Toxic Report. This information becomes avail-
able then not only to me in the Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Management, but it becomes available to other state agencies as well. 
Applying our various rules and regulations, we undertake to control 
hazardous substances, that is, to identify what needs to be disposed of 
and the limitations on disposal of the substance. 
One of the problems we have in Virginia today is that we do not 
have adequate hazardous waste disposal facilities. When I became the 
Director for the program in Solid and Hazardous Wastes I found in 
examining Title XXXII, that the Board had been authorized to regulate 
the disposition of both solid wastes and toxic substances by an amend-
ment enacted in 1976. We have identified a number of disposal sites and 
have issued special permits on disposal sites for a very limited number 
of potentially toxic materials. One of the revisions that we are going 
through right now will be setting up regulations that will specify what 
constitutes an environmentally safe hazardous waste disposal operation 
or facility from a health standpoint. They are needed. In the absence of 
adequate disposal facilities right now, many companies are having to 
transport large quantities of toxic materials to South Carolina, Texas, 
New Jersey, Arkansas and many other places where they have a limited 
capacity to take care of these particular compounds. If it becomes too 
difficult to dispose of a compound, you can have and will have the kind 
of illegal dumping episode that occurred in Louisville. So, one of my 
problems is going to be to set up rules and regulations that are both 
enforceable, that can be followed, that provide the highest degree of 
protection for water (surface water, ground water) and the environ-
ment that can possibly be done. We must recognize that industry does 
develop a number of compounds that are hazardous whether it be from 
a physical, chemical, or a biological nature, or toxic in the true sense 
of the term in the science of toxicology. 
The present Title XXXII is being amended to expand our capacity 
for fully implementing a hazardous waste management program which 
would permit the Department of Health to seek the authority of the 
Environmental Protection Agency to administer the hazardous waste 
portion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that was 
passed by Congress in 1976. The Solid and Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Program as was envisioned by the Resource Conservation Re-
covery Act of Congress was intended to be the final capstone environ-
mental program, if you will: the program that will tie together the Water 
Pollution Program, the Air Pollution Program and many others that 
deal with protecting the environment. As an example, it identifies solid 
waste as being anything that you throw away that is not permittable by 
a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit 
whether it he a liquid, a gas, a solid, a semi-solid. It covers almost 
everything we throw away. What this program is intended to do is to 
provide coordination in the disposal of sludges, in the disposal of in- 
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dustrial chemicals, in the disposal of many other compounds with the 
State Water Control Board, the Air Pollution Control Board, and other 
state agencies that have responsibilities that bear upon the problem at 
hand. 
In addition to Title XXXII, there is the State Water Pollution Control 
Law which is Title 62.1 of the Code which establishes the policies rela-
tive to the non-degradation of the water quality of the State of Virginia. 
It provides for regulation of industrial discharges and the regulation of 
sewage discharges. It does create an enforcement procedure which has 
been well established and well followed in recent years to provide 
prevention of discharge of hazardous compounds. It also provides for 
the prevention of discharge of cil into State waters. There are permit 
requirements that are included within it. The Board of Health does 
share with the Water Control Board responsibilities for regulating 
sewage discharges. 
One of the areas of concern, however, is in the non-point source 
discharge control that the Water Control Board has responsibility for. 
This is an area where I do think we have a shared responsibility under 
the Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Act, as well as the Water 
Pollution Control Act, in that we do work together in establishing what 
best management practices are for the disposal of sludges. Sludges, 
whether they be from an air pollution control facility, an industrial 
process, or a sewage treatment plant, constitute in some cases a possible 
toxic or hazardous waste product. If we do not work together in devel-
oping management practices that will at the same time prevent non-point 
source discharges of compounds into the surface water, we will not be 
very effective in achieving the objectives of these three basic laws. 
Next on the program is Mr. Douglas who will continue the discus-
sion of Special Laws in other areas. 
Professor Brion: The second major speaker in this panel will be Mr. 
James Douglas, Director of the Marine Resources Commission. 
Mr. Douglas: Thank you, Denis. You know, a number of things 
happen, and a number of assumptions are made, when you announce 
a pinch-hitter. The first thing that happens is that the pinch-hitter never 
can get his uniform right and he's always allowed to fidget more. He 
also brings a lot of bats out. You can see that I brought all my bats 
with me. So to that extent I'm going to be like the usual pinch-hitter. 
The other assumption, which is a very dangerous assumption in this 
case, is that the pinch-hitter is generally conceded as having a better 
opportunity of getting a hit than the fellow who otherwise was going 
to be there. Otherwise, why would you put in a pinch-hitter? But I 
can assure you that this is a very dangerous assumption in this case, 
because Delegate Baliles and Senator Bateman are certainly two of the 
most erudite and knowledgeable individuals in our General Assembly 
in Virginia on these subjects. I am very sorry that you won't have the 
pleasure of listening to those two gentlemen. 
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It was yesterday when Carter Lowance called me. He said, "You're 
it. Will you send us a copy of your speech?" And I said, "Yes. I'll 
start writing it." 
But what I want to talk with you a moment about today really is one 
part of the portion of the program that Senator Bateman and Delegate 
Baliles would have delivered to you. My assignment is to cover Oil 
Spills, EPA Chesapeake Bay Program, Coastal Resources Management 
Program, Wetlands & Subaqueous Lands, and Fisheries. With the ex-
ception of oil spills, these topics are somewhat peripheral to toxic 
substances. That is to say that these programs and laws (and some of 
them are laws and some are programs, of which there is a distinction) 
are not designed to directly control or to manage toxic substances, but 
in some instance they may very well be doing just that. 
Oil spills are a different matter; because we do regard oil spills as 
toxic to the marine environment. I think that one of the things that 
brings oil spills into our minds more readily than anything else is that 
this kind of toxic degradation of the environment receives tremendous 
visibility. Most of the oil spills that we see come from shipwrecks, and 
man has been fascinated by shipwrecks for years and years—particu-
larly if it's a gigantic supertanker. Worldwide economics and politics 
are involved in oil. And, generally speaking, the quantity involved, and 
therefore environmental degradation, is usually massive. Now, with 
regard to oil spills, it seems to me Virginia has a dilemma. 
Virginia has a tremendous port facility in Hampton Roads, in fact 
the entire Virginia area has numerous smaller ports. Therefore, Virginia 
is not only susceptible to waterborne traffic of all kinds, but indeed seeks 
such traffic. And of ocurse, within the full scope of various waterborne 
traffic there is bound to be traffic of sonic hazardous and toxic sub-
stances. Oil, in particular, comes into focus recently with the proposal 
of the Hampton Roads Energy Company refinery in Portsmouth. 
And yet there seems to me to be another dilemma that Virginia must 
face. That is, if Maryland, for example, were to encourage and develop 
refineries (and there are some on the drawing boards up there), then 
the transport of oil might still be going through Virginia waters right 
up the center of the Chesapeake Bay. It's merely a matter of where 
Virginia is exposed to that risk. Indeed we do know one thing, that 
in the last several years oil transportation has increased—increased 17% 
from 1970 to 1974. If various proposed refineries are developed at 
the capacities that at least are on the drawing board, oil transport 
will soon be up more than 50% over 1975. I think we are faced with 
a potential problem in this particular area--no question about that. 
What are the State laws that deal with this? Well, most of this falls 
under the State Water Control Board and I'm going to have to profess 
some degree of ignorance of the specifics of some of those laws. But 
we have a law in Virginia's books that says it is illegal to discharge 
oil into the navigable waters of the Commonwealth. With it go the 
usual criminal penalties and also there can be assessed penalties for 
the cleanup if, indeed, you can catch the culprit. That, of course, 
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becomes a matter of some difficulty. Indeed, the State Water Control 
Board has a Hazardous Substance and Oil Spill Strike Team. In fact 
they have several of them. The Federal government, primarily the 
Coast Guard, similarly has teams that will participate in cleanups. It's 
been my experience, and I think this will be echoed by the State Water 
Control Board, that while cleanup teams do in fact help, you can't undo 
the damage that has occurred from a massive oil spill. 
So it seems to me we ought to turn our attention to reviewing State 
law on this particular matter and try to develop a group of laws that 
in fact are preventive in nature. For example, it's nice to say it's illegal 
to dump oil and it's illegal to have an accident with your barge or 
your vessel that spills oil. But how do we develop a set of laws that 
help prevent such incidents? Maybe we need to devise laws that dictate 
certain handling techniques when you're dealing with oil. Proper navi-
gation procedure, it seems to me, becomes a problem. It seems to me 
that for Virginia to get into the navigation aspect becomes a problem 
because this has generally been considered to be an aspect of Federal 
jurisdiction. (I'm no lawyer but perhaps some of the lawyers on the 
response team here will comment on this.) Similarly, the standards of 
maintenance and handling of the carriers, namely the barges or the 
vessels, have historically been a Federal prerogative. I don't know 
whether it is possible for the State to get involved in that. But I do 
know this, that in the Chesapeake Bay in the last several years where 
we have had several accidents, I believe the statistics will show that 
in every case it was a barge involved and not an oil tanker as we 
know it. Thus one of the first items might be better safety standards 
for barges. 
Perhaps there is another way in which Virginia could address this 
problem of oil spills. We must consider that there may be alternatives. 
It may be a little difficult for Virginia to address some alternatives 
alone, because I think most of them may be Federal prerogatives. Even 
though we want to control the way oil is presently being handled and 
transported, there are alternatives. And one alternative which has been 
most readily identified is pipelines. Most experiences show that pipe-
lines are less environmentally degrading and less susceptible to spills 
than are ships. 
I note that the top of your program here asks a question: "Are 
Federal and State Laws Adequate and Arc They Being Administered 
Adequately?" As I go through this I'm going to give you my own, and 
it really is my own, editorial opinion in that regard. In the instance of 
oil spills I am of the opinion that the State has done about all it can 
do in terms of placing a law on the books that makes it illegal, provides 
penalties, and provides for assessing cleanup costs. But perhaps the 
State can go farther and be more aggressive in trying to press for and 
deal with alternative methods of handling oil! Is it being administered 
properly? My good friend Bob Davis is up there at the State Water 
Control Board. I have great faith in him. I would certainly say it 
probably is. I would also point out that in this area I believe there is 
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a tremendous Federal responsibility, and while I'm talking about State 
laws, I won't hazard a guess as to whether the Federal government 
has accepted its responsibility. 
Now, I'll turn next to the EPA-Chesapeake Bay Program. This is 
a topic that is not law as far as the State is concerned. But it is a 
program that I think has developed a lot of interest among the citizens 
and can perhaps go a long way in dealing with this whole issue of 
toxic substances. Let me read to you just a moment what this program 
is designed to do,—and then deal with it in terms of how it applies 
to toxic substances. The EPA was directed to do basically three things: 
I. To asses the principal factors having an adverse impact on the en-
vironmental quality of the Chesapeake Bay; 
2. To analyze all environmental sampling data presently being col-
lected on the Chesapeake Bay; and 
3. To determine what units of government have management re-
sponsibility for the environmental quality of the Chesapeake Bay 
and define how the management responsibility can best be struc-
tured. 
The EPA has an authorized program of $25 million to be spent over 
five years, although I will caution you and point out that not all of 
those funds have been appropriated and there is some question as to 
whether the project will in fact continue for five years. The State Water 
Control Board was handed the lead role in Virginia, and they with 
other agencies sat down and defined ten problem areas. These problem 
areas were prioritized, and I believe I am giving these to you in their 
order of priority. Interestingly enough, the first one is toxic accumula-
tion in the food chain. Then comes euthrophication, submerged aquatic 
vegetation, dredging and spoil disposal, shellfish closures, fisheries 
modification, hydrologic modification, wetlands alterations, water quality 
effects of boating and shipping, and shoreline erosion. 
At the present time contracts for three scientific studies have been 
let dealing with toxins, euthrophication, and submerged aquatic vegeta-
tion. To date those studies have not been completed, but nevertheless 
the EPA Chesapeake Bay Program is another rather substantial effort 
on the part of the Federal government in partnership with the State 
government to address some of these very problems that we are talking 
about. And for those of you here, most of you being citizens and not 
bureaucrats, there is a tremendous amount of citizen participation in 
this particular EPA Chesapeake Bay program. There are citizens 
advisory committees that are working very hard on this, and who sat 
with the respresentatives of State agencies when this list of problems 
was developed. I think it is worthy of you to be aware of this par-
ticular program. It covers a broad spectrum of problems in the Bay, 
but the first one was toxic materials. 
Moving on, the Coastal Resources Management Program in Virginia 
is the next item. Again this is not a law. It's sort of half-way to being 
one I guess, inasmuch as the Coastal Resources Management Bill has 
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passed the Senate and is now being considered by the House of Dele-
gates in Virginia. This program was born out of response to the 
Federal Coastal Management Act of 1972 which Secretary Rowe 
mentioned to you in his address. For four years now the Common-
wealth of Virginia has been in what is known as a planning phase, 
whereby various aspects of the coastal zone, the very fragile coastal 
area, is being examined. Present laws and present policies that relate 
to that coastal zone arc being rethought and discussed. In effect there 
is an attempt on the part of the Commonwealth to bring all of this 
together into one plan and if it requires an additional piece of legisla-
tion, then to enact it. Legislation has been introduced into the General 
Assembly this session in order to try to develop a coherent, cohesive 
and coordinated approach to managing our very fragile coastal area in 
Virginia. We have a tremendous amount of it, and it is of tremendous 
value to us. More specifically, while we're studying a very broad spec-
trum of problems under the Coastal Bone Management Program, two 
particular studies might be of interest to you in again trying to focus 
on toxic substances. One is a Pipeline Corridor Study, completed by 
the Virginia Institute of Marine Science. You will recall when I men-
tioned oil spills that I observed that pipelines are an alternative. If 
you want to know, then here it is all in one report (report held up to 
view). It is a very well done study, and it does identify potential 
areas for pipeline corridors and also identifies many of the parameters 
that will affect a decision as to whether or not Virginia permits or 
dictates such facilities. The other study, which has not been completed, 
is one again being conducted by the Virginia Institute of Marine 
Science in concert with the Council on the Environment. It is a study 
on hazardous material transportation. Again within a broad program 
designed to deal with management of our coastal resources in our 
coastal zone, toxic substances rears its head. No question about that. 
Now, I know that many of you here undoubtedly have been fol-
lowing the debate that has been ensuing in the General Assembly con-
cerning Coastal Resources Management. It seems to me that what Vir-
ginia needs to recognize is that the coastal zone is indeed a fragile 
area, is susceptible to many, many degradations and many, many 
transgressions only one of which is toxic substances. We have talked 
here today about Kepone as being a primary example of one of the 
greatest environmental evils that we've seen in a long time. Chlorine, 
for example, does us so much good in our water supply for disinfec-
tion. We've found that if not handled properly it becomes a toxic 
substance in the marine environment. It kills our fish. These arc the 
things that we have to recognize, and that the competing uses of our 
marine environment must be reconciled in some way. We must permit 
those necessary uses but with the best techniques, with the best con-
trols possible in order to assure that we don't degrade our marine 
environment. 
In a nutshell, it boils down to someone making a decision as to what 
is the public and private good versus the public and private detriment. 
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And most of the laws that we have on the books today have some 
phascology dealing with just that kind of thing— to weigh the public 
detriment versus the public good. Of course at some point that becomes 
a little bit subjective. There was some comment earlier in the program 
today concerning citizen boards who are charged with responsibility 
of weighing the public benefit versus the public detriment. Coastal Zone 
Management, or Coastal Resources Management as we're calling it in 
Virginia, I think has a lot of potential. But we'll have to wait a 
moment—perhaps another few weeks—to find what may come out of 
the Virginia General Assembly in this year that would be identifiable 
as a Coastal Resources Management Program. 
The EPA Program and the Coastal Resources Management pro-
gram, I remind you, are not laws per se. However, we do have a 
couple of other laws that I do want to touch on briefly, because they 
similarly might deal in some peripheral manner with toxic substances. 
These are the Subaqueous Beds Law and the Wetlands Law. 
In each instance my Commission administers those programs from 
the State level. The State owns all of the subaqueous bottom below 
mean low water in tidal areas. I don't want to get hung up with 
some of my legal friends back here, because when you get into non-
tidal areas then in many instances it is questionable as to whether the 
bottom is privately owned or State owned. But in tidal areas you can 
fairly well make the statement that it is State owned. Consequently, 
anyone wishing to use the subaqueous bottom to either dredge, build, 
construct something over, or what have you, has to get a permit from 
the State to do so. And the State assesses the public benefit versus 
the public detriment in reaching the decision of whether it is an 
appropriate use of the State owned bottom. In this instance you would 
come to the Marine Resources Commission as the primary agency 
dealing with that permit. 
Now how does that relate to toxic substances? Obviously, if you're 
putting a toxic substance overboard in the water you're under the 
Water Control Board, and the Health Department and other agencies. 
But nevertheless, if someone wanted to build a plant on any river in 
Virginia to manufacture Kepone and they came to the Marine Resources 
Commission, or any Commission at this stage of the game, for a permit 
and we assessed the potential public damage versus the public good, 
I think you know what the answer is going to be. So there is, in a 
peripheral sense, a way through this law by which the State can assess 
the potential as well as immediate and real impact that might relate 
to toxic substances. Although again this particular law was not put on 
the books, in my opinion, specifically to try to control toxic substances. 
Similarly there is the Wetlands Law, although it is administered 
slightly differently. The Wetlands Law came on our books in 1972, 
dealing with the issue of protecting our biologically very important 
marshlands of the Commonwealth. Indeed we are blessed with a tre-
mendous amount of them. Incidentally, the marshlands in and of 
themselves form a filtration function for runoff which might otherwise 
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convey toxic substances from our highlands into the oceans and 
estuaries. The marshlands will in many instances remove those toxic 
substances from that runoff prior to reaching the waterways. So, merely 
by trying to save the wetlands through the Wetlands Act, we might also 
be assisting in preventing toxic substances from reaching our waterways. 
Here again, the Wetlands Act, as a law, requires that in making your 
decision as to whether the particular project is an appropriate use of 
the wetlands one must weigh the public detriment versus the public 
good. And one could then assess the likelihood of toxic substances 
being introduced into our marine environment, and through the Wet-
lands Act be able to exercise some control over that possibility. 
The Wetlands Act, incidentally, is a local option Act. That is, a 
local governing body, either a county or a city (towns at one point, 
although they no longer have that option) could elect to administer 
this act themselves by creating a local wetlands board. But the Act 
also recognizes that wetlands are a unique asset to the Commonwealth 
as a whole, and that one could not permit one locality to utilize their 
wetlands to the detriment of the public good of the Commonwealth 
or conversely have another locality perhaps never allowing acceptable 
development of wetlands. It provided that the Commonwealth, through 
the Marine Resources Commission, would always have an overview 
and be able to overrule a local board if they did not meet certain kind 
of criteria. 
Now, in each instance—wetlands and subaqueous lands—these are 
laws. Whether they are adequate or not I suppose again becomes a 
bit of a subjective decision. I conclude that they arc. While the juris-
diction of the Wetlands Act or the Subaqueous Act, I believe that the 
langauge in both of these acts is sufficiently broad to give the protec-
tion that is really required. However, these acts are not so broad as 
to permit their utilization to stop other developments which should 
be stopped in other ways and on other criteria. But I really believe that 
both of these Acts are adequate in their scope and definition. If you 
ask me the second part of the question, if they are being administered 
adequately, I will have to concede that they are being administered 
brilliantly. 
Let me turn to the final topic, that of fisheries, and note to you that 
there is a very large body of law in Virginia that deals with fisheries—
none of it dealing with toxic substances. However, being in charge of 
that agency that manages fisheries and having an abiding interest in 
continuing to have adequate fisheries for the people of the Common-
wealth, I think it is appropriate to note that toxic substances don't react 
solely on humans. They react on other animals in the environment. 
And when we talk about our marine environment that animal that most 
readily is identified as having a reaction to toxic substances is our 
fishes. 
We have already talked about Kepone, chlorine and any number of 
other things. Oil spills react on fisheries. Any attempt to manage a 
biological entity such as fisheries in a biologically sound manner to 
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inure to the benefit of the seafood industry or the people of the Com-
monwealth is bound to be futile if we similarly don't have the environ-
mental side of the equation under control. If we're going to get con-
tinual fish kills and other problems of this nature because of toxic 
substances, then our fisheries resources will never yield to their maxi-
mum potential. One of the crying needs in the world of fisheries is 
data as to the value of fisheries. I'm here to say to you, that Virginia 
does not have, nor does any other state have a real good estimate of 
the value of its fisheries resources. Consequently, when you reflect on 
some of these other laws that I've been talking about and you're asked 
to weigh the public detriment versus the public benefit and there is a 
threat of a very real destruction of the fisheries resources in any 
given area, then how does one weigh that against whatever other 
benefits might be accruing from the particular project? You need to 
know what you're losing. You need to be able to quantify your loss, 
and that is very, very difficult. 
Well, I don't know whether our fisheries laws are adequate or not, 
but in any event they don't really relate that much to the subject of 
this meeting, toxic substances. But I do say to you that it is important 
that you understand the impact of toxic substances on one of our 
greatest resources, fisheries. 
Of the five points that I have touched on, three of them are laws 
and two of them are programs. In my opinion, in general, the State 
laws are indeed reasonably adequate to cover most of the problems 
that we see. I do believe, and I say this in all sincerity and with great 
confidence, that these laws are administered extremely well in Virginia. 
I've had the opportunity to see state laws in other states and how 
they are administered, and I believe you who are Virginia citizens can 
take great pride in the people in your State government and the way 
they go about administering these laws. 
I've taken up more than my half inning I think, Denis, but I'll be 
glad to answer any questions. 
Thank you. 
Professor Brion: Thank you. Our first commentator will be Manning 
Gasch, Jr. of the law firm of Hunton and Williams. 
Mr. Gasch: Thank you, Denis. The great luxury of following excel-
lent background presentations such as you have just heard from Bill 
and Jim is that there isn't much remaining that needs to be said. The 
difficulty, of course, is that when you are asked to respond, you have 
to say something. Rather than try to define this mandate with any 
more precision, I will just talk about what I want to for a few minutes. 
Let me make one preliminary point and then touch briefly on four 
problems which I see emerging in the area of toxics regulation. 
My preliminary point is that you cannot view State laws and their 
administration in any one of these regulatory schemes with which 
we are concerned in isolation from the influence of federal law. The 
pattern of federal/State partnership is now well established and is here 
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to stay. In Virginia, of course, we see this in connection with the State 
Water Control Law; the State Air Pollution Control Law; the Vir-
ginia Pesticide Law, and; the Virginia Public Water Supply Law. All 
establish regulatory schemes under State law which serve, in some 
measure, to implement the requirements of federal, as well as State, 
law. In the near future I believe we will see the same pattern in con-
nection with the regulation of solid waste disposal and perhaps coastal 
zone management, as well. 
Now the four problem areas. I think we have already heard a bit 
about the first today. I refer to it as the overlap problem. What exists 
now as "toxics law" is not a cogent system of regulations and pro-
cedures, but a hodgepodge of discrete laws directed at discrete prob-
lems. These laws generally break down into two categories. The first 
is concerned with the protection of certain classes of selected critical 
environmental amenities. The other category takes a slightly different 
approach. It selects some particular environmental badactor and goes 
directly at controlling or regulating that. Examples of the former type. 
of course, are laws protecting the air, water, drinking water, natural 
water courses, groundwater, wetlands, endangered species, scenic rivers 
and historic sites and structures. Examples of the latter type of laws 
are those regulating the use, distribution and disposal of such things 
as pesticides, toxic substances and solid waste—that sort of thing. The 
problem, of course, is that a single planned activity may slice into 
several of those discrete spheres of regulation at once. Needless to 
say, where procedures and regulatory standards differ for each, this 
means that regulation is not as well coordinated as it might he. The 
consequence of that, in turn, is that there are often overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting requirements. Inevitably, this results in delay and 
increased cost of performing those regulated activities which are ulti-
mately determined to be in society's best interests. This does not serve 
society's best interests. When it takes a long time to license something 
because of regulatory inefficiency, the public not only pays the increased 
costs of the various agencies' labors, we also pay the increased costs 
of producing and providing the product which results from that regu-
lated activity. In short, everyone loses. This is a problem in need of 
a legislative solution. 
The second problem I want to mention is that of layered conservative 
biases. While this problem exists in the field of environmental regu-
lation, generally, it is most apparent in the area of toxics regulation. It 
starts with the legislatures. Federal and State legislatures have re-
sponded accurately to what they perceive as the wishes of the people. 
The wishes of the people are to get toxics out of the environment. So 
the legislatures undertake to do that and they often do it in a 
straightforward and fairly draconian way. A good example is Section 
307 of the federal Clean Water Act which requires regulation of toxics 
without regard to costs or technological feasibility. In other words, 
these considerations are inappropriate in administratively setting limi-
tations under Section 307 as to the amount of a toxic substance which 
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may be discharged to the water. That gets the ball out of Congress' 
court and puts it in the agency's. 
The agency regulators are well intentioned human beings who are 
concerned about toxics themselves. Otherwise, most of them would not 
be working where they are. Predictably, they are going to be very 
conservative in making judgments about what constitutes a toxic con-
centration of something. Also, being astute regulators, they are going 
to be quite conservative in their judgments because this is the way 
to present as little of their posterior as possible for criticism. After all, 
they have a mandate from Congress who got their mandate from the 
people. Well, that gets the ball out of their court. Then it goes to the 
judiciary. 
Again, experience indicates that we can expect more of the same 
from the courts. Perhaps the best example is the trend of the D.C. 
Circuit, which I suppose is the leading environmental circuit court in 
the country. There, we have seen three cases come down in 1978 which 
say essentially that where there is a factual question within the ambit 
of expert agency judgment in the environmental/toxics area, the court 
is not going to look beyond the agency's exercise of that judgment. In 
Weyerhauser, Hercules and EDF vs. EPA, the D.C. Circuit has been 
inclined to establish what they call a "zone of reasonableness" test. And 
where the agency determination falls within that "zone of reasonable-
ness," no matter how stringent it may be, the court is not going to 
examine it. 
Now you are wondering who has the ball. Well, I believe it has come 
full circle, back to the public. And the real problem is that it hasn't 
arrived yet. We have not yet paid the costs. The costs will come, both 
in terms of the increased cost of a product owing to the installation of 
astronomically expensive pollution abatement controls, and also be-
cause of the unavailability of certain products which we have grown 
acustomed to and have grown to like but which have been determined 
to present some risk of toxicity. Perhaps the first wave to hit on this 
shore was the saccharine controversy. There, the public essentially 
said that they didn't care if saccharine had certain toxic properties, 
they wanted it in their coffee. There are more saccharines to come. 
I suppose the answer to this problem is that our system of government 
will ultimately bring our systems of regulation into balance with what 
the public actually wants. As for the immediate future, however, I 
suspect that the ball will be going back to Congress for some exceptions 
and cost-benefit requirements. 
The third problem I would note today is that we have now set up 
some reasonably competent machinery for regulating toxics, but there 
are a lot of horses out of the barn. Toxics control is in its infancy. The 
problem was first realized back in the early sixties, or at least it was 
first publicized then. It was a problem long before it was realized. There 
have been toxic substances going into the ground and the rivers and 
lakes in various ways in this country for at least the last hundred years. 
Many are persistent. I'm afraid we arc going to live with these sins 
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for a long time. Nor do we now have any comprehensive regulatory 
mechanism for dealing with this problem. It may be that there is no 
appropriate mechanism for dealing with it except on a case-by-case 
basis. And as far as the law is concerned, it may be that it is best 
left for a resolution under the Common Law as to fault and who pays 
the cost. Another alternative is the "superfund" concept in one of the 
various forms now being proposed at the federal level. But this is an 
area of serious concern which is now essentially unregulated. 
The fourth problem I would like to comment on results from the 
fact that in this general field of regulation, we arc pushing both the 
limits of science and the limits of the law. The various statutes with 
which we are concerned, for example, often result in the regulation of 
toxics down to such minute quantities as to actually exceed conven-
tional scientific limits of our ability of detection. We arc talking about 
concentrations here ranging way down into fractions of parts per 
billion. When you talk about a part per billion, you are talking about 
making a martini by filling an olympic-sized swimming pool with gin 
and putting two drops of vermouth in it. The two drops of vermouth 
are something in the range of a part per billion in the swimming pool. 
And we are now frequently seeing regulated concentrations in the 
range of .00—something parts per billion. This is why I say we are 
pushing the limits of science. 
Now that kind of regulation on the scientific frontier has particular 
significance in the context of laws like the federal Clean Water Act 
and the State Water Control Law. Under those laws, civil penalties 
may be imposed without respect to fault. Criminal penalties of up to 
a year in jail and $25,000 per day of violation for the first offense 
may be imposed upon a showing of simple negligence. Under the 
federal law, responsible corporate officers are subject to the imposition 
of criminal penalties for the acts of their subordinates. In case the 
significance of this escapes you, what it means is that if you are presi-
dent of a large corporation and one of your 12,000 employees put 
two and a quarter drops of vermouth in the swimming pool because 
you negligently declined to pay $2,000,000 for atomic absorption 
monitoring equipment which could monitor down to these concentra-
tions, you may be invited to reside in a comfortable federal facility 
at the expense of the American taxpayers for about one year. 
Of course, we have the old sop of prosecutorial discretion, but some-
one wiser than I once said words to the effect that where there is the 
opportunity for abuse, there will be abuse. 
Thank you, and I enjoyed being with you today. 
Professor Brion: Thank you, Mr. Gasch. The next commentator will 
be Mrs. Barbara Bitters of the Virginia Consumers Council. 
Mrs. Bitters: Thank you. I'd like to comment on that new Kepone 
plant that might come into Virginia. I'd say that Virginia would let it 
come in. They want the business and they might put a few restrictions 
on it, but big business speaks louder than your health and mine. 
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Several people have mentioned the laws that exist or are pending in 
the General Assembly and I'd like to touch on some of those. One is 
on the storage of nuclear substances or hazardous wastes. And it 
seems there are a lot of people down there at the General Assembly 
that think we shouldn't have any restrictions on where we store those 
things, or who brings them in from out of state and stores them. I 
disagree. 
There is a bill in on hazardous materials transport. This bill came 
about by the experience of a young lady coming from Northern Virginia 
down to Tidewater in rush hour when she discovered that the traffic 
was being held up by a truckload of nuclear wastes and in front of it a 
propane truck. All it took was one idiot to have created a big problem. 
There are no laws governing, no one it has to be reported to, the trans-
port of hazardous substances through this state, or in this state. There 
is a lot of objection to this bill, 
The Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sets levels of 
toxic substances in the state. But two years ago a bill was put through 
to allow Virginians to consume more poison than they could sell in 
other states. I know this was aimed at Kepone and it was aimed to 
protect some of our watermen, but this year the Department of Agri-
culture used that law to raise the amount of toxic substances in our 
agricultural products. Now, instead of 25 parts per billion of afla toxins, 
we can now have 100 parts per billion. And that toxic substance is 
passed through in your calf's liver, and your milk, and your eggs, things 
like that. But that is all right. 
Our drinking water—chlorine kills fish, keeps oysters from setting—
but in the long run what does it do to us? If it is toxic to the higher 
forms of biological life in the aquatic food chain, what does it do to 
us? Or is it simply the lesser of two evils? 
What can we do about it? We can educate our farmers, our children, 
our general public, not only on what big business is doing to us, but 
what non-point source pollution does in and to our life chains. And you 
would be surprised how many people don't know what all of this does. 
They don't know what the insecticides and herbicides going down their 
rivers from their farmlands do until it later comes back to haunt them. 
We can do it with radio and T.V. and pamphlets and fliers to visibly 
explain what happens and how all of this affects everyone. I think if 
we did do a better job of education to the general public, that we 
would have Less resistance to the zoning and the restrictions and land 
use plans that are so very necessary that we have been speaking of. 
We need more public input. This is very necessary. But the public 
is afraid. The public feels afraid that if they submit suggestions or 
attend meetings, that they will be not listened to, or talked down to, 
or looked on as stupid, because they have only the simple basic feelings 
and ideas and information that they have to work with. So we need to 
give them more reassurance and more education. And this will be the 
only way that we will get the support and pressure on our legislators 
correctly from our efforts because, as it was quoted in the paper I read 
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that was prepared for Bateman and Baliles, the planning body of the 
General Assembly determines the level of administration that each law 
receives. So it is up to Joe Blow on the street to pressure his legislator. 
I believe in encouragement and rewards. They will win out every 
time over threats and penalties and punishments. And we, the con-
sumer, in the long run have to pay for all of the prevention and all of 
the poisons, whether we pay for them in the cost passed down in the 
protection, or we pay for it in illnesses later. So we all need to work 
together for the protection of our own lives and the lives of our 
children and the lives of our grandchildren. Thank you. 
Professor Brion: Thank you, Mrs. Bitters. Our next speaker will be 
Dr. Robert Jackson, Assistant State Health Commissioner for Health 
and Environmental Management. 
Dr. Jackson: When you follow as skillful an orator as I am following, 
perhaps it is presumptuous of me to try not to use the microphone, but 
if anyone can't hear me please let me know. 
I'm going to play the devil's advocate a little bit, here, because I 
find myself on a panel responding along with attorneys representing the 
Commonwealth and representing law firms that represent other clients 
in the Commonwealth in cases currently in litigation. Consequently 
there is one topic that I am not going to get into. And you can guess 
what that particular topic is. (Editor's Note: the pending litigation 
relating to the "Kepone incident"). 
However, I do think that my answer to the question that is raised 
regarding the adequacy of the laws is "No". And most assuredly it is 
no. And I will give you just one example of something that really is 
scary to me as a physician, as a professional, and as an advocate for 
the protection of the public's health. And that is the absolute inability 
of Congress to pass a law that will adequately address the entire 
subject of pesticides. We sit here and we look at the record and we 
read into it what we want, but the fact is that all that it does is assure 
that somebody along the way provides a certificate to someone in order 
to use and apply pesticides randomly and indiscriminately throughout 
the agricultural portions of our country. I say that having come from 
having served as the Chairman of a lengthy panel at the Society of 
Occupational and Environmental Health meetings in Washington re-
cently entirely limited to that topic. The question before that panel was, 
"Are the laws Adequate and Are We Adequately Regulating Pesticides?" 
The result of that Conference, with people coming from all over the 
country was a most resounding and alarming no. And, even the respon-
sible agency representatives themselves admitted it. 
Why? Well it is the basic answer to Louise Burke's points of earlier 
today. We live in a world of political reality. The amount of investment 
that we are willing to make in prevention depends directly on how we 
can compel the political process to provide the money to finance regula-
tion. Now the agriculture business, the chemical and pesticide producers, 
and agribusiness in this country are an enormously strong political 
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force. And they have managed to hold their line and keep effective 
pesticide regulations or laws from every being developed. 
Three weeks ago I had the unfortunate experience on a Saturday 
morning to receive a call from an upset local health director who had 
just had a man die, had seven children who were sick, and didn't know 
what to do. And to and behold, what did it turn out to be? Arsenic 
poisoning. It turned out that the pesticide had gotten into these folks' 
well. Pesticides fill barns. They are unmarked in many cases because 
they have been sitting there for a long time and nobody is really sure 
where they came from or what is in them. You've got arsenic out 
there. You've got mercurials out there. You've got all kinds of things 
which have been used, in most cases I'm sure in a well intentioned 
manner by the individuals involved, but without the knowledge of what 
they were dealing with that was necessary in order not to over-use or 
abuse them. And there is no law that compels anybody to be responsible 
in that particular area and no effective means of enforcement of the 
limited laws which do exist. 
I was just reading some of that background document as I was 
coming down here and I understand that there are two people in the 
pesticide section of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Ser-
vices who deal with pesticides and the issuance of application permits. 
They issued twenty thousand certificates to pesticide applicators last 
year. Well, just how much impact can that have at the delivery point 
where you and I are likely to get exposed to it? I just pose that as a 
question. 
What I am saying is that that network that has been described to 
you by a number of people here today of laws that address the en-
vironment has some loopholes in it big enough to fly a B-17 through. 
And in order to get that net tightened we are going to have to spend 
significant amounts of money. And in this day and age, with Proposition 
13 having been mentioned, we simply are confronting certain realities 
in the process. And we have to do that. These decisions have to be 
made by society. As Mr. Gasch pointed out, we're getting the tech-
nology to analyze down to points which we never could do before, and 
at the same time we've got a sort of ambivalence in society as to what 
we want our government to do for us. And unless we can decide on 
that, we certainly can't expect them to be able to project what we want 
them to do for us and to generate the necessary revenues, to do that 
necessary research, write the necessary laws, and to carry out the 
necessary regulatory functions, 
The fundamental dilemma, of course, is that on the one hand you 
have a Delaney Clause saying no carcinogens can be placed intentionally 
in a food that is going to be consumed by humans. And that say none. 
As our technology increases for determining the presence of things, 
however, we keep finding them. That's one of the basic dilemmas of the 
Delaney Clause. The better our technology gets, the more things we're 
going to find contaminants in. The other side of that coin is what 
generally is viewed as the approach to environmental contaminants in 
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food which get there unintentionally. The situation in that regard is 
that you consider the economic factors that are involved in regulating 
it before you issue the so called action level or tolerance level that 
determines what the regulatory process will consist of. Economics are 
allowed to be considered in that area, even though the federal Food 
Drug and Cosmetics Act does not state that economics are to be con-
sidered. But economic factors have always been considered by the 
agency and the regulators and the writers of the regulations and they 
are a major factor. In fact, some argue, and quite intelligently, that it is 
the almost deciding factor in many of these regulatory decisions. I 
don't think any of you would disagree if I said that we didn't want 
economics to be the sole determinant of what we decide to do with 
these things which relate to human exposure and potential death or 
suffering. We certainly want and have to accept a certain amount of 
reality and that is what compels us to allow economics to play a role. 
But as long as we have to make those judgments, until we as a society 
are ready to decide how we're going to address these problems, don't 
expect your government to be able to do for you any more than you can 
do for yourself. 
Thank you. 
Professor Brion: I see there is a question for Dr. Jackson. 
Q: I'm Luther Carter with Science Magazine. I have a question di-
rected to either Dr. Jackson or Mr. Gilley. Several years ago, I think 
it was about 1974, the Olin Corporation dismantled its old chlorine plant 
on the north fork of the Holston River. It was found that there were 
some 220,000 pounds of mercury in the first 30 feet of the soil profile. 
There has been some evidence over the last several years of an effort 
by the Water Control Board to have this site sealed off from the river 
so that when the river rises globules of mercury will not go into the 
river. I would like to ask about the status of that effort. 
A: Mr. Gilley: First of all, the Water Control Board continues to 
monitor and continues to work with the Corporation to settle the ultimate 
geological solution to the problem that you address. Unfortunately, it 
is not a simple one to resolve and a lot of time and effort has gone into 
trying to determine what is the best way to do it. The problem has 
been there and the river closed since 1972. At a point down the road 
from the original discovery of the problem it was decided by the com-
munity to raze the old Olin plant. The disruption of the soil pursuant 
to that project caused a substantial increase in the amount of mercury 
discharged into the river. This resulted in increases in the levels in the 
fish which were being monitored regularly by the State Water Control 
Board. 
Following this discovery, renewed efforts with the State Health De-
partment, the State Water Control Board, the City and the U. S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency were undertaken and most of the actions 
determined to be necessary to prevent further contamination have been 
completed. 
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A few problems remain and these are continuing to be addressed by 
many of the same agencies with the State Water Control Board serving 
as the "lead" agency in the matter. Because of the continued high-level 
of methylmercury in the fish, however, the Health Department's emer-
gency order banning the taking of fish for consumption remains in effect. 
Professor Brion: Our first commentator will be James Ryan, Deputy 
Attorney General of Virginia. 
Mr, Ryan: Thank you, Denis. I'm grateful for the opportunity to be 
here today. I have prepared some remarks, but in the interest of time 
I am going to try to hit the high points. I want to focus specifically on 
the State Toxic Substances Information Act which was drafted prin-
cipally by me about three years ago at the request of Governor Godwin 
and Attorney General Miller. It was a by-product of an analysis of 
the adequacy of Virginia's laws which regulate toxic substances. 
When we examined all the laws on air and water pollution and on 
other matters, we determined that those basic authorities were sufficient, 
with several changes. We drafted ten bills that provided for a number 
of things, like industrial waste surveys and sewer use permits. It was 
tinkering with programs, filling in little gaps. The main problem we 
identified was the lack of information. So we structured an Act which 
provided a reporting trigger, if you will. The Board of Health was re-
quired to adopt a list of toxic substances and the circumstances in 
which those substances were toxic. After that Bill was enacted, as well 
as all but one of the total package, we felt like we were in pretty good 
shape. But there were two mistakes that were made. And I am going 
to suggest several changes that need to be made in the present Act. I'm 
going to give you a little background so I can illustrate my point. 
The first significant mistake that was made in the conception and 
implementation of that Act was that we grossly underestimated the 
scope of the problem. During the time we were arguing the bill before 
the General Assembly, I thought we were talking about hundreds of 
chemicals. Now, I'm a Chemical Engineer by training and I know there 
is a tremendous diversity in organic substances. But I thought what we 
were going to choose to regulate was a relatively small number. After 
we got into the rule writing phase we found out how large some wanted 
the list to be and we wound up with 24,000 substances on which re-
ports were required. The ripple effects of this, as you might imagine, 
were terrific. People came out of the woodwork everywhere saying 
"What in the world are we going to do? We can't discover whether 
some of our substances are on your lists. The lists aren't in sufficient 
numbers in print." We just had tremendous headaches. 
The second major mistake was one of conception. The idea was to 
get the information in hand, and then get it out to the individual agency 
decision-makers. But we failed to make it clear in the Act (and the Act 
still has this problem) that the determination by the Board of Health 
shouldn't be binding. It is just a reporting trigger. The idea is to get the 
information in and disseminate it to the agencies which would then 
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make binding determinations whether something is toxic in some cir-
cumstances in some uses in the plant. By implying that the Board of 
Health and the Toxic Substance Advisory Council were going to make 
the binding determination of toxicity, we again created a ground swell 
of opposition to the implementation of our program. This quickly 
resulted (as quickly as the next session of the General Assembly came 
to town) in two new legislative changes. 
The first one ratified what we had done by regulation. It required 
not a detailed report, but an inventory report. Tell us every chemical 
you have on hand. We don't care whether it is on your original list or 
not. Tell us everything you have and we'll get back to you if we find 
some problems. This phase is going on and it really is very beneficial 
because we know for the first time now where certain chemicals are. We 
have a very, very large store of information on which we can draw. 
But the second legislative change really changed the function of the 
program, as I conceive it. It created a Class I list of toxic substances 
and it has tied up a substantial part of the time of the Toxic Substances 
Information Advisory Council and the staff in going through formal 
rulemakings now on things like asbestos and benzene over which we 
have no dispute. They are admittedly toxic. The Council is not focusing 
on the broad range of toxic chemicals that we have in Virginia. Rather, 
they are promulgating "on the basis of substantial evidence a list of 
Class I substances determined from toxicological and other scientific 
data to pose the greatest threats to human health or the environment, 
and the amounts in which the substances pose those risks." Well, that 
ties up the whole apparatus. I think we need several amendments to this 
Act. 
The first one would abolish the Class I list, concept and all. Go 
back to the long list. I don't know whether you want to have 24,000 
chemicals or not on the list, but it certainly ought to take into account 
all the chemicals that have been identified in some academic or other-
wise scientific study as toxic under some circumstances, and require 
detailed reporting. Also, make it legislatively clear that the determina-
tion to require the report and the adoption of some scientific study 
that found the substance to be toxic in certain circumstances is not to 
be binding or given any weight in a later regulatory proceeding. The 
idea ought to be to get the information that is solely in the hands of the 
private interests into the public sector where it can be assessed by the 
agency that has to make a decision. An illustration, of course, is the 
Kepone case. We found out, after we got into the Kepone case, that 
there was a study done in the early 1960s at MCV which showed fairly 
conclusively that Kepone produced cancerous tumors in laboratory 
animals. We didn't know that at the time we were setting the initial 
standards. We certainly would have liked to have known that at that 
time. 
The creation of the Class I list also created another problem. It 
shifted the burden. It was intentional that the thresholds were put in the 
first Act. The purpose was to say "We're going to tell you whether or 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 43 
not you have to report," That is, the public will tell you whether or not 
you have to report. In going to the Class I list, we focused only on a 
very narrow number of substances for detailed reporting and, for the 
test, rely almost exclusively on what we call the General Duty Clause. 
That is, if you know it is toxic, or it is reasonably knowable to be toxic, 
you have to make a report. This shift is something that is unacceptable 
to me, personally. I think the State, not the private interests, ought to 
be making the decision whether this information in private hands should 
be disclosed. 
The last legislative change that I would propose, is to shift the burden 
of proof in toxic substances regulatory proceedings. What I would 
propose is that, notwithstanding the provisions of the regulatory statutes 
of the Commonwealth, the proponent of manufacturer use, discharge, or 
emmission of one of the listed toxic substances must make an affirma-
tive showing that his activity will not cause any damage to humans. 
Now that, of course, necessarily involves looking at the environment, 
because the human happens to be one of the organisms at the top of the 
food chain. But I think the principal emphasis ought to be on human 
health, not aquatic life. Such a provision would be consistent with the 
dangerous instrumentality cases you are familiar with in tort law, where 
a higher standard of care is imposed on people who want to handle 
dangerous substances. It is also consistent with full disclosure of in-
formation. The industry would have to come forward and make an 
affirmative showing before the regulatory agency. 
Now I want to turn to administration of laws. It seems to me that 
one must focus on what is proper attitude. I think we in Virginia have 
a pretty good attitude in State government. But I think it is helpful 
to reflect a little bit on what that attitude ought to be. 
First, the regulator must presume, until it is shown otherwise, that 
the persons with whom he deals are acting in good faith. The public 
wouldn't long stand for a government that viewed it otherwise. This 
is not to say, however, that one ought to ignore reality. We've got our 
James River closure. We've got Love Canals. We've got the Valley of 
the Drums. We've got many problems. Therefore, second, the regulator 
ought to have a healthy skepticism for any assertion that in any way 
appears to be incorrect or untrue. And third, and perhaps most im-
portant, he must have the mental discipline to focus on and prepare for 
the worst case. Because the Love Canals and the Kepone problems 
teach us that those occur more frequently than we had ever hoped they 
would, 
Regarding administration, I think government has a further duty. 
It has a duty to deal more directly with the public's expectations. More 
and more frequently in this country when something goes wrong, the 
first reaction of the public is to blame government. The view of govern-
ment as guardian angel, if you will, ready, willing and able to protect 
the public from all evils is unrealistic. If government tried to imple-
ment it, it would he very unpopular. To be the public's guardian angel 
would involve far more massive intrusion by government than any of 
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you in the audience would tolerate as consistent with what we view as an 
acceptable level of personal liberty. It would mean excessive preventive 
programs. The alternative is, and we must advocate it, strict account-
ability for the reasonably foreseeable effects of personal, corporate and 
governmental acts. 
What, then, must government tell the public when we say their 
guardian angel expectation is unreasonable and that they are not 
entitled to use responsible government officials as scapegoats? We 
should say that they are entitled to form some positive expectations 
about the effects of their collective action through government. What 
government must say is that the reasonably foreseeable risks facing 
the public have been identified and can be dealt with with the re-
sources on hand, if, in fact, that is the case. Government has a positive 
duty, it seems to me, to tell the public when it cannot deal with identi-
fied and reasonably foreseeable risks for whatever reason. Having this 
relation with the public it serves, government would then be entitled 
to insist more strongly than it does now upon strict accountability for 
violations of laws and regulations. If government maintains the proper 
attitude and the public frees it of the responsibility to be its all-purpose 
guardian angel, we will have further assurance that our statutes will be 
administered properly. 
Thank you. 
Professor Brion: I want to thank all of the speakers, the commenta-
tors and those in the audience who participated in the discussion. This 
evening we will hear from Judge Merhige who has presided over aspects 
of the Kepone litigation and will also get the evaluation of the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality as to how effective the Federal 
programs are. This meeting is adjourned. 
II 
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE FEDERAL LAWS REGULATING 
HAZARDOUS AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES? 
INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM B. SPONG 
DEAN, MARSHALL-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW 
Dean Spong: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. I hope you en-
joyed the reception earlier this evening in the Great Hall of the Chris-
topher Wren building and that you have enjoyed your dinner. The 
dinner was served, and very well I think, by William and Mary students. 
As your program indicates, and as I mentioned in welcoming remarks 
earlier today, our conference on Toxic and Hazardous Substances was 
made possible by a grant from the Virginia Environmental Foundation. 
Money for a series of conferences on environmental law and to establish 
a collection in the Marshall-Wythe library of books on environmental 
law was, I believe, the first grant made by directors of Virginia Environ-
mental Endowment. We are privileged this evening to have with us the 
principal moving spirit behind establishment of the Endowment, Judge 
Robert R. Merhige, Jr. and three of its Directors, Admiral Ross Bullard, 
Judge Henry MacKenzie and William B. Cummings, Chairman of the 
Board. We are also pleased to have the Executive Director of the 
Foundation, Gerald McCarthy. 
We live at a time when there is much criticism of our federal court 
system for the far reaching effects that judicial decisions in the United 
States have upon our lives. We should be mindful that much of the 
subject matter for policy decision has been thrust upon the courts be-
cause the executive and legislative branches of our government, for 
reasons of their own, preferred it that way. In response to this many 
members of what the late Professor Alexander Bickel referred to as 
"the least dangerous branch" have become innovative in seeking judicial 
solutions. 
In response to the offer of Allied Chemical Company to pay several 
million dollars to the people of Virginia as partial restitution for the 
damage caused by the dumping of Kepone into the James River, Judge 
Merhige appointed the directors who today administer the Virginia 
Environmental Endowment. He charged these directors with the re-
sponsibility of using the money for the benefit of the people of Virginia 
through research and education to improve and preserve their quality 
of life. 
Judge Merhige is among the most innovative of judges. In addition 
to his judicial duties, he has taught and lectured at several law schools 
and universities throughout the United States. He is a judge who has 
demonstrated courage, industry and wisdom. It is a privilege to wel-
come him this evening. I present Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
Judge Merhige: Thank you, Dean Spong. It is always a pleasure to 
visit Williamsburg and the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. It is especi- 
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ally pleasant to be here under these circumstances, associated with a 
project that seeks to protect the public health and the environment of 
Virginia. On October 5, 1976, one of our corporate citizens was fined 
a sum in excess of thirteen million dollars by the court over which I 
have the honor to preside. The fines were imposed on the basis of a 
finding of guilt after the corporation had pled no contest to charges 
of having violated the laws of the United States, which had been de-
signed to protect and enhance our navigable waters. At sentencing, 
I reiterated a statement that I had made at the time of the nolo con-
tendere plea to the effect that I hoped there would be some way that the 
fines that obviously would be imposed, could be used for the benefit 
of those who had been so directly injured; meaning of course primarily 
the citizens of Virginia. Obviously, the pollution of our waters affects 
each and every citizen of our nation. 
In any event, that comment, made in open court, was the genesis of 
the Virginia Environmental Endowment. The corporation involved gen-
erously funded the endowment with a grant of eight million dollars. 
Under the charter, I, as senior judge of the Richmond division of our 
Court, was charged with the responsibility of appointing the members 
of the Board of Directors. I am frankly delighted that it is at a meeting 
such as this, that I have the opportunity to say thank you to Admiral 
Bullard, Judge MacKenzie, George Yowell, Sidney and Frances Lewis, 
Kathy Douglas, and Bill Cummings, not only for their generosity in 
serving on the board without compensation, but for their good judgment 
in selecting Gerry McCarthy as the Endowment's Executive Director, 
and for their approving grants which make it possible for conferences 
such as this. The members of the Board, as I'm sure most, if not all of 
you know, exercise their own independent judgments consistent with 
the charter, and in no manner solicit any suggestions from the Court. 
Their independence and concern for the environment were the major 
factors leading to their appointments. 
We arc proud of the Endowment, for we feel that it presents an ex-
citing opportunity because it is designed to help all Virginians to take 
steps to improve our environment. It is designed to help individual 
citizens, industry and government alike. Its very impartiality in this 
regard makes the Endowment unique. 
The Board has chosen toxic substances, environmental law, and eco-
logical research as its initial priorities and since December of 1977 
have made approximately 18 grants, including those to MCV, and 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, all supporting Ke-
pone research. Additionally, grants have been made to Old Dominion 
University, Virginia for an Environmental Mediation Project, and to 
the Nature Conservancy to help purchase a mainland site on the eastern 
shore to serve as a base of operations for the Virginia Barrier Islands 
Coast Reserve. 
I'm proud of the work of the Endowment and if it continues to serve, 
as I'm satisfied it will, as a catalyst to bring people together, improving 
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the quality of Virginia's environment, then all that I had hoped for at 
its inception will come to fruition. 
Shirl and I are most grateful for the opportunity of being here with 
you, and I would hope that each of you would carry back to your 
respective communities a firm conviction to see to the adequacy and 
fair implementation of state and federal laws in the interest of averting 
another Kepone incident. 
Dean Spong: Thank you, Judge Merhige. It is a privilege to have you 
with us this evening. We would also like to welcome Mrs. Merhige and 
say how pleased we are that she was able to come to Williamsburg 
with you. 
Today, we began the conference by examining Virginia laws on toxic 
and hazardous substances. Tomorrow the entire day will be devoted to 
examining federal laws. We begin our look at the federal picture this 
evening when we hear from one of President Carter's advisors. 
Gus Speth is one of three members of the President's Council on 
Environmental Quality. He serves in this capacity as an advisor to the 
President on environmental policy. Among its many responsibilities the 
Council also oversees the implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, prepares a comprehensive annual report on the 
environment, and conducts environmental studies. 
Mr. Speth's principal interests at the Council include the environ-
mental aspects of energy policy, toxic and hazardous pollutants and 
their impact on environmental health, water resources policy reform, 
and the relationship between the need to provide jobs and environ-
mental protection. 
Before his appointment to CEO in March 1977, our speaker was a 
staff attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, a public 
interest group which he helped found in 1970. He was responsible for 
NRDC's programs in energy research and development, water pollu-
tion, stream channelization, and corporate responsibility. 
Our speaker was born in Orangeburg, South Carolina on March 4, 
1942. He received a B.A. degree from Yale University in 1964, and 
was a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford University, from which 
he received a B.Ltt. in economics. After graduation from Yale Law 
School in 1969, he was a law clerk to U. S. Supreme Court Justice 
Hugo L. Black. 
I am pleased to present to you, Gus Speth of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality. 
Mr. Gus Speth: Thank you, Dean Spong. I am very pleased to be a 
part of this important program. It is heartening to me to see a roster of 
speakers and participants in this program which possess such outstanding 
credentials. The problem of toxic and hazardous substances and waste 
is of great importance to the welfare of this country. Nothing will be 
the same after Kepone. To labor and environmentalists—indeed, all 
those who value a healthy, productive environment in which to live and 
work—the Kepone incident is all the evidence one needs that a night- 
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marish possibility of our chemical age can become the morning's grim 
reality. The incident justifies strong governmental regulation to ensure 
that such neglect, destruction and injury is never repeated, in Hopewell 
or elsewhere. 
To business leaders, Kepone is proof that the public, the media and 
the government can extract a tremendous price. Fortune's editors re-
cently noted "Neither Allied's Chairman, John T. Connor, nor his 
fellow executives will ever be the same after the beating they took in 
the courts of law and public opinion." Fortune believes that Allied has 
been treated rather too harshly for its role in the affair, but notes that 
"As a result of the Kepone case, Allied has down-graded profitability 
as a measure of a manager performance and given greater weight to 
his regard for social and environmental responsibilities." 
I don't want to see silver linings where none exist, but there are 
valuable lessons we can learn from the Kepone disaster, and it appears 
that we are learning some of them. It sometimes take calamity to teach 
big lessons: the failure of a dam brings the dam safety issue into con-
sciousness; India's explosion of a nuclear bomb makes us realize that 
atoms for peace can become bombs for war. Hopefully, we will learn 
the lessons of Kepone well. This conference and other activities of the 
Endowment can play a major role in this regard, and I want to con-
gratulate President Graves and Dean Spong for putting this program 
together. 
Kepone has played a large role in shaping public awareness of toxic 
chemicals and their risks. The incident was in part responsible no 
doubt for the recent Lou Harris survey indicating that two out of three 
Americans are seriously concerned about toxic substances. As a sub-
sidiary finding, however, Mr. Harris detected an attitude that runs 
in somewhat the other direction: Since 1976, he found, the percentage 
of people who think toxics will be less of a problem in the future has 
grown from 14 to 36 percent. 
That may indicate a sense of public relief that, after five years of 
temporizing on the matter, Congress finally passed the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act. It may suggest that American citizens feel we've 
finally buckled down to business on this issue, and that it's only a 
matter of time—short time—before we halt the introduction of trouble-
some chemicals into our air, water, and food. Or finally, even in these 
Proposition 13 times, it may imply a sense of confidence in the public 
officials to whom responsibility for the hazardous substances problem 
has been assigned. 
Whatever it suggests, I'm afraid those Americans who feel that toxic 
substances will be less troublesome in the future then in the past are in 
for a nasty shock or two. For, though I think recent legislation has 
given us, for the very first time in our history, comprehensive authority 
to control dangerous chemicals, we must realize that we have just 
started to manage a problem at least a generation old. 
Troublesome chemicals are much older than that, of course. Poison-
ous lead leached from the aqueducts of ancient Rome into the drinking 
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supply, and is believed to have been responsible for documented cases 
of sterility and permanent mental impairment. The Mad Hatter who 
gave the tea party in Alice in Wonderland drew his real-life inspiration 
from hat workers who inhaled mercury, used in treating furs and felts; 
they suffered neurological disorders as a result. And Percival Pott's diag-
nosis of soot as the cause of cancer among chimney sweeps goes back 
to 1775. 
But cur modern revolution in the creation of synthetic chemicals is 
much more recent; observers generally date it from World War II, a 
single generation ago. And we have only begun learning now wide-
spread—and how persistent—the harmful side-effects of that chemical 
revolution can be. 
Not long ago, for example, we began reading about the seepage of 
chemicals in Niagara Falls, New York, from a disposal site lying be-
neath a housing subdevelopment. Since then, however, public health 
officials have noted trouble in and around some other chemical-disposal 
sites: 
• In Hardeman County, Tennessee, at least 17 chemical contami-
nants have been found in local well water . 	 a short distance 
from a ridge where 350,000 drums of wastes from a pesticide plant 
are buried. 
• In Lowell, Massachusetts, health officials got an emergency ap-
propriation from the state legislature to remove 17,000 barrels of 
toxic chemicals that have been found leaking into the Merrimac 
River. 
• And in Michigan, state officials sued to recover the $1 million 
spent to clean out a site in Pontiac; they are also worried about 
another disposal site from which a chemical used in carcinogenic 
pesticides is leaking into a small lake that feeds into Lake 
Michigan. 
Such discoveries, troubling as they are, may not be isolated incidents, 
but the first omens of worse trouble to come. About 400,000 American 
facilities generate hazardous chemical wastes, another 20,000 transport 
them, and 20,000 more process or store those wastes. As many as 400 
sites around the country, used to hold toxic chemicals in a supposedly 
safe manner, could develop leakage problems such as those I have cited. 
In short, we've got quite a job to do. How prepared are we to do it? 
My own view is that the federal laws we now have are one of Congress' 
major achievements in this century. If not perfect, they are nevertheless 
very good. It is difficult to believe, upon reflection, that the folks who 
brought us the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Clean Water Act 
also brought us the Internal Revenue Code. But they did. I'm certainly 
not saying that existing environmental laws allow no room for improve-
ment. On the contrary, improvements, adjustments, and new initiatives 
will be needed. For example, new measures addressing the hazardous 
waste disposal problem are necessary, and I want to share some 
thoughts on other initiatives with you shortly. But let us admit from 
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the start that we have good federal laws in this area, and be thankful. 
Given this soundness of our basic approach to the control of toxic 
pollutants, I think there are three challenges we should set for ourselves: 
• We must work together to make these laws succeed; 
• We must not allow spurious claims of "inflationary impact" and 
"government intrusion and overregulation" to deflect us from 
achieving the national environmental objectives we have estab-
lished; 
• And we must explore and experiment with new approaches to the 
control of toxic chemicals. 
As for the first of these, I can assure you that there is a concerted 
effort now underway among the federal agencies involved in controlling 
toxic chemicals to achieve more efficient, more effective and better 
coordinated regulation. There are major efforts underway to develop a 
government-wide cancer policy; to coordinate regulatory actions on 
particular chemicals and industries; and to build new systems for ac-
quiring and sharing the basic data on toxicity and exposures that are 
the backbone of regulation, to mention a few. I urge you to explore 
these initiatives further with your speakers tomorrow, several of whom 
are deeply involved in these efforts. 
The second challenge I mentioned earlier concerns the anti-regulation 
bandwagon. In recent years, as the size and influence of the corporation 
has expanded, so has the pace of legislation to control it: since 1963, 
Congress—not without reason—has enacted at least 150 major laws to 
regulate the social impact of business activity. From the standpoint of 
the businessman, therefore, it would seem that we have all the regula-
tory control that any economy can withstand. Indeed, some major cor-
porations have apparently launched a rather large campaign to convince 
the American people that government regulation is out of control. 
And yet . . . And yet, year after year some new piece of corporate 
neglect or law-breaking either mocks the controls we have, or suggests 
that they have failed again. I am not talking here about the bush-league 
infractions that any human enterprise will exhibit from time to time, 
but serious violations—sometimes condoned at the highest corporate 
level—both of our laws and of the norms of responsible business be-
havior. PCB's from General Electric plants have profoundly damaged 
the mighty Hudson—leading to a ban on commercial fishing—and you 
know of Kepone, Love Canal and other incidents. 
In view of one revelation after another of this type, and others 
beyond the environmental realm, much of the current corporate pro-
testation against government regulation rings awfully hollow . . . es-
pecially when companies and entire industries are quite willing to 
support government regulation when it suits them. In spite of all the 
praise lavished upon the concept of competition by business spokesmen 
and their copywriters, we see the trucking industry today appalled at 
the prospect of deregulation, and gearing up a massive political action 
campaign to fight it. 
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Corporate complaints about government regulation are perfectly 
understandable in a human way. Yet virtually every environmental 
regulation has its genesis in some problem that threatened the public 
and finally brought a legitimate public demand for governmental action. 
Regulation is not going to go away until the problems do. The way we 
regulate can and must be improved, but let us face the fact that a con-
tinued high level of government regulatory activity is essential to 
national goals of paramount importance—to controlling cancer and 
protecting health, to preventing consumer fraud and deception to clean-
ing up air and water pollution, to reducing oil imports and conserving 
energy, to protecting us from improperly sited or mismanaged nuclear 
power facilities—and I could go on, as you know, with a very long list. 
One particular basis being used to attack environmental regulations 
today is that they are inflationary. Well, it just ain't so. The most recent 
comprehensive analysis of the inflationary impact of pollution control 
regulations was performed by Data Resources, Inc., at the behest of the 
Council on Environmental Quality. DRI's study indicates that, for the 
period 1970-1986, federal air and water pollution control requirements 
will add an average or 0.3% to the annual rate of increase in the Con-
sumer Price Index, with the 1978 figure estimated at 0.1%. 
The first point to note is that, even by standard economic measures, 
the inflationary impact of environmental programs is quite minor. 
Moreover, any conceivable modification of federal environmental regu-
lations would produce no significant reduction in the overall CPI. If the 
inflationary impact of these requirements could be reduced by a fourth 
—a substantial relaxation—the CPI's increase would be restrained by 
less than 0.05% : the net effect of even draconian measures could be 
the difference between a 7.00% and a 7.05% increase in the CPI. So 
we must look elsewhere than environmental regulations for the sources 
of inflation, and for the proper targets of our anti-inflation efforts. 
The third of the three challenges I mentioned earlier is to improve 
existing regulatory efforts by supplementing them with new and innova-
tive approaches. Certainly the most widely discussed of these is the 
increased use of economic incentives such as emission charges and non-
compliance fees as a complement to the standard-setting approach to 
regulation. We should continue to build increased economic incentives 
and disincentives into our pollution control efforts. 
A related idea—one which has received less attention in the past but 
which could become a major issue in the near future—is victim com-
pensation. The theory here is to ensure that the victims of exposure to 
toxic chemicals, whether workers or members of the general public, 
are fully and adequately compensated by the company or companies 
that are responsible. This compensation, on the "polluter pays" prin-
ciple, would not only be equitable from the injured party's perspective 
but would provide a strong deterrent against harmful releases and ex-
posures by manufacturers and others. A number of mechanisms have 
been suggested for ensuring this type of compensation. They range from 
improving state workers' compensation programs to creating a new 
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federal right of action that victims can pursue in court without having 
the entire burden of proof on their shoulders. In my judgment, this is a 
very promising area for further exploration. 
My final suggestion is that we pay more attention to matters of cor-
porate responsibility and accountability. Two types of nonmarket forces 
influence the corporation: in addition to the government controls we 
have been discussing, there are the internal controls exercised by those 
who directly manage or run the firm. We have tended strongly in the 
recent past to force good citizenship on corporations from the outside 
rather than on promoting social responsibility on the inside. The result 
has been something of a vicious cycle: the intensity of government 
regulation has tended to lead business to abandon its own sense of 
responsibility in favor of the philosophy that that which is not pro-
scribed by law is permitted. This leads to questionable corporate activi-
ties and, in turn, provokes still greater regulation. 
Both sides—business and government—stand to gain from a new 
approach which supplements traditional regulation with a new focus 
on efforts to improve corporate governance. 
From business' perspective, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps 
made the point well in recent testimony before Congress: 
"To the extent business helps (through improved corporate 
social performance) to deal with issues that might otherwise 
prompt government regulation, it serves its own economic 
interests." 
Secretary Kreps made another point that day that every business 
leader agitated by government intrusion should remember: business 
cannot responsibly call for less government regulation without also 
addressing those social issues and needs that prompt the calls for more 
regulation. 
In my judgment, business leaders, government officials and the public 
must work together to put the concepts of corporate social responsi-
bility and accountability into routine practice. It is unlikely that this 
will happen as long as the laws that determine the way corporations 
conduct their "internal" affairs remain so primitive. As far back as the 
1890's, New Jersey and Delaware competed to see who could water 
down their laws most to attract corporate charters. Delaware won; by 
1934, one-third of the corporations listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change were incorporated in Delaware. 
Partly because of this auctioning-off of corporate controls to attract 
business, the legal institutions for corporate governance—the stock-
holders and the directors—function as little more than rubber stamps 
for management decisions. Those that are affected most by the corpora-
tion's decisions—labor, consumers, the community at large—have least 
to say in its decisions. 
As a solution to these ills, I think it's time for a healthy dose of 
democracy in corporate decisionmaking. Two fundamental elements of 
democracy are participation by and accountability to the people whose 
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lives the corporation affects. I have two proposals which I'd like to 
offer today for bringing greater participation and accountability into 
corporate affairs, and I don't believe either risks the economic benefits 
that corporations have and must continue to provide. Neither proposal 
is fully developed or final in my own mind, but they do indicate the 
type of steps I think are needed. 
The first proposal is that the independence and representativeness 
of the boards of directors of all large corporations be assured. To ac-
complish this, every large corporation should be required to have on its 
board of directors a strong majority of members who come from outside 
corporate management, so that, say, two-thirds or more of the directors 
of these companies would be unencumbered by relationships (such as 
significant business relations to the corporation) which limit their ability 
to provide an independent review of management. Of these independent 
directors, about half—or a third of total directors—should be directly 
representative of the public communities affected by the company's 
activities: consumers, environmentalists, employees, citizens from plant 
towns, and so on. 
Regarding the proposal that the company's constituencies be repre-
sented on the board, I'm not talking about dragging just anybody in 
off the street simply because he or she belongs to an environmental 
group. Such "public directors," in addition to being representative of 
constituencies I've mentioned, would have to wear two hats and share 
responsibility with other directors for the corporation's profitability. 
And who is to decide who these directors are? There are several possi-
bilities, but the simplest is to let the shareholders vote for candidates 
for the potential slots, much as they vote for directors now. 
The second proposal is that major corporations be required to pre-
pare a periodic social audit or report which will provide the public with 
the information needed for determining whether the company is a good 
citizen and also provide shareholders with the information they need to 
make socially responsible decisions in buying and voting their shares. 
Social reports are now required in several European countries where 
they are viewed in part as an alternative both to central government 
controls and to the traditional market, which is no longer felt to be 
capable of needing the broad spectrum of social needs. 
What type of information could such a social audit contain? In the 
environmental area, the kind of information the public and many in-
vestors want corporations to disclose is succinct factual information on 
what the company's activities do to the environment, on whether the 
company follows enlightened environmental practices, and on whether 
it is in compliance with federal and other laws which protect the 
environment. 
These are three areas—economic incentives, victim compensation 
and corporate accountability—that we should explore vigorously as 
supplements to traditional regulatory approaches. If we pursue these 
newer ideas while continuing the steady, strong commitment to enforc-
ing the goals of the Toxic Substance Control Act and the Clean Air 
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and Water Acts, then I think we will have learned the lesson of Kepone 
and the suffering of all those caught in that calamity will not have been 
for naught. 
Dean Spong: Thank you, Gus, for a thoughtful and provocative talk. 
We appreciate your coming to Williamsburg to address this conference 
and are pleased that you have provided us with so much to think 
about on the evening before we examine federal legislation dealing 
with toxic and hazardous substances. 
Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes our program for today. The 
conference will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9 A.M. at Millington 
Hall. 
III 
WHAT ARE THE FEDERAL LAWS THAT GOVERN 
HAZARDOUS AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN THE 
GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, THE WORKPLACE, 
AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS? 
INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR SCOTT C. WHITNEY 
MARSHALL-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW 
CO-MODERATOR OF THE FEDERAL PANEL 
Professor Whitney: I am pleased to have this opportunity, with the 
assistance of Visiting Professor Waite, who will take over the moder-
ator function this afternoon, to welcome a distinguished panel of speak-
ers and commentators who will supplement our understanding of the 
regulation of toxic and hazardous substances by addressing the federal 
initiatives that have been undertaken to protect public health and the 
environment. 
Our first speaker will he Mr. Steve Jellinek of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
Mr. Jellinek: Thank you, Professor Whitney. This morning I want to 
describe how the Environmental Protection Agency is working to pro-
tect public health and the environment from the hazards of toxic 
chemical substances, both as products and as unintended by-products 
and wastes of our highly industrialized society. 
In doing so, I am acutely aware of the objective of this conference, 
which is to examine whether existing Federal and State laws are ade-
quate to avert future hazardous and toxic substances calamities, includ-
ing those of the kind that befell the State of Virginia several years ago 
with Kepone. 
EPA, of course, has been given a lion's share of the responsibility 
for controlling hazardous chemicals under six major laws: the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Resource Conservation Recovery 
Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, Each of these laws is designed, in whole or in 
part, to prevent the serious human health and environmental risks that 
may be posed by toxic substances in commercial chemicals, pesticides, 
wastes, and air and water pollutants. 
The job Congress has given us to do under all of these laws is a little 
like trying to juggle six cut-glass vases while running the 100-yard 
dash ... barefoot. 
Consider the following mandates: 
--For TSCA . . . develop adequate data and information on the 
effects of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the 
environment, and assure that those chemicals which present an 
unreasonable risk of injury are regulated to reduce risk; 
—for FIFRA .. protect public health and the environment from 
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unreasonable adverse effects of pesticide products, while permit-
ting the necessary beneficial uses of pest-control technologies; 
—for RCRA . . . assure that both hazardous and nonhazardous solid 
wastes are disposed of in environmentally sound ways, and con-
serve natural resources both directly and through resource recovery 
from wastes; 
—for the Clean Air Act . protect the public health and welfare 
from the harmful effects of air pollution and insure that existing 
clean air is protected from significant deterioration by controlling 
and preventing harmful substances from entering the ambient air; 
—for the Clean Water Act . . . restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, with 1977 
amendments giving added emphasis to toxic water pollutants; 
—and finally, for the Safe Drinking Water Act . . . protect and im-
prove the quality of the Nation's drinking water supply by estab-
lishing drinking water standards that specify maximum permissible 
contaminant levels. 
The potential universe of problems that require the Agency's atten-
tion under each of these laws is enormous. For example: 
—we know that the health and environmental hazards stemming 
from our society's heavy reliance on commercial chemical sub-
stances reach into virtually every nook and cranny of modern 
life. Nothing we touch, smell, consume, or otherwise use through-
out a given day hasn't in turn been affected in some way by 
chemicals. 
—Conventional chemical pesticides, by definition, are hazardous. 
While their benefits are often self-evident, their risks often arc 
not . . . especially cancer, birth defects, and gene mutations. Mil-
lions of Americans are exposed knowingly and unknowingly, will-
ingly and unwillingly, to pesticides in and around their homes, their 
places of work, and their recreation areas, as well as in the food 
they eat and sometimes the water they drink. Some 35,000 pesti-
cides containing approximately 1,500 active ingredients are regis-
tered for use on the U. S. market today. 
—Improper disposal of hazardous waste constitutes an extremely 
serious environmental problem. Some 30-40 million tons of haz-
ardous waste are produced each year, with a recent EPA estimate 
holding that 80 to 90 percent of it is not being disposed of in 
ways that will meet forthcoming standards. For decades, we have 
been disposing of these chemicals without adequate safeguards. 
Thousands of potentially dangerous chemical dump sites exist 
throughout the country—with more than 800 presenting poten-
tially imminent threats to public health and the environment. 
—At least 65 separate classes of toxic water pollutants from some 
21 categories of industrial sources have been identified as high 
priority for control. 
—And finally, new attention is focusing on potentially dangerous 
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toxic chemicals that are fouling the air around industrial sites 
throughout the country. 
I believe EPA is doing a credible job in beginning to address this 
universe of potential problems, but it's also clear that we have only 
just begun to scratch the surface. 
Just as the problems addressed by each of these laws did not develop 
overnight, so they will not be eliminated overnight—no matter how 
strong our commitment. 
And despite growing public concern about high taxes, inflation, and 
the economic impacts of government regulation, public opinion polls 
consistently conclude that the majority of Americans are solidly behind 
these national efforts to control chemical hazards. 
In fact, in one area—keeping toxic substances off of the marketplace 
—most Americans think that the government is not moving fast enough. 
A recent ABC News-Harris Survey reported that while 29 percent of 
Americans believe the government is moving at the right speed to clean 
up chemical hazards on the market, and 5 percent think we are going 
too fast, most-51 percent—think we should move faster. 
President Carter's proposed budget for fiscal 1980 reflects this senti-
ment: while the total budget calls for an overall reduction in Federal 
employment and a major effort to reduce the annual deficit, EPA's 
operating budget provides moderate increases in staff and money re-
sources—much of it going directly into the Agency's steeped-up efforts 
to implement the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. I would like 
to focus the remainder of my remarks this morning on this Act and its 
promise. TSCA gives EPA a mandate to protect public health and the 
environment from the unreasonable risks of chemical substances. As I 
have already noted, of course, TSCA is not the first Federal law to 
address the serious health and environmental problems associated with 
toxic chemicals in our society. In addition to the six EPA-administered 
statutes that have toxics provisions, eight others are administered by 
the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the 
Departments of Transportation and Agriculture. 
With all of these other laws, you may ask, doesn't TSCA seem a bit 
redundant? 
Much of the 5-year debate in Congress that preceded TSCA's final 
enactment in October 1976 focused on various aspects of that very 
question. In the end, Congress and the President concluded—with the 
support of an extraordinarily broad-based coalition of industry, labor, 
environmental, and consumer groups—that enactment of TSCA was 
necessary to fill a number of significant gaps that exist in the other 
Federal toxics-related laws. 
One of the major concepts—and one of the major distinctions—
underlying TSCA is tnat the public interest requires EPA to have the 
capacity to act before harmful substances threaten human health or the 
environment. The other laws, Congress found, largely enable the gov- 
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eminent to take action only after widespread exposure and possibly 
serious harm has occurred. 
And this gets to the very heart of TSCA's purpose—and distinctive-
ness—as perhaps our most far-reaching public-health law yet. 
TSCA provides EPA with comprehensive and flexible authority to 
gather basic information on chemicals, to identify harmful substances, 
and to control those toxic chemicals whose risks of injury to public 
health and the environment outweigh their benefits to society and the 
economy. The reach of the law is extremely broad. It encompasses the 
tens of thousands of chemical substances manufactured for commercial 
purposes and several million research and development chemicals. 
It makes the entire chemical industry subject to comprehensive Fed-
eral regulation for the first time. EPA's authority under TSCA is ex-
tended into virtually every facet of industry—product development, 
testing, manufacturing, processing, distribution, use, and disposal. And 
because the Act treats importers of chemical substances as if they were 
domestic manufacturers, it also expands EPA's responsibilities into the 
multi-billion-dollar international chemical trade. 
Most of TSCA's authorities, however, are discretionary—that means 
Congress has given EPA the necessary flexibility to apply a variety of 
non-regulatory and regulatory options in controlling the problems 
posed by toxic-chemical hazards in our society. 
Our actions, for example, can range from jawboning to non-manda-
tory guidelines, to limited regulation of handling, use, and labeling, or 
to outright bans on manufacturing and processing. 
With all of TSCA's flexibility and discretion, given limited resources, 
and in light of the enormous number of potential targets for attention, 
EPA's efforts to implement this law must be well-focused and deliberate. 
In this regard, we have already set a number of public and program 
priorities: 
From the standpoint of policy: 
—We will give highest priority to substances that pose the greatest 
risk as a function of both toxicity and exposure. 
—Chemical substances that may produce chronic and irreversible 
health effects such as cancer, birth defects, and gene mutations 
will take a higher priority than those that produce acute effects 
such as eye and skin irritations. 
—Substances that are widely dispersed in the environment and that 
may significantly disrupt ecosystems will take a higher priority 
than those that threaten individual species other than man. 
In developing our initial program for implementing TSCA 
—We will give highest priority to testing and information-gathering 
and to establishing the pre-manufacture notification program. This 
will help to build a firm basis for fulfilling TSCA's preventive 
health promise and for controlling potentially hazardous sub-
stances about which we currently know little or nothing. 
—At the same time, we will focus a significant proportion of our 
resources on assessing the risk of known high-toxicity, high-ex- 
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posure substances and on taking early regulatory action where 
those risks outweigh the chemical's benefits. 
—And finally, we will use actions under TSCA to promote effective 
control of toxic substances under other laws. 
I believe that these are sound priorities. They represent a responsible 
approach to the mammoth task we face in carrying out Congress' intent. 
Yet I am also aware of—and quite concerned about—an attitude of 
some within the chemical industry these days: that government is on 
some kind of a chemical "witch hunt"—that we view all chemicals as 
inherently "bad" until proven "good," and that we make our regulatory 
decisions largely on the basis of fear, emotion, and bias. 
This kind of paranoia about EPA and other regulatory agencies at 
best indicates a certain level of naivete and, at worst, represents a 
cynical attempt to undermine the broad national concensus in favor 
of protecting public health and the environment. 
The fact of the matter is that the regulatory process at EPA is tem-
pered in many ways that make it difficult for us to foist sloppy or poorly 
developed decisions on an unsuspecting industry. Let me give you a 
few examples: 
First, under the law EPA is bound to implement TSCA in a "reason-
able and prudent manner," and of course we must "consider the en-
vironmental, economic, and social impact of any action" we take. 
Second, the law provides ample opportunity for public and judicial 
review of EPA actions or non-actions. 
Third, in order to minimize the chance that we will be sued—and 
to maximize the chance that we will win if we are sued—EPA just has 
to do its homework. We must he well-prepared. Our decisions have to 
be documented and defensible. For example, the regulations for the 
chemical inventory reporting, the PCB ban, and pre-manufacture noti-
fication took literally thousands of hours each to develop. 
Fourth, beyond the requirements of the Administrative Procedures 
Act, EPA is committed to involving the public—including the chemical 
industry and other interested groups—in our decision-making process. 
The inventory, PCB, and pre-manufacture notification regulations are 
again instructive. We have held dozens of public meetings on them 
with representatives of industry, labor, environmental, and other groups. 
Fifth, at each step of the way toward a regulation EPA's decision 
makers are subject to careful scrutiny by interested parties inside gov-
ernment as well as by our outside constituencies. EPA's own internal 
decision and rule-making procedures require extensive coordination 
with other offices. Our colleagues in the Council of Economic Advisors, 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability, and the Department of Com-
merce keep close tabs on our activities. The Offices of Management and 
Budget takes a special interest in our resource requirements and moni-
tors the record-keeping and reporting we may require of industry. And 
five separate Congressional Committees exercise the Constitutional pre-
rogatives of guidance, oversight, and appropriations. 
These tempering factors notwithstanding, the fact remains that in a 
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society as intertwined as ours, characterized by a technology as complex 
and massive as ours, a substantial amount of regulation is necessary. 
We have to protect health, safety, and environmental integrity in situa-
tions where such protection exceeds the jurisdiction or self-interest of 
any corporation. And a further fact—one we are just beginning to 
recognize—is this: if, in the name of combating inflation, we reduce or 
postpone governmental control of potentially harmful activities now, 
we may produce vastly greater costs and inflation later. 
Take, for example, the well-known case of Love Canal in Niagara 
Falls, New York. Originally intended to provide hydroelectric power 
for new homes in a "dream" community, this three block long ditch 
was converted to a dumpsite in the 1920s. After roughly 30 years of 
use, it was covered over by the Hooker Chemical Company and sold 
to the city for a dollar. In the late 1950s, as homes were built around 
the site, a school was built on top of it. 
Niagara Falls and New York State are still trying to count the costs 
of that one-dollar "bargain." Over the years, 82 chemicals—11 of them 
suspected of being carcinogenic—percolated up through the soil as their 
containers rotted. At first, the results appeared minor: puddles of foul-
smelling substances formed, trees and gardens changed color, children 
returned from play with skin-rashes. Then, in the spring of 1978, an 
investigation by the New York State Health Department turned up a 
startling incidence of birth defects, miscarriages, and other abnor-
malities. 
So far, New York State has spent $23 million on cleaning up Love 
Canal. That expense includes evacuating 239 families, purchasing their 
homes, performing medical tests on the former residents, installing 
drainage pipes, and personnel costs for a task force of State employees. 
Claims against the chemical company are reported to exceed $2 billion. 
Even these dollar sums exclude costs that we have no way of measur-
ing: the life-long agony, for example, to one girl born with a cleft 
palate, an extra row of teeth, and slight mental retardation. 
Perhaps the most appalling fact of all is this: had the proper govern-
ment regulation been in force at the time, it would have cost Hooker 
Chemical Company a maximum of $4 million—that's in current, 1979 
dollars—. to find, construct, and seal a secure, hazardous waste facility. 
Instead, the public has already spent $23 million—and the ultimate 
cost to former Love Canal residents and to the company is beyond 
credible calculation. 
Two weeks ago, a trucker and his two sons were convicted in Raleigh 
of dumping PCBs along roadsides in North Carolina. Handling that 
waste properly would have cost about $100,000. Unless a simpler, 
equally safe method can be devised, that contaminated soil will have to 
be dug up and shipped to a secure site . at a cost of $2 to $12 
million. 
Similarly, an investment of about $200,000 at the Life Sciences plant 
in Hopewell, Virginia, would have made it safe for the production of 
Kepone. You are all too familiar with the consequences of the owners' 
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failure to make that expenditure. To date, Allied Chemical Company 
has reportedly paid some $20 million in fines, settlements, and legal 
fees—with some suits by workers claiming nerve damage and sterility 
still outstanding. Furthermore, EPA estimates that it would cost $8 
billion to clean up the James River . . . if that can ever be done. The 
cruel irony here is that Kepone was a relatively minor product, for 
which Allied's net profit never exceeded $600,000 per year. 
Each of these examples—and I could cite dozens more—presents us 
with a case in which enormous social costs stemmed from the lack of 
environmental regulation, or from the violation of regulations and laws 
that were in effect. But as dramatic as these examples are, this does 
not mean that the present body of Federal regulations is sacrosanct. 
Far from it. 
We know, for example, that there are outdated regulations, and we 
expect that others should not have been written in the first place. We 
are trying to get both types off the books, and to insure—given our 
current state of knowledge—that the benefits of new regulations justify 
the costs they impose. 
What we do not need, however, is a regulatory book-burning, for 
in the interest of reducing costs today, we may create nightmares for 
ourselves tomorrow—and have to pay a much higher price to recover 
from them. 
Let me close by borrowing a thought from a TV commercial: for 
decades, as an airline ad of some years back expressed it, we have been 
a "Go now, pay later" society. As an expression of the credit system, 
pure and simple, this principle—based ultimately on faith in ourselves—
has not served us badly. In purchases ranging from refrigerators and 
vacation trips through new homes, credit has enabled us to enjoy now 
things we really could not afford now. It has changed us from a nation 
of renters to a nation of homeowners. It has stimulated demand, 
created jobs, and provided most of us with a high standard of living. 
Of course, it has put us deeply in debt, a debt which we must ultimately 
pay off. And when the "Go now, pay later" principle is extended beyond 
the purely fiscal realm to the broadly social and environmental—when it 
becomes a state of mind—the associated debt can guide us into national 
bankruptcy. Little by little, year by year, we can defer payment on our 
current obligations until—when the bill finally becomes due—we find 
we don't have enough assets to pay it. 
Our health, safety, and environmental regulations have begun to 
reverse this process. We are beginning to redress our past profligacy 
in treating our air, water, land, and health as goods without limit. We 
have made a start toward cleaning up the dirt and damage caused by a 
generation-long vacation financed only by an I.O.U. drawn on the 
future. 
That future has arrived. That I.O.U. has been presented. The vaca-
tion is over. 
At EPA, we arc doing our best to make sure that every regulation 
pays its own way in terms of avoiding risk and providing benefit. 
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But we are also doing our best to prevent a short-sighted, uniformed, 
intellectually anemic alarm over the immediate costs of regulation from 
reversing the repair work we have begun on our national home. As the 
man says, the choice is up to us: we can pay for that work now . . . or 
we can pay for it later. 
We have made the right choice. Let's pay now. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you, Mr. Jellinek. Our first commentator 
will be Frederick R. Anderson of the Environmental Law Institute. 
Mr. Anderson: Thank you, Professor Whitney. This is a valuable 
opportunity to make observations, hopefully helpful observations, on 
one of the most crucial public issues facing the nation today. I have 
been asked to take a few minutes to respond to Steven Jellinek, a 
federal official whose title, Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, describes pretty well the 
organizational niche in which he functions. Steve Jellinek's remarks 
give me the opportunity to reflect with you upon the performance which 
one may reasonably expect from the federal government in the control 
of toxic substances. A number of broad social problems fit the generali-
zations which one can make about toxic substances control. Thus in my 
remarks about the specific problem of toxic substances, I hope that I 
am able to raise for our consideration a series of wider questions about 
the role of the federal government in regulating complicated social 
problems. Toxic substances control is another of those areas in which 
legislative consensus on ends had not led naturally or automatically to 
effective administrative means to put consensus to work. Securing agree-
ment on what the government's objectives should be does not ensure 
success in such difficult policy areas as health care delivery, relieving 
urban congestion, providing an ample supply of energy, and cleaning 
up the environment. Deciding how the job should be done has become 
an equally difficult, critical issue. Although a legislature may enact a 
new policy toward toxic substances, someone still must devise effective 
implements for social intervention.' Can we expect that the federal 
government will be able to implement effectively the policies embodied 
by Congress in toxic substances legislation? Let me dwell for a moment 
on why I do not think he and his colleagues can be entirely successful. 
Let me first ask you to contrast two observations. First, Congress 
has enormously enlarged the federal role in controlling toxic substances. 
Even here, at a state-oriented meeting on toxic substances, the federal 
role necessarily occupies over half the program. Steve, and others yes-
terday and today, have spoken of the broad scope of federal activity. 
By my count, eight federal agencies now administer nineteen statutes 
regulating toxic substances (see Appendix A). 
Allen Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy, 
(Brookings: 1975) at 113-120; Christopher T. Hill, "Dynamics of Regulation: 
Technical and Political Change," in Proceedings: Accountability of Academic 
Health Science Centers, Annual Meeting, Association for Academic Health Cen-
ters, October 1978, pp. 38-49. 
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Consider also, in the second place, what our conception is of the 
regulatory task. Our toxic substances control policies are end-oriented, 
in that they focus upon what can be done about individual chemicals 
and individual hazardous waste dumps. Steve said that 44,000 chemicals 
are in commerce. Many millions have documented chemical formulas. 
Luther Carter, who will appear in a few moments on this panel, wrote 
recently in Science Magazine that approximately 700 new chemicals 
enter the commercial stream annually." Steve has also said today that 
there are 35,000 registered pesticides which contain about 1,500 active 
ingredients. Some 30-40 million tons of hazardous wastes have ended 
up in an estimated 30,000 dump sites, of which 2,000 are already be-
lieved to pose substantial human health risks. 3 Hence, although we 
expect a lot of the federal government, the sheer numbers appear likely 
to overwhelm even the resources which the federal government com-
mands. The federal apparatus, despite our high expectations of it, 
probably will not be adequate to protect public health, safety, and wel-
fare. If the federal government fails, that failure—partial or complete—
will be all the more disappointing by virtue of the combination of our 
high expectations and our end-oriented approach to the task of control. 
Although, as you will see in a few moments, I do not view them as 
the nub of the problem, some of the limitations on what the federal 
government can achieve are chronic to that enterprise. A balance of 
factors keeps any single initiative in federal government from gaining 
overwhelming momentum. Perhaps on balance this checking of vast 
power is a good thing. The government, like a great flywheel, turns 
calmly on regardless of the new policy initiatives and staffing changes 
(even on lower agency personnel levels) which a vast new social prob-
lem like hazardous wastes would seem to require. Job freezes present a 
chronic, sometimes paradoxical fact of life in Washington. For instance, 
Mr. Jellinek and his colleagues are now being exhorted to do more, 
but with less resources, in order to meet the Carter Administration's 
desire for more effective, but less costly government regulation. At the 
same time, his office must bid for talent in a pool where most of the 
incentives for professional or scientific advancement lie on the side of 
private industrial and teaching communities. Further, the reward struc-
ture for talented individuals is determined by a whole host of factors 
that extend beyond the pay scale, although even the federal pay scale is 
well below that of its competitors. Thus the federal government comes 
up short, losing good people while arming its adversaries with brains 
and expertise. 
I want to emphasize again that the problems of the bureaucracy are 
not evanescent. The problems with which Mr. Jellinek must cope are 
characteristic of new administrations which come into office with some 
elan but rapidly lose momentum in the existing dynamics of the federal 
2 Luther J. Carter, "Yearly Report on Carcinogens Could be a Potential 
Weapon in the War on Cancer," 203 Science 526 (1979). 
3 Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, May 16, 1979, (statement of 
James W. Moorman, at 9). 
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government. I was intrigued recently to read a Brookings publication 
from about twenty years ago entitled The Job of the Federal Executive.' 
This book examines the laments of political appointees who came into 
the Eisenhower Administration charged up with visions of achieving a 
variety of substantive policy objectives. The parallel between Mr. Jellinek 
and his peers from another era and political party should ring true to 
him. The Eisenhower Republicans found to their dismay that the 
bureaucracy had its own agenda. Observed one, "As quickly as political 
executives come into office, they have to resist pressures to make them 
prisoners of their agencies. They have to meet so many demands, make 
so many contacts, process so much paper and attend so many meetings 
that they have little time for such matters as defining their own ob-
jectives." 5 Or take the comments of another dismayed Eisenhower ap-
pointee with the problem of interagency competition: "Everything a 
federal executive does impinges upon the authority of another agency. 
You are not free in personnel matters because of the authority of the 
Civil Service Commission. The Bureau of the Budget and the General 
Accounting Office limit your spending powers. . . . In government, you 
need a lot more time to accomplish something significant." a I do not 
want to burden you with quotes from two decades ago, but consider 
lastly the feelings of another appointee about intradepartmental "tradi-
tion." "The new executive comes into a department loaded with what 
we call tradition but which might more appropriately be termed bureau-
cratic habits and internal procedures. . . . It is more or less a system 
by which different parts of the same agency learn to tolerate each 
other." ' Subject to pressure from without and within, he goes on, the 
political appointee often ends up playing the role of apologist for his 
department. Sometimes his mission never gets beyond this task. The 
time-consuming, restrictive aspects of working in the federal govern-
ment, at least for these appointees, soon quelled individual expectations 
for achieving major changes. I hope Mr. Jellinek has been more success-
ful, but I doubt it. Certain of these problems today represent permanent 
institutional characteristics of a federal system. Running hard to stay in 
place may be one of the more permanent attributes of that system. 
Even accepting a certain amount of permanent institutional inertia 
in the federal system, recent concern over the economic impact of 
regulation and bureaucratic red tape has spurred interest in a type of 
regulatory reform which will not make Mr. Jellinek's task any easier. 
Since 1977, the following groups have been created to handle the inter-
agency aspects of federal regulation—the Interagency Regulatory 
Liaison Group, to coordinate the activities of the principal regulators 
of toxic substances; the Regulatory Council, to curb "costly bureau-
cratic inefficiency;" and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group of the 
Council on Wage and Price Stability, to review key regulatory analyses. 
4 Marver H. Bernstein, The lob of the Federal Executive, (Brookings: 1958). 
5 Id., at 13. 
6 Id., at 184. 
7 Id., at 196. 
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The President's March 23, 1978 Executive Order for the reform of the 
development of regulations has become part of the Administration's 
anti-inflation campaign:' Congress is also currently considering a num-
ber of bills for regulatory reform, including one submitted by the Ad-
ministration which includes requirements for cost-benefit analysis and 
mandatory "sunset" reviews.° But merely to address the problems of 
regulation does not provide alleviation. The additional groups and 
councils contribute their own paperwork and red tape to the pile. With 
additional reviews of statutes and regulations, a regulatory effort may 
find itself "due processed" to death before effective controls are put in 
place. This is without mentioning that cost-benefit analysis is in itself 
no panacea. Its inherent assumptions of a perfect market and singular 
policy objectives, and the uncertainties involved in estimating costs and 
benefits, limit the value of the method." 
Now, bearing this discussion in mind, I want to pursue my earlier 
question about what we can reasonably expect of the federal govern-
ment in the control of toxic substances and what directions we might 
want to take to improve its involvement. 
The current approach to control not only presents the federal govern-
ment with a nearly impossible task—regulating thousands of substances 
and products—but also connects regulation to industry at inefficient 
and unstrategic points. A different approach to regulation might begin 
with an examination of private institutional behavior and the incentives 
to which it responds, seeking to identify the patterns which companies' 
actions take. To what incentives do they cue? Which prompt their 
quickest responses? Examining incentives first, rather than immediately 
issuing a series of commands, would result ultimately, I would hope, in 
a federal effort which tries to change the way people, through their 
organized behavior, view their best interests. 
Perhaps I can usefully restate my idea in terms of leverage. The 
federal government should husband its limited resources, seeking to use 
them at the point where intervention will trigger the maximum chain of 
desired subsequent effects within the private sector. I think Gus Speth 
had this in mind last night when he spoke of corporate reform. 11 He 
reasoned that if federal regulation can affect corporate decision making 
before product lines are launched or corporate sub-entities created, then 
the government, through a corporate disclosure law or regulation of the 
composition of corporate boards, can influence that behavior through 
preventive, before-the-fact form of control. The current effort to 
8 Executive Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 3195 (March 23, 1978). 
9 S 262, 755, and 1291, 96th Congress, 1st sess., 1979. 
10 Frederick R. Anderson, "The Environmental Agenda in the 1980's: Eco-
nomics, Health and Safety, and the Andromeda Strain," discussion paper pre-
sented at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Chicago, 
Ill. (January 2, 1979). Available from the Environmental Law Institute. 
11  Gus Speth, "Towards a Better Bull's Eye: Corporate Responsibility and 
Accountability," (Nov. 28, 1978) American Bar Association—Natural Re-
sources Section, Washington, D.C. 
12 Meinolf Dierkes, "Corporate Social Performance in Germany: Conceptual 
Developments, Practical Experience and Political Interests," paper prepared for 
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regulate each dump or each pesticide encourages industry to defend 
products which ought never to have been produced. Focus on the 
thousands of end products dillutes regulatory power and diverts it from 
impact on the early, more crucial phases of industrial pollution. If end-
product safety is our goal, then it must also become the vital concern 
of chemical producers. This will occur only if society has greater lever-
age over early decision-making processes. 
Before considering some innovative ways through which the govern-
ment might increase its leverage, but at the cost of a large political and 
social effort, I would like to point out that possibilities exist within the 
current regulatory structure to increase leverage at the margin without 
significantly upsetting the status quo. (In asserting that points of maxi-
mum leverage do exist, I also emphasize that no single one of these will 
solve the problem of toxic substances control.) 
The effort to enact a policy for regulating chemicals by generic classes 
could be a partial solution. If families of chemical substances could be 
viewed as common threats to the public health and safety, swifter action 
on the part of the federal government would be possible. If scientifically 
viable, such an approach could provide greater security for product de-
velopment while saving the government the time and expense of han-
dling each substance separately. The same would be true of a statement 
of cancer "principles." Scientists might continue the dispute over how 
much is known of causation of cancer or other harms, but for the pur-
poses of acting under our statutes, a set of principles might be estab-
lished which would not be open to re-debate each time rule making 
commenced. 13 
These reforms, however, are only palliative. If we agree that the roots 
of the toxic substances problem penetrate to deeper corporate decision 
making levels, we need to examine the forces which operate at this level. 
In Where the Law Ends," Christopher Stone challenges the assumption 
that corporate decisions are based heavily, even exclusively, on maxi-
mizing profits. He presents a list of other relevant factors, such as the 
need to minimize liability, the insulation of top executive salaries from 
market perturbations, prestige, and even a type of organizational inertia 
similar to that I have already commented upon within the federal gov-
ernment. Applying Stone's insights, locating the point of greatest lever-
age will not lie merely in harnessing the profit motive. 
Stone points out that in many ways our current laws actually dis-
courage certain types of information flow within corporations. But, "if 
the law says that the organizational pathways have to lay certain in- 
the meeting of the Academy of Management, Joint Session of the International 
Management and the Social Issues Division, San Francisco, August 1978. Dierkes 
discusses the possibilities for corporate social accountability through reporting 
to the public. 
13 OSHA is expected to publish its generic concept policy within the next few 
months. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Identification, Classifi-
cation, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Occupational 
Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54.148 (1977). 
14 Christopher Slone, Where the Law Ends (Harper and Row: 1975), 
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formation at the feet of specified people, it can effectively do away with 
the various defenses of 'ignorance' that the officers might otherwise 
subsequently raise." 13 If, for example, we were to focus on the ques-
tion of board composition or disclosure, we would first want to ascer-
tain and, if necessary, alter by law, the relationships and patterns of 
accountability that exist between stockholders, management, workers, 
and even the public. Directly altering paths of information flow might 
prove a powerful tool for this purpose. To take toxic substances control 
as an example, under current regulation the producers of toxic sub-
stances have a strong incentive not to learn which substances are most 
likely to cause eventual harm. Even with the current prevention-oriented 
measures, as in pre-manufacturing notice, there is no penalty for 
ignorance. A change in the legal status of particular paths of information 
flow might provide a mechanism for eliminating the current incentive 
not to know. 
Obviously, if we enact laws which merely dictate new paths of in-
formation flow without also removing the benefits of "not knowing," we 
will only superficially affect corporate behavior. What is needed are 
different approaches to reverse these incentive patterns, to change the 
kinds of facts that producers will want to know. New measures could 
place the maximum possible burden on producers to identify the sub-
stances that are most likely to cause harm and to do so as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Mechanisms could be devised to change the 
strong economic incentives that producers have to fully exploit a market 
before they learn the harmful consequences of their activities. 
At this point, I want to consider how we might actually institute such 
changes within the federal government. As Eisenhower's people learned, 
and as I am sure Steve continues to experience, important federal de-
partures are rare. Thus a threshold criterion for change must be in-
crementalism. Only through gradual steps can we hope to move the 
large federal system of checks and balances. And, in compliance with 
the current demand for simplicity and efficiency in the federal govern-
ment, the new measures must demonstrate cost-effectiveness. We shall 
also have to accomplish many of these objectives through existing insti-
tutions. In a sense this is our only alternative, but we might also succeed 
in avoiding some of the political opposition that will greet a radically 
different program which generates its own, new bureaucracy. 
This will require that we draw on and improve elements of our 
present system such as workman's compensation and common law relief. 
In theory, common law money damage recovery is the ultimate threat 
to corporate misbehavior. No administrative bureaucracy or new legisla-
tion is necessary to invoke it. But I am not convinced that it functions 
as an effective deterrent to the kinds of misbehavior which Steve has 
documented. This is partly because of the time frame involved in real-
izing injury from toxic substances. Latency periods may extend 30 to 
40 years. Hence the statutes of limitation may have already extinguished 
causes of action before a party knows of the harm done. In the state of 
15 Id., at 204. 
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Virginia, I believe the limit is two years. The combined problems of the 
statute of limitations, burden of proof, permissible types of evidence 
and evidentiary conclusions, and the limited elements of damage awards 
pose fairly substantial barriers to common law relief. 
I do believe, however, that various compensation schemes could go 
a long way towards changing the producer's perception of his own best 
interest." Ultimate financial responsibility would help promote longer, 
more thorough pre-market testing, quicker removal of suspect products 
from the market, stricter oversight by corporate boards, and less reli-
ance on public agencies that are ill-equipped to identify potentially 
harmful substances and to penetrate the data bases of corporations. 
As it stands now, most types of regulation promote active contests 
between government and industry. Rather than focusing on the issue of 
product safety, corporations respond with a game-like strategy to the 
maze of regulatory requirements. Successfully running the regulatory 
gauntlet becomes the goal. If producers are able to elude the regulator's 
grasp for even a limited number of years, they "win," and then the 
human and financial burdens of injury fall upon the victims or upon 
health care programs which are ultimately funded by the public. 
We must establish the cost association between present activity and 
future consequence, between present risk and future harm. After exam-
ining patterns of incentives and paths of information flow within the 
private sector, a "closed system" might be designed which would 
eliminate all real alternatives to some form of social accountability for 
any harm which does in fact eventually flow from dealing in toxic sub-
stances. 
These in brief are my ideas of how we, together with Steve and his 
colleagues, might begin to think. We stand at the beginning of what I 
am sure will be a long evolutionary federal response to toxic substances. 
As you see, I have some tentative ideas about where the evolution 
should go. I hope I have been able to provoke you into examining how 
you would chart our future course. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Our next commentator is Luther 
Carter of Science Magazine. 
Mr. Carter: I'm delighted to be here. I worked for nine years for the 
Virginian-Pilot in Norfolk and feel very much on home turf here in 
Tidewater. 
Anyone undertaking to run programs as large and complex as TSCA 
and FIFRA, the pesticide law, is entitled to a long period of grace. So 
it is certainly not my intention to criticize Mr. Jellinek for EPA's not 
having made greater progress to date. The job would be daunting even 
if undertaken in the most favorable of circumstances. It is certainly my 
view that circumstances are in many important respects most unfavor- 
16 Frederick R. Anderson, testimony before the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection and Finance, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
(on proposed amendments to TSCA), Serial No, 95-150, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 
348 (July 25, 1978). 
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able. Apart from all of the accusations and criticisms about regulation 
of all kinds being an inflationary and often ill considered nuisance, 
there is a more fundamental problem that besets the regulators. They 
are, I believe, the victims of a dilemma that is fundamental to the 
regulatory process. 
On the one hand there is an urgent need to remove from the general 
environment and the work place chemicals that can cause cancer or do 
other harm, or at a minimum to reduce human exposure to these sub-
stances, of which there are a large if undetermined number. The number 
of known and suspected animal carcinogens, for instance, already runs 
into the hundreds and it will probably be constantly increasing as more 
bioassays are completed. 
On the other hand, there is an elaborate system of procedural and 
judicial safeguards that governs the regulatory system and insures that 
none of the affected parties will be denied that precious thing we call 
due process. These safeguards, including the rights of discovery, cross-
examination and all the rest, represent a part of the American system 
that few of us would willingly forego. And even apart from the political 
clout that industry has, I believe that Congress will want these safe-
guards to remain essentially in place, although occasionally modifica-
tions may be made in the hope of greater regulatory efficiency. 
Yet, where there is an iron determination on the part of industry 
to use the system of safeguards to thwart or delay regulation of toxic 
substances, the result can be something very close to regulatory 
paralysis. This is, I believe, much more true in the regulation of toxic 
substances than in other fields of environmental regulation because it 
often must proceed in the face of some degree of scientific uncertainty. 
You cannot, and certainly should not, wait for ten, twenty, thirty years 
to see if a certain substance found to be carcinogenic in well conducted 
animal tests is in fact a human carcinogen. By then the incidence of 
cancer could be of epidemic proportions. But even though there may 
be strong evidence that a chemical is likely to have dangerous chronic 
effects in certain concentrations, the companies producing it can often 
delay if not prevent all together, the imposition of reduced exposure 
tolerances by making much of the fact that the evidence is not con-
clusive and that some scientists question its sufficiency. 
The aldrin-dieldrin story is very much in point, even if it is perhaps 
an extreme case. Aldrin, as you will remember, was a chlorinated 
hydrocarbon pesticide manufactured by Shell Chemical Company and 
much used by farmers to prevent infestations of corn soil insects and 
other pests. The first tentative evidence that dieldrin, aldrin's meta-
bolite, was a carcinogen in the mouse turned up as early as 1962. By 
the 1970's it had been shown to be carcinogic in five different strains 
of mice. In the minds of many experts in the field of carcinogenisis, 
and the opinion of the EPA hearing examiner and the administrator 
and the appeal court judges this was a clearly sufficient basis for 
banning all major uses of aldrin, especially inasmuch as dieldrin had 
become ubiquitious in the environment and was present in the tissues 
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of virtually all humans included in EPA monitoring surveys. 
Nevertheless, Shell Chemical fought this proposed action all the 
way. It took nearly five years, from 1970 until 1975 for the adminis-
trative and court proceedings leading to a permanent ban on 
aldrin-dieldrin to run their course. This dangerous pesticide was accorded 
virtually the same legal rights as a criminal at the bar and only the 
classiest of our criminal defendants can command all the expensive 
lawyers and expert witnesses that were used in the defense of aldrin. 
(I might point out parenthetically that it took less than five years for 
the Watergate defendants to be indicted and convicted and for them to 
serve out their sentences and to write a half dozen best sellers.) The 
aldrin-dieldrin case might seem an extreme example, but it is not so 
untypical that it doesn't apply here. 
The heptachloradine story is much the same, also mirex. Except in 
this case, the story does not even have a happy ending. Mirex is back 
as the dominate ingredient in farramicide which Mr. Costle, the EPA 
Administrator has permitted to be used for emergency control of pests, 
doing so apparently in response to heavy pressures from Congress 
which always has the power to tie his hands in any number of new ways. 
I recognize that with the enactment of TSCA and last year's amend-
ment to the pesticide Act, EPA may have an opportunity to deal with 
the problem of toxic substances in a somewhat more effective and ex-
peditious manner than in the past. But as Mr. Jellinek, who seems 
given to understatement upon occasion, has told people in the chemical 
industry, over-regulation is not one of the facts of life as he knows it. I 
will venture the prediction that the pesticide and other chemical manu-
facturers wilt be able to keep the regulatory process moving at no better 
than a glacial pace if they wish it to be that way. And I have seen little 
evidence they want it to be any other way. 
When you consider that there are already some 70,000 chemicals in 
commercial use and that hundreds of them are suspected to be carcino-
genic or to be otherwise harmful it is evident that barring some truly 
dramatic change in the weather, EPA and other regulatory agencies 
may never really get on top of the problem, however hard they may try. 
Indeed, it could turn out that what they are engaged in is not so much 
a regulatory process as a kind of moral or religious exercise—good for 
the soul and the spirit, but without much worldly effect. 
Is there any way that the problem of controlling toxic substances can 
be met? I would not presume to say one way or the other, but I am 
convinced that it will never be met in the absence of a new kind of 
climate of opinion in Washington, in the country at large, and in in-
dustry—a change to the effect that the problem is regarded as so 
serious, so dangerous, that willful—or even indiscriminate—use of the 
elaborate system of legal and procedural safeguards to prolong the use 
and profitability of compounds that are either known to be hazardous 
or highly suspect will be recognized as reckless and selfish behavior. 
EPA and the other regulatory agencies, the environmental groups and 
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all of the interested parties should be alert to every opportunity to 
foster such a climate of opinion. 
In this connection, it is worth calling attention to the new amend-
ments to the National Cancer Act which were adopted last year. Al-
though apparently little known, they are in my view of great potential 
importance. In particular, they call for HEW (Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare) to issue each year a report on carcinogens. 
This report is supposed to contain a list of all known or suspected 
carcinogens and, along with it, estimates as to the extent of human ex-
posure. Then, on top of that, there is to be an evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of regulation in reducing exposure. This is a very tall order. 
Steve Jellinek and I were talking about it last night and he thinks that 
just the task of making useful estimates of exposure is an enormous 
one. But nevertheless I think it is really important that this be gotten 
on with. If properly done this report could be a compelling document. 
and I think, it is clearly in the interests of all the regulatory agencies—
EPA, OSHA, the FDA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
—to lend every assistance to the National Cancer Institute and the 
other HEW agencies in making the report as complete as possible. 
Industry, and the chemical industry in particular, is making a religion 
out of cost benefit assessment, with the emphasis heavily on the cost 
side. On the face of it, one cannot and should not object to such assess-
ments. But there is every reason for the regulatory agencies, the Con-
gress and all other groups that are interested to insist that the assess-
ments done by industry (and industry after all has most of the cost 
data) be credible and not self-serving. The Manufacturing Chemists As-
sociation is, I think, to be commended for its current efforts in planning 
a cost impact study which, if all goes as the MCA hopes, will be open 
to independent audit by the General Accounting Office. Also the MCA 
has had plans to appoint an advisory committee of prominent outsiders 
to help in the design of the study and in the communication of the 
results. 
But, in my opinion, this kind of thing is not enough to make indus-
try's positions fully credible or socially responsible. Advisory commit-
tees often turn out to be not much more than a public relations device 
and, in matters as complex as this independent audit, can prove to be 
illusory. 
I want to touch on somewhat the same thing that Gus Speth devel-
oped last night about corporate responsibility and accountability. I think 
it is very important that this be a part of the effort to control toxic sub-
stances and cope with environmental problems of all kinds. In 1977 
Union Carbide elected Russell Train to its Board of Directors and put 
him on two of the Board's key committees, including its policy com-
mittee. This was, in my judgment a praiseworthy step by one major 
company to involve a prominent and highly knowledgeable outsider in 
corporate decision making. A lot more of this kind of thing could, and 
I think should, be done and done as a matter of course. The whole sub-
ject of corporate responsibility and corporate governance should be 
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made a major part of the current discussion of government regulation. 
If corporations are going to insist that the regulatory burden be lightened, 
let's see the evidence that they are willing to weigh the social and en-
vironmental impacts of their decisions much more carefully than they 
have in the past. On this latter point I want to quote something Russell 
Train said to an ARCO Chemical Company Management Conference 
some time in 1977. He said, 
"A company's environmental and health problems must figure 
as an integral part of the decision making on both old and new 
products. There must be a process for insuring that those 
problems do not get buried, that they be surfaced at a higher 
level of management. Decisions involving product risk should 
not be made at the plant level. Where there is a possible 
trade-off between profits, on the one hand, and protection of 
health and environment on the other, a strong case can be 
made for presenting the issue to the board of directors. Pre-
sumably a company's board is the one place with implicit re-
sponsibility for balancing the corporate with the public in-
terest." 
Now it would be interesting, I think, to know at what level in Allied 
Chemical Company it was decided to contract out to Life Sciences the 
production of Kepone, a compound whose dangerous properties had 
been known for many, many years. The balancing process that Train 
speaks of need not always involve questions of whether the company 
should forego in the public interest opportunities to turn a profit. It 
could, I should think, just as well lead to a concentrated search for 
profit making opportunities in the manufacture of compounds known to 
be benign in their environmental effects. 
I wonder, for example, whether the pesticides manufacturers have 
even begun to exploit in full their chances for profit in the field of 
integrated pest management. Now I understand, too, that there are 
substitutes available for benzene which is one of the most heavily used 
chemicals in our society. It is in gasoline which we are exposed to 
when we are at self-service pumps. It's in many other products. It's in 
the work place. (And it is also in great contention, with the industries 
that manufacture it just having won a decision in the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals against a proposed OSHA regulation to reduce ex-
posure in the work place from, I think, 10 parts per million to one part 
per million. The reason the Court acted as it did is that OSHA was not 
able to produce evidence showing that the health benefits of that re-
duction in exposure would be worth the cost.) 
Now the reform of corporate governance and greater social respon-
sibility on the part of chemical manufacturers is certainly only one part 
of the answer of controlling toxic substances, but I would judge it to be 
a highly significant part. The opportunities for chemical producers and 
the expensive lawyers they retain to use procedural and judicial safe-
guards to frustrate the regulatory process are simply without end. It is 
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beyond the power of Mr. Jellinek and his associates in the regulatory 
apparatus to cope with the dilemma represented by our system of safe-
guards on the one hand, and the urgent need to remove dangerous 
chemicals from the environment on the other. They may be dedicated, 
and they may be competent, but they are not supermen. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Our next commentator is Mr. Peter 
Barton Hutt, of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. 
Mr. Hutt: Thank you, Professor Whitney. I am very pleased to par-
ticipate in this important symposium. There seems to be little doubt 
about the adequacy of present Federal laws protecting the environment. 
They cover virtually every aspect of our modern life. Indeed, as we 
look around us it is very difficult to find anything in this room that is 
not regulated by some Federal law (except, as one person pointed 
out to me when I last made that remark, the length of my hair, and that 
is only because I choose not to work for the District of Columbia 
Police Department). These laws provide an extraordinary range of in-
formal and formal sanctions and enforcement mechanisms. 
My remarks today encompass not just my present occupation as a 
private attorney, but also rely upon my experience for four years as 
Chief Counsel for the Food and Drug Administration. In that capacity 
I found that I was not concerned about a lack of statutory authority to 
achieve what ought to be achieved—because I can think of no situation 
in which sufficient legal authority did not exist—but rather was con-
cerned about statutory mandates requiring action that might be unwise 
or unnecessary. 
Thus, to the extent the risks that we perceive about us continue to 
exist and may exist for many years in the future, it is not because of a 
lack of statutory authority. Rather it is because of two other far more 
significant and important problems. The first is one that Mr. Carter 
just mentioned, and that is the scientific and other decision-making 
problems that are posed by the statutory objective of risk avoidance. 
Many of these problems today are utterly intractable, in spite of modern 
scientific knowledge that we think to be fairly sophisticated. These prob-
lems do not exist, certainly, because our government officials, or indeed 
our industrial officials, are callously ignoring them. It is the very nature 
of these problems that impedes their solution. Second, and I think far 
more important, risk avoidance can only be pursued at the expense of 
an enormous loss of personal pleasure and individual freedom. This is 
a price that many are unwilling to pay in our country today. 
My remarks this morning will therefore focus not on the laws that 
Congress has enacted, because no new laws can address the real issues 
that are at the heart of our problem. Congress cannot by law resolve 
scientific uncertainty. Nor can Congress devise ways to eliminate risk 
without a corresponding reduction in personal freedom. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that Congress even can perform its time-honored function of 
throwing money at these problems, because simply appropriating more 
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funds will not contribute very much toward resolving these issues in 
the near future. 
Let me talk then first about the issue of scientific uncertainty. It was 
quite easy in the early part of this century to resolve the kinds of 
scientific questions that we were faced with—the problems of acute 
hazards in our foods and drugs in our caustic chemicals—and to take 
immediate action to control those hazards on a practical regulatory 
basis. I recently had the opportunity to review the annual reports of the 
Food and Drug Administration from 1906 through 1978. I was struck 
by the fact that, prior to 1910, there were several reports that dealt with 
problems that we still face today—the safety of saccharin, of lead in 
canned food, and of caffeine in soft drinks. The focus of the concern 
at that time, of course, was on the acute hazards. This permitted prompt 
resolution of the issues. Tests were immediately run, decisions made, 
action taken. 
But what we are now facing with those very same substances, and 
many others like them, is quite different and far more difficult. We have 
discovered the three terrible chronic hazards: teratogens, mutagens and 
carcinogens. We do not know what causes these hazards and thus we 
can only guess on how to go about regulating them. We therefore regu-
late today not out of respect for what is known, but rather more out of 
fear for what is unknown and at this time, on the basis of currently 
available scientific information, essentially unknowable. 
Even our efforts to explore these new scientific frontiers pose definite 
but unquantifiable risks. Probably our best hope for understanding 
chronic human hazards lies in basic biological research at the cellular 
level. The techniques of recombinant DNA now make that possible. 
Yet many of the same people concerned about our chronic hazards 
have objected most vociferously to the very experimentation with re-
combinant DNA that may at some future date provide the answers that 
we so badly need. 
Thus unwise regulation can be as costly both to present and to 
future generations as the lack of regulation. Stopping the technological 
development can be as bad or worse than stopping government regula-
tion. But I do not, of course, espouse either of those severe extremes. 
What is clearly needed is balance—neither too much regulation, nor 
too little regulation—a phrase that is full of meaning but hopeless to 
implement. Exactly how and where to strike that balance is not an easy 
task because, as the degree of scientific uncertainty increases, the diffi-
culty in finding that balance increases proportionately or perhaps even 
geometrically. 
Let me now turn to the issue of personal freedom. It would not be at 
all difficult to achieve an extraordinarily dramatic reduction in the 
United States death rate within one year. We need only draw up a list 
of the leading causes of death from birth to old age and ban or severely 
limit those causes. It could be done. But we know that this is unrealistic, 
that society would not tolerate it. It would be an unthinkable loss of 
individual freedom. It would require restriction or elimination of auto- 
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mobiles, sports, alcoholic beverages, and a wide variety of other com-
mon products and human activity. 
It is helpful to refer to the statistics on the yearly risk of death that 
were recently published by Professor Richard Wilson of Harvard from 
publicly available accident and death reports. Professor Wilson pointed 
to three activities that carry the highest risk of death—auto racing, 
horse racing, and motorcycle racing. Each has a yearly death risk of 
greater than 1 in 1000. Two others that are also extraordinarily high 
are rock climbing (a yearly risk of death of 1 in 1000, almost as bad as 
motorcycle racing) and canoeing (1 in 2500). It is obvious that not 
one chemical or consumer product remotely presents this magnitude of 
risk of yearly death. But we not only tolerate this level of risk for sports, 
we pay people to do it and we watch it as entertainment. And we save 
the beauty of our environment precisely in order that people can pursue 
rock climbing and canoeing, which can be viewed, from the statistics, 
as merely a form of suicide. I find it fascinating in trying to analyze 
consistent decision-making in government that the epidemiological evi-
dence cited for the risk of tobacco smoking is roughly the same as the 
risk of death from rock climbing. I am not aware of a federal campaign 
against rock climbing. 
In my own field of food and drug law, in which I have spent most 
of my 20 years in law practice, we know what the major sources of 
carcinogens are in the food supply. Quite purposely the United States 
Food and Drug Administration has avoided doing anything about it. 
Why? Because the public would not stand for it. The major carcinogens 
in our food supply do not have long, complex chemical names. They 
are known to us quite familiarly as coffee, tea, peanuts, corn, and milk, 
egg whites and egg yolks, the entire water supply, calcium, and Vitamins 
A and D. Some of these we could get along without quite nicely. We 
certainly could survive without peanuts (although perhaps the Presi-
dent could not, and thus no Commissioner of Food and Drugs would 
survive without peanuts). There are no essential health benefits asso-
ciated with peanuts. There are economic benefits associated with pea-
nuts, but no greater or smaller economic benefits than for all those 
chemicals with the long terms. I doubt if any one would suffer one bit, 
except for peanut farmers, if they were eliminated from society. And 
yet I hate to think what the United States Congress and the public 
would do if we eliminated peanuts in order to get rid of the aflatoxin 
content that many of them necessarily carry. We have already seen what 
happened when the Food and Drug Administration proposed to ban 
saccharin. Congress went to the trouble of enacting a special law to 
save it. 
The conflict between safety regulation and public pleasure is a new 
phenomenon in our society. Regulatory agencies were not prepared for 
it. In the near future our regulator agencies will be proceeding deliber-
ately and slowly in this area, educating the public, feeling their way, and 
concentrating on regulation which has the lowest impact on public 
freedom—for example, where alternatives are available to those chemi- 
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cals and products that must be restricted or banned. Congress has been 
quick to bow to public demand in specific instances, where federal 
agencies have not been sufficiently sensitive to personal choice, such as 
where FDA proposed to restrict the use of vitamins and minerals and, 
of course, saccharin. 
Congress has not yet come to grips with the more basic issue, in the 
broader context of how one balances personal freedom against societal 
regulation. There must be a much greater inquiry into the social costs 
involved and the social trade-offs. The National Academy of Sciences is 
currently undertaking a report on food safety issues that, I believe, will 
focus nationwide attention precisely on those important issues. 
In the meantime, Congress has enacted two laws to begin to address 
this matter. One, already mentioned by Mr. Carter, requires HEW to 
issue a yearly report on carcinogens. The other requires the National 
Academy of Sciences to issue an annual report on all adverse biological 
effects that are in any way attributed to the environment, which is de-
fined to include the workplace, the home, and the great outdoors. If 
these reports are done honestly, I agree that they will have a major 
impact on the public, the agencies and on Congress. They would show 
that the real danger to our society is not primarily from chemicals with 
long names, but rather is from many of our favorite past-times and the 
things that we enjoy most in our lives. 
I favor adding to those lists, for comparison purposes, dangers that 
we face daily in our other activities, from things like rock climbing and 
canoeing and playing football. This would give the public a true per-
spective of where we face danger in our lives, and would allow each of 
us to control our own risks and our own destinies by permitting us to 
make informed choices about what we individually and as a society 
wish to do with our lives. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Are there any questions for the 
panelists? 
Q: Devra Davis from the Environmental Law Institute. 
I hesitate to take exception to the person who served as General 
Counsel of the FDA for four years, but must disagree with your view 
that there are no legal or administrative gaps in laws governing hazard-
ous substances. There are carcinogens that are now subject to a ban for 
use as pesticides such as captan or lindane which are ingredients in 
anti-dandruff shampoo that can be bought today in Peoples and Dart 
Drug Stores throughout this country. If you read the labels they say, 
"captan, an active ingredient." I wondered if you could comment on the 
fact that substances banned under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act for use on food may be used on the human scalps, 
since they are exempt from stringent regulation under the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
But I have a more serious over-all comment. I think you do us a dis-
service to make an implicit comparison between voluntary and involun-
tary risks. Rock climbing, auto racing, horse racing and motorcycle 
racing and canoeing are activities which are engaged in voluntarily. 
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And, more importantly than the fact that they are voluntary, the ex-
posed population at risk from those activities is very, very small in 
number, whereas the exposed population at risk to cigarette smoke is 
orders of magnitude greater. Particularly, there are high risk populations 
of young children nowadays starting at ages 8 to II and certainly con-
tinuing up to the teenagers, smoking at increasing rates. Smoking poses 
a much more serious risk to the public health today than the activities 
that you mentioned. 
I raise two issues. One of which is that we are dealing with voluntary 
versus involuntary risks when it comes to environmental exposure. And 
the other of which is that the population at risk in these activities is 
quite different in size. So to return to your own point, if we were to 
estimate the relative public health impact of such activities as rock 
climbing and smoking it would hardly do justice to make comparisons 
between them giving the fact that they are quite, quite different. 
Mr. Hutt: With respect to the use of particular ingredients in current 
over-the-counter drugs or cosmetics, there is no statutory gap, which 
was a point that I made in my remarks. I simply cannot respond from a 
factual standpoint as to whether there would he a hazard from the 
particular uses of the particular chemicals you mentioned. But if there 
is a gap, it is an administrative and not a statutory gap. The current 
law is quite sufficient to handle any problem of this kind. 
Second, I simply cannot accept your conclusion that the use of 
consumer products is any more or less voluntary than motorcycle racing 
or automobile driving or flying in airplanes or rock climbing. Indeed 
it is on that basis that Congress enacted the saccharin moritorium re-
quiring that information be provided to consumers so that they could 
make their own personal decisions whether to accept the risk (because 
the benefit to that particular consumer outweighs the risk) or whether 
to reject the risk (because in that consumer's mind the risk outweighs 
the benefit). One can reject that theory only if you assume that the 
individuals in our society are incapable of intelligent decision-making 
and that we must have a national decision made on their behalf, thus 
restricting the individual's freedom to make his own choice. 
The difficulty with the government making benefit/risk decisions is 
that you have your own benefit decided for you, by the government, 
rather than you making that decision for yourself. The best example is 
FDA's ban of fish containing a relatively low level of mercury because 
there are a few people in the country who eat large quantities of fish. 
That meant that the rest of the country, which eat a normal or small 
quantity of fish, had fish denied to them even though they would have 
had great benefit and no hazard from it. 
Dr. Davis: Do you mean to imply that children who smoke and 
children who drink saccharin and unborn children whose mothers and 
fathers smoke and use saccharin and therefore expose them to greater 
risks to other carcinogens, teratagens and mutagens are making informed 
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choices as consumers? Where do you draw the line as to who is allowed 
to consume something that will cause them death? 
Mr. Hutt: That is a perfectly reasonable question. You draw the 
same line there as you do when you decide to take your child in an 
automobile and then decide either to put them into a seatbelt or not 
to do so, or when you decide to take your child on an airplane knowing 
the risk of crash or knowing the risk of the additional cosmic ray 
radiation exposure which is very well known to scientists and is totally 
quantifiable. We in our society have chosen to entrust to parents the 
safety of our children. I have four children myself and I assure you I 
am terribly concerned about their safety. I have urged them not to 
smoke. I have also urged them not to do and to do various other things 
that hopefully will promote their safety. But that does not mean that 
everything in society that has some risk, some potential risk, to my 
children should be banned. 
Mr. Whitney: One more question. Yes, sir? 
Q: I'm Donald Hornig. It seems to me there is a terrible danger in 
polarizing these discussions to the point where one dosen't progress to 
the real questions. I belong to a scientific panel myself trying to as-
certain the problems and difficulties inherent in some of these substances 
and I have come to several conclusions. 
One is that I disagree seriously with Mr. Hutt on the argument that 
all risks are equivalent. It is quite obvious in many respects that we 
use very different scales of risks depending on whether we are talking 
about a statistical person somewhere in the future or a real person. 
We are very, very good about protecting individual lives. We take great 
risks to rescue people. We often spend several lives to save one, you 
know. So that I don't think that it is correct to use the standard of risk 
we take in smoking or driving to apply to risks which are inflicted in 
one degree or another by an external agency. 
Secondly, it seems to me we have to think further about the concept 
of informed choice because of the big problem of scientific uncertainty 
that was raised. When a learned panel of the National Academy of 
Sciences or consultants to Mr. Jellinek can't come to any conclusions 
that are universally accepted, it is unreasonable to expect that having 
named the substance on the label enables all users to come to informed 
conclusions. I just think we have to rethink the whole notion of in-
formed choice over a wide spectrum of activity. 
Mr. Hutt: Simply putting the name of a substance on the label is not 
sufficient to provide for informed choice. In various writings during 
the past two years that have now been published in the October 1978 
issue of the Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal, I have pointed out, for 
example, that the saccharin warning does not promote informed choice. 
It is too cryptic. It could have been far more informative. It illustrates 
why one should not leave difficult decisions of that nature to Congress. 
They wrote that warning. The Food and Drug Administration did not. 
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Professor Whitney: It is with great reluctance that I proclaim the 
coffee break. Let's make it a half a coffee break so we can get back to 
this interesting discussion. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Our next speaker is Richard Voigt, 
from the Office of the Soliciter, OSHA Division, in the U. S. Depart-
ment of Labor, who will address the problem of protecting the environ-
ment of the work place from hazardous and toxic substances. 
Mr. Voigt: Someone once said, "Just think what God could do if 
He had the money." 
I suspect that this wry remark might reflect the feelings of the federal 
administrators who have the responsibility of implementing the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,—not that you would want to 
confuse any federal employee with God. 
I also suspect that this remark might reflect the feelings of some 
employers who regard the statutory obligations imposed on them by 
the Act to be unrealistically burdensome. 
Certainly the Act, which is considered by many to be the most 
significant piece of labor legislation since the National Labor Relations 
Act, has brought into sharp focus difficult social policy issues involving 
the need for and the ability of the Federal government to protect 
American workers from occupational hazards. 
As currently enforced by the U. S. Department of Labor and ap-
proved state plans, the Act covers over 5 million employers and 70 
million employees nationally. Among other things, the Act requires 
both that employers provide a workplace which is free from recognized 
hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm and that em-
ployers comply with specific regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of Labor. The specific standards with which employers are required 
to comply cover a broad range of conditions relating to both employee 
safety (the prevention of job-related accidents) and to employee health 
(the prevention of job-related illnesses). In addition, the Act as in-
terpreted by the Secretary of Labor, prohibits employers from discrimi-
nating against employees who participate in the OSHA enforcement 
process, who file safety and health complaints with either public agencies 
or their respective employers or who, in certain circumstances, refuse 
to work in order to protect themselves from death or serious physical 
injury. In terms of the complexity and variety of circumstances covered, 
the statutory duties imposed by the Act represent one of the most 
ambitious efforts to regulate employers in the private sector. 
Partly as a result of its broad impact, the Act has emerged as one 
of the more controversial Federal statutes currently being enforced. 
Regrettably the agency became a symbol to many of rigid, nitpicking, 
oppressive, and useless governmental regulation. (I apologize to OSHA's 
critics if I left out any of their adjectives.) 
While based, in part, on isolated incidents and some polemical 
exaggeration, the basic criticism that OSHA was investing too much 
time on relatively insignificant occupational hazards was not totally 
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inaccurate. Accordingly, the agency has made a concerted effort under 
the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, 
Dr. Eula Bingham, and her predecessor Dr. Morton Corn, to eliminate 
unnecessary or so-called "nitpicking" regulations, to simplify other 
standards, and to redirect its enforcement effort towards the abatement 
of more serious occupational hazards. One result of this process, which 
is ongoing, is that the agency is focusing more of its resources on con-
trolling employee exposure to toxic substances in the workplace. 
While this effort has answered much of the criticism of the agency 
for pursuing insignificant hazards, the effort has generated new con-
troversies which are considerably more complex. 
The limited time available to me here today prevents a detailed dis-
cussion of all the issues raised by the current debate. Therefore, I will 
provide you with an abbreviated summary of the statutory enforcement 
scheme as it applies to the control of toxic substances in the work-
place. In addition, I would like to share with you an abbreviated sum-
mary of some of the issues which have arisen in the agency's effort to 
implement this scheme. 
Employers' statutory obligations are outlined in Section 5 of the 
Act. Section 5(a) (1)—the so-called "general duty" clause—requires 
that each employer "shall furnish to each of his employees employment 
and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm." 
Section 5(a) (2) of the Act requires employers to comply with the occu-
pational safety and health standards promulgated pursuant to the Act. 
Employers have been cited under both provisions for exposing their 
employees to toxic substances in the workplace. 
Turning first to Section 5(a) (1 )—the general duty clause. Citations 
have been issued under Section 5(a) (1) when no specific standard 
applies to the toxic material involved and when, as the language of the 
section indicates, employee exposure to the toxic substance constitutes 
a recognized hazard causing or likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm. For example, the citations issued to Life Sciences, Inc., of 
Hopewell for exposing its employees to Kepone were based on violations 
of Section 5(a) (1). 
While relatively few Section 5(a) (1) cases involving toxic sub-
stances have been litigated, several basic principles have been estab-
lished. In Brennan v. Vy Lactos Laboratories, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir., 
1974), the Eighth Circuit held that the fact that an employer may not 
have anticipated the exact sequence of events which resulted in a 
hazardous exposure to employees does not justify vacating a section 
5(a) (1) citation. In that case, three employees were killed by exposure 
to hydrogen sulfide gas which had been released by an unanticipated 
chemical reaction. The court rejected the employer's argument that the 
unforeseeable nature of the exact circumstances surrounding the fatali-
ties provided a defense to the citation, in view of the fact that the 
employer had failed to take any precautions whatsoever to protect 
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employees from the general hazard associated with hydrogen sulfide 
gase. 
Similarly in American Smelting and Refining Company v. OSHA, 
501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir., 1974), the Eighth Circuit held that for purposes 
of Section 5(a)(1), a "recognized" hazard need not be one that is 
"readily apparent" or one that is "only detectable by the human senses." 
In affirming a 5(a)(1) citation for excessive exposure to lead, the 
court rejected as "folly" the employer's argument that the hazard in 
its workplace was not a "recognized" hazard since it could only be 
detected through the use of air-sampling instruments. The court's 
position was based on the common sense observation that hazardous 
levels of many substances, can only be detected through technical 
devices. 
While Section 5(a) (1) offers important protection to employees, its 
usefulness in preventing employee exposure to toxic substances may be 
somewhat limited. For example, there may be difficulties in applying 
the section in cases in which employees are exposed to a toxic sub-
stance at a level which, while identified with some adverse effects, has 
not been associated with death or serious physical harm. This problem 
may be particularly troublesome in those cases involving non-carcino-
genic substances which are seriously toxic only at high levels of 
exposure. 
Turning now to Section 5(a)(2)—the clause requiring employers 
to comply with standards promulgated by the Secretary. Most OSHA 
standards relating to toxic substances are found in Subpart Z of the 
General Industry Standards (29 CFR 1910). The first section of 
Subpart Z, Section 1910.1000, sets exposure limits for several hundred 
air contaminants ranging from acetone to zinc oxide. The standard's 
exposure limits, which prior to the Act had been in effect under other 
Federal safety programs, were adopted by OSHA at the specific direc-
tion of Congress under Section 6(a) of the Act. OSHA had no option 
but to adopt those standards. Section 1910.1000, which is usually read 
in conjunction with the OSHA respiratory protection standard (29 
CFR 1910.134), also requires that "as far as feasible", engineering 
controls are to be used to control employee exposure (e.g. enclosure or 
confinement of the operation, general and/or local ventilation as in 
contrast to using a personal protection such as respirators to control 
exposure). 
In addition to adopting the exposure limits set forth in Section 
1910.1000, OSHA has promulgated a number of new standards relating 
to toxic substances. These standards, which were promulgated pursuant 
to Section 6(b) of the Act, respectively cover such substances as vinyl 
chloride, asbestos, coke oven emissions, DBCP, arsenic, benzene, 
acrylonitrile and a group of 14 other carcinogens. These standards were 
promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Section 6(b)(5) 
which address toxic substances. That section specifically instructs the 
Secretary that in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials 
to "set a standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, 
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on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure . . . for the period of his working life." 
These new standards which are promulgated pursuant to this specific 
directive from Congress not only establish exposure limits but also 
require, among other things, that employers implement feasible engineer-
ing controls to achieve these levels. This policy reflects the consensus 
of experts that compared to engineering controls, personal protective 
equipment [e.g. respirators] is an inferior means of protecting employees. 
The court challenges to the new standards promulgated by OSHA 
have focused on three principal issues: ( 1) the technological feasibility 
of the standard's requirement, (2) the economic feasibility of the stand-
ards' requirements, and (3) the scientific basis for the standards' ex-
posure level. These issues, which I would now like to discuss, are at 
the heart of the current debate surrounding OSHA's effort to regulate 
toxic substances. 
In challenging the standard for vinyl chloride—a potent carcinogen 
associated with a rare form of liver cancer, the industry argued that 
the permissible exposure level of one part per million over an eight-
hour period was technologically infeasible. In rejecting this argument, 
the Second Circuit concluded that even though no plant had been able 
to reach the 1 ppm level by the time of the adjudication, the industry 
was underestimating its technological potential and that a "variety of 
useful engineering and work practice controls" had yet to be imple-
mented. Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d. 1301 
(2nd Cir., 1975). The court emphasized that: 
. . . In the area of safety, ... the Secretary is not restricted by 
the status quo. He may raise standards which require improve-
ment in existing technologies or which require the develop-
ment of new technology, and he is not limited to issuing 
standards based solely on devices already fully developed. 
509 F.2d. at 1309 
Similarly, the Third Circuit rejected a similar technological infeasi-
bility argument relating to the coke-oven emission standard, concluding 
that "the coke oven industry also could with some self-confidence 
and determination develop 'their own technological potentialities' and 
achieve a variety of improvements. American Iron and Steel Institute, 
et al. V. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd. Cir., 1978). The same basic con-
clusion was reached by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
in finding that the OSHA standard regulating atmospheric concentrations 
of asbestos dust is technologically feasible. IUD, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 
F.2d 499, 467 (D.C. Cir., 1974). 
In sum, the Courts have consistently ruled that the fact that OSHA 
standards regulating toxic substances may be "technology forcing" does 
not mean that they are technologically infeasible. Indeed, it is interesting 
to note that after the vinyl chloride standard became effective, the in-
dustry was able to comply with its requirements rather quickly despite 
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their earlier predictions that such compliance was technologically 
impossible. 
With regard to the issue of economic feasibility, the courts have 
articulated several basic principles. First, the courts have ruled that the 
economic feasibility of a standard is a factor which can be properly 
considered in a standard's promulgation. In rejecting the AFL-CIO's 
argument that the Act did not authorize OSHA to consider economic 
factors in setting permanent standards for toxic substances, the D. C. 
Circuit concluded that "practical considerations can temper protective 
requirements", that "Congress does not appear to have intended to 
protect employees by putting their employers out of business .. . by 
making financial viability generally impossible," and therefore the court 
approved of OSHA's setting an exposure limit for asbestos above zero 
in order to avoid economic difficulties associated with the zero limit. 
A similar principle was recently recognized by the Fifth Circuit in 
setting aside the standard regulating benzene—a carcinogen associated 
with leukemia. American Petroleum Institute, et al. v. OSHA, 581 
F.2d 493 (5th Cir., 1978). Initially, the Fifth Circuit recognized that 
there is no known safe level for benzene, that a dose-response curve 
for the substance could not be charted on the basis of existing informa-
tion, that reducing benzene exposure to the lowest feasible level of 
1 ppm would result in some benefits to employees, and that compliance 
with the standard was apparently technologically and economically 
feasible. Nevertheless, the court set aside the standard's exposure limit 
because, in the court's opinion, there was no substantial evidence that 
the "benefits to be achieved by reducing the permissible exposure limit 
from 10 ppm to 1 ppm bear reasonable relationship to the costs im-
posed by the reduction" and that therefore the standard was not 
"reasonably necessary" to provide safe or healthful workplaces. The 
court concluded that a determination that the benzene standard was 
"reasonably necessary" could not be made until OSHA had better 
"studies of the effects of human exposure to benzene at higher con-
centration levels" or "reliable animal studies", 
No doubt, there is a facially attractive aspect to the Fifth Circuit's 
decision, particularly in view of the current concern with inflation and 
the real benefits of federal regulation. However, it should be under-
stood that the benzene decision may well cripple OSHA's effort to 
regulate employee exposure to carcinogens and other toxic substances 
in the workplace. Even though benzene has been associated with 
numerous cases of human leukemia, no dose-response data is currently 
available. This is not untypical for human carcinogens. Very rarely do 
you have specific dose-response data with which to work. The reason 
is we don't know what levels of carcinogens people are or have been 
exposed to. You have to conduct a very careful experiment to correlate 
the production of cancer related symptoms with certain exposure levels. 
In essence, the Fifth Circuit has held that OSHA should wait for 
better data on the dose-response curve before it acts to reduce ex-
posures. But such a policy essentially requires a long-term experiment 
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on workers currently exposed to benzene. It requires waiting another 
20 years (the normal latency period) in order to catalogue the cancer 
experience of workers exposed to present-day levels of benzene and then 
weighing costs and benefits at the end of that period to see if enough 
lives will be saved to justify the cost of regulation. Obviously, the 
benzene decision will, if not overturned by the Supreme Court, sig-
nificantly undermine OSHA's ability to act quickly to protect American 
workers from known carcinogens. We submit that such a result is in-
consistent with the Act's underlying goal of preventing occupational 
illnesses before they occur. 
I saw a movie earlier in the week that I think summarized the way 
some workers feel about the policy embodied in the benzene decision. 
The title of the movie was called Song of the Canary. It may be some-
what dramatic or even melodramatic but nonetheless reflects the feeling 
of some workers. The movie began by a reference to the practice in 
the early part of the century of miners taking canaries into underground 
mines as a self-protecting measure against carbon monoxide gas. When 
a canary died that was the message to the miners that the level of carbon 
monoxide was too high in the mine, and that the workers should get 
out of the mine. The comment made by some of the workers in the 
film was "We don't want to be human canaries—that when our ex-
posure history produces death, that be the sign that the level is too 
high." 
My remarks here today have been, by necessity, severely abbreviated 
and, I fear, somewhat elliptical. Many issues have remained undiscussed, 
e.g. issues relating to the validity of OSHA standards requiring specific 
abatement techniques, the research and development of new abatement 
technology, or the proper labelling of toxic substances, issues relating 
to the correctness of the statutory interpretations utilized by some 
courts to evaluate OSHA standards, issues relating to the naure of 
judicial review of the quasi-legislative judgments inherent in these 
standards, issues relating to the application of cost-benefit analysis in 
the enforcement of OSHA standards, and many others. 
Certainly, the rather cursory nature of my remarks is not meant to 
imply and I hope by tone has not meant to imply that the issues raised 
by OSHA's effort to implement the Congressional goal of regulating 
employee exposure to toxic substances to be simple issues with obvious 
or inexpensive answers. Indeed, I think that the issue involved with this 
effort are extremely complex and subtle. I confess that there have been 
times when the current debate reminded me of Walter Lippman's com-
ment that "if you not confused, you just are not thinking clearly." 
But there is one thing of which I am certain: the current debate is 
vital, vital to the health of the American worker and vital to our 
definition of human society. 
Thank you very much. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Our first commentator will be Pro-
fessor Richard Merrill of the University of Virginia. 
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Professor Merrill: I'm pleased to be here. I always like to accept 
an invitation from Bill Spong. He is one of my favorite people—the 
State of Virginia's loss and William and Mary's gain—and one of the 
people who is in the process of transforming William and Mary's law 
school into one of the premier legal institutions in this country. That is a 
source of some envy and increasing anxiety 110 miles to the west, I can 
tell you. 
I'm going to have to apologize for doing something I don't like to 
do, which is to make a couple of observations which I hope are pro-
vocative of discussion, and then not stay for the questions. I'm having 
to court some of the risks Mr. Hutt adverted to earlier in the morning, 
including the risk of detection by the Virginia Highway Patrol. A mem-
ber of our faculty died tragically earlier this week and there is a 
memorial service in Charlottesville at 2:00. I don't know what the 
estimated risk is for my journey back, but between now and the time I 
conclude at twenty minutes to 12, Peter can do the computation. 
One way of describing the redirection and current attention of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration toward the prevention 
of occupational disease would be to say that OSHA is at last trying to 
deserve the criticism that it gets. I mean this in a flattering sense, be-
cause I think that OSHA's efforts to focus on occupational disease 
reflect a very sound judgment about the proper allocation of public 
resources. The agency is deserving the criticism that now falls on it 
because it is dealing, as Mr. Voigt suggests, with extremely difficult 
and important problems. 
It is probably fair to say that, among the areas in which federal 
agencies are now trying to curtail human exposure to environmental 
agents that produce chronic effects, principally cancer, the greatest 
opportunities for effective regulation and health protection possibly lie 
in the occupational area. At the same time, the costs of achieving such 
gains are more obvious and perhaps more acute than, for example, in 
the areas of principal concern to the Food and Drug Administration 
and even, I dare say, to the Environmental Protection Agency. 
OSHA is in a sense a reactive agency. It must deal with conditions 
that it finds. It doesn't license toxic exposures; it tries to curtail them 
when it discovers a source of problems. Necessarily, then, OSHA's 
mandate requires it to redirect the expenditures of financial resources, 
to order the relocation of equipment and changes in work and produc-
tion patterns that are in place and reflect enormous investments of 
capital. When you find a clash of this kind—where the public health 
stakes are high and the monetary stakes are high as well—you find 
the participants in the process are prepared to litigate to the ends of 
the earth. This leads me very briefly to two issues of concern to me. 
I do not purport to be an expert in the area of occupational dis-
ease or indeed in the operation of the Agency which is our topic this 
morning. I do spend some time worrying about questions of "due 
process". For a while I pursued it. Later, while at FDA, I was accused 
of denying it. And now I make a living talking and writing about it. 
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One of the things that the Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
has done, which represents one of its most ambitious efforts—to which 
Mr. Voigt has only indirectly alluded—is to publish something known 
as a proposed cancer policy. This is a proposed set of regulations in 
which the Agency attempts to establish conclusively, for purposes of 
future individual proceedings involving individual chemicals, a set of 
scientific principles that will undergird its subsequent regulatory action, 
but not be open to relitigation in subsequent proceedings. 
Published in October, 1977, OSHA's proposal draws upon the 
experience of some other agencies and some fairly well established 
principles of administrative law. But the proposal pushes these principles 
to their outer limits. If you pause to read it, the proposal is an enor-
mously ambitious one. It attempts to resolve questions of animal to man 
extra-polation, to define the weight to be accorded particular data from 
animal studies and evidence from human epidemiological studies. It 
describes the pertinence of the short term bioassays in the evaluation of 
chemicals. Moreover, OSHA also proposes to correlate particular config-
urations of facts about chemicals with predetermined regulatory out-
comes—in short, to resolve as a matter of general policy the kind of 
administrative response that will be taken upon the discovery of a given 
set of facts and to foreclose debate on this issue as well. The administra-
tive gains of OSHA's effort promise to be substantial if its initial costs do 
not turn out to be excessive. I think that not only regulators in Wash-
ington but people who are interested in the toxic chemical area generally 
are watching the outcome of this rulemaking process with anticipation, 
some forbidding, and a good deal of eagerness to see whether or not the 
really unprecedented effort that OSHA is making will increase the 
efficiency of its subsequent enforcement efforts. Mr. Voigt may in 
response to questions be able to tell people here where that process 
stands at the moment. The rulemaking record is concluded but a final 
decision has not been issued. 
One thing that the OSHA does not propose to do in this document, 
but on which it invites comment, is connected with the second point I 
want to address. This has to do with a court decision that Mr. Voigt has 
discussed in detail—the famous benzene case. (American Petroleum 
Institute v. Bingham.) The Agency does not propose that, in its sub-
sequent identification and development of standards for particular car-
cinogenic chemicals, it will try to quantify the potency of a substance—
to try to assess the frequency with which toxic effects are likely to 
occur at particular levels of exposure. OSHA's omission is based on 
practical concerns, but rests on good scientific underpinnings as well. 
The agency has invited comment on the wisdom of avoiding any attempt 
to quantify risks. 
And among the comments that OSHA has deceived on its proposal 
are statements by the Food and Drug Administration and the En-
vironmental Protection Agency suggesting that this may be one of the 
Achilles' heels of the proposal. This is an issue on which OSHA may 
have to give ground in order to be able to put a more reasonable price 
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tag on the kinds of worker protection controls that its subsequent 
specific chemical standards are likely to impose. At one level, this is 
what the Fifth Circuit is asking for in the benzene decision. 
For benzene, OSHA proposed and finally adopted as a permanent 
standard, a reduction from 10 parts per million to 1 part per million 
of benzene in the work environment. The Agency put a price tag on that 
reduction of something in the neighborhood of $450 million. The in-
dustry put a price at more than $2 billion, but though the range was 
under the lower figure this was still fairly high. The Fifth Circuit un-
doubtedly was impressed by this. It described this as a half million 
dollar decision. The Agency concluded in a generalized way that reduc-
ing exposure by 9 parts per million was destined to provide appreciable 
health gains to exposed workers, a proposition that the Court seems to 
not directly have disputed. But the Agency conscicusly refrained from 
attempting to quantify the extent of that health gain. 
The policy OSHA proposed in October 1977 is consistent with the 
position it took in the benzene case, namely, that the scientific tools 
do not permit us to assign mathematical estimates of the reduction in 
human risk corresponding with its proposed reduction. The Court found 
this to be a fatal flaw in OSHA's reasoning and a basis for upsetting the 
agency's standards. 
But the Fifth Circuit's opinion goes on—and this is the part of 
it that I find most troubling—because it suggests that in the absence 
of data that permits that kind of quantification of risk or of benefit, 
OSHA is unable to adopt or sustain in court a standard designed to 
reduce exposure. That part of the decision, it seems to me, seems 
extraordinarily troublesome for the Agency and alone is a basis for 
seeking to have it overturned at the Supreme Court. 
The other part of the decision, implicit in the Court's concern that 
the Agency had failed to correlate the health gains with the costs that 
they were imposing upon the industry, strikes me as something that 
the Agency is going to have to confront and, if it should not be success-
ful in overturning the benzene decision, will have to live with. 
I don't view this outcome as entirely bad. OSHA's success in persuad-
ing the public and the Congress at large that its efforts to protect the 
health of the American workers are worth the price will depend to 
some degree on its ability to quantify the health gains that it is buying 
with private industrial dollars when it establishes work place standards. 
A reluctance on the Agency's part to address that question could lead 
eventually to political, if not legal, difficulty in the future. 
With those two comments I will conclude and, with your indulgence, 
I will excuse myself. Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you, Professor Merrill. Our next com-
mentator, Ms. Seminario, is substituting for Mr. George Taylor, Director 
of the Department of Occupational Safety and Health in the AFL-CIO. 
Ms. Seminario: Good morning. I would like to thank Dean Spong, 
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Professor Whitney, and the other organizers of this Conference for 
inviting the AFL-CIO to participate in these two days of deliberations 
on toxic substances. 
Occupational health and environmental pollution and degradation 
have been primary concerns of the AFL-CIO and many of its member 
unions and departments for many years. I am happy to say at this time 
that the activities of the labor movement concerning occupational health 
and environmental health are expanding rapidly. While our activities 
are expanding rapidly, our staff size is not keeping quite the same pace, 
and I find myself as an industrial hygienist jumping from forum to 
forum and wearing very different hats. So today I guess I am playing 
the role of a lawyer rather than that of an industrial hygienist—so bear 
with me, please. 
Mr. Voigt has outlined some of the key legal issues related to the 
implementation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, particularly 
in the standard setting area. I would like to take a few minutes this 
morning to reemphasize some of the points that Mr. Voigt raised, and 
raise a few additional issues which potentially, I believe, have far 
reaching impact on regulation and the protection of worker health. 
Let me start by saying that regulation of toxic substances under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act is in big trouble. In the last 
few years, particularly the last year, we have seen impediments and 
hurdles to promulgation of effective standards necessary for protecting 
worker health and safety being thrown up by industry, the Administra-
tion, and the Congress, and in some cases the Courts, making it 
essentially a Herculean task to issue regulations for protecting worker 
health and safety. 
Inflationary impact and excessive costs are the present battle cries 
against effective regulation. However, as Gus Speth pointed out last 
night at his remarks at the dinner, the analysis of facts and figures 
don't support these claims. And the bottom line in my view is still the 
same that it always has been—industry is still adverse to regulation. 
Industry does not want to be regulated. 
While the bottom line may be the same as it was seven or eight 
years ago, efforts by industry to delay or to dilute effective regulation 
in soliciting the intervention of administration officials and Congressional 
representatives raises very serious questions and concerns about the 
statutory authority of the Secretary of Labor to issue effective regula-
tions. The question becomes "Who regulates?" 
In the past year numerous examples of intervention by the Presi-
dent's Council of Economic Advisors and Congressional representatives 
in the rulemaking process in attempts to dilute effective regulations have 
been seen. These include actions which are totally outside of the pro-
cedures of the informal administrative rulemaking. Administration offi-
cials and Congressional representatives have been granted a special 
status in rulemaking and essentially a last crack at regulation. I think a 
key example is the promulgation of the cotton dust regulation. 
After many years of delay of the issuance of the standard for largely 
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political reasons, in 1975 a standard was proposed and in 1976 and 
1977 hearings held on a regulation for cotton dust exposure. Last 
May the decision was made by the Council on Economic Advisors to ask 
for delay of the issuance of the final regulation. The Council on 
Economic Advisors, as a member of the regulatory analysis review 
group, had no statutory authority to ask for the delay. Subsequent 
regulations have been covered, or in fact are covered, by Executive 
Order 12044 which pertains to improving government regulations. 
However, regulations which were essentially in the hopper previous to 
the effective date of that Executive Order, March 1978, were not sup-
posed to be subject to scrutiny and review by the Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group. What we saw as a result of that illegal intervention was 
essentially a delay in the issuance of the standard and some major 
changes in the final standard from the version which was to be issued 
by the Assistant Secretary of Labor. 
We finally got a cotton dust standard into the Federal Register on 
June 23, 1978 only to see the August and September Congressional 
hearings on Labor-HEW appropriations address many of the same 
issues that were addressed in the rulemaking process. We saw riders to 
appropriations bills coming out of several committees attacking the 
regulation and essentially attempting to dilute it. We had a rider on 
the appropriations bill from the Agriculture Subcommittee which would 
appropriate $200,000 for the National Academy of Sciences to review 
the record of the cotton dust hearing and the cotton dust standard to 
determine whether or not the Secretary of Labor or the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor had made the correct decision in issuing the cotton 
dust regulations. This rider essentially put authority in the hands of the 
National Academy of Sciences to make a decision and a determination 
that by statute should be in the hands of the Secretary of Labor. 
Well, after we got done with the Agriculture Appropriations Bill 
and lost on that one, we moved to Labor-HEW appropriations and saw 
a series of ammendments tacked on to the Labor-HEW appropriations 
in the health and safety area. One of these was an amendment to delay 
the implementation of the effective date of the cotton dust regulation. 
The amendment, known as the Johnson Amendment, passed in a voice 
vote on the Senate floor and it was only knocked out in conference. 
The kinds of information that was used to justify the delay in the 
issuance of the cotton dust standard were articles from the New York 
Times citing the fact that the cotton dust standard would be inflationary, 
and articles from Newsweek Magazine showing that respiratory pro-
tection in fact would be sufficient in protecting workers. And on the 
basis of that kind of evidence and on a half hour/hour debate on the 
Senate floor, the decision was made that a delay of the cotton dust 
standard was in order. 
This kind of action completely ignores the fact that a lengthy rule-
making process had taken place in which all parties—industry, labor, 
other government officials, including representatives from the Council 
on Wage and Price Stability—had had a chance to come and publicly 
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present their testimony and cross-examine other witnesses. So, the 
question I raise once again, and it is an important one, is "Who exactly 
is regulating?; Where does that authority lie?" 
I think in this next session of Congress we will see attempts to 
legitimize the activities of individuals from the Administration and from 
other government agencies to intervene in the rulemaking process 
subsequent to the actual hearings and testimony concerning the standard 
itself. I think you are going to see attempts to amend the Administrative 
Procedures Act and other attempts to intervene in the regulatory proc-
ess introduced under the guise of improving government regulation. 
In my view it doesn't improve government regulation. It merely delays 
or dilutes it. 
I would like to turn right now, back to the issue of the benzene 
decision which had been the subject of the two previous speakers. I 
don't think that the import of the benzene decision can be understated 
in any way. The degree of proof that was required by the Fifth Circuit 
in that decision, in my opinion as a scientist, is an impossible task to 
meet. The Court essentially was calling for information which would 
justify the benefits of a one part per million standard when compared 
with its cost. For benzene, the positive evidence on carcinognicity has 
come from human exposure. To get the kind of positive results or the 
evidence that the Court is requiring in that case will essentially take 
another twenty to forty years to have a population which may be ex-
posed to those levels that is large enough to come up with evidence 
that is statistically significant and can be relied upon in any way. There 
is no animal proof for benzene and its leukomegenic action. 
Looking at other substances, and the degree of proof required by 
the Fifth Circuit in the benzene decision, what you are talking about is 
looking at the results of animal tests conducted on small numbers of 
animals at high doses, extrapolating that risk to the human population, 
and making a quantitative determination of the effect in the human 
population. Again Professor Merrill spoke to the uncertainty of the 
science behind it. And there is voluminous evidence in the record of 
the OSHA cancer policy hearings that that kind of judgment and 
quantitative determination of risk is not possible to make at this present 
time given the limitations of scientific knowledge. 
One point that I would just like to touch on that we've talked about 
quite a bit is cost/benefit analysis and the assessment of risks and 
benefits. The Occupational Safety and Health Act in its present form 
does not require a cost/benefit analysis. The Act itself has a requirement 
that standards be set to the extent feasible to protect the lives and health 
of workers. That feasibility determination has been defined in numerous 
court decisions which Mr. Voigt outlined this morning. But there is 
no specific provision in the Health and Safety Act which requires that 
cost/benefit analysis, and in my view the decisions and talk which 
basically puts that on OSHA has no basis in the Act or in the legislative 
history whatsoever. 
I would now like to make a few other points about regulation that 
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haven't been raised this morning that are particularly of concern to the 
labor movement. These deal basically with approaches to regulation. 
Given the number of toxic substances, it is the view of the labor move-
ment in our efforts to protect the health and safety of our members that 
a substance by substance approach to rulemaking is a total absurdity. 
Therefore, we have strongly endorsed OSHA's proposed cancer policy, 
which has been outlined to you by Professor Merrill. We are also in the 
process of pushing and promoting, and, if necessary petitioning for, 
chemical substance identification standards which will basically give 
workers access to information about the hazards to which they are 
exposed. We are pushing for generic standards on benzidine dyes, again 
for the regulation of substances by classes rather than by individual 
chemicals. 
There is no doubt that with each of these regulations forthcoming 
that there will be legal challenges to OSHA's legal authority to issue 
generic regulations and other issues related to the science necessary 
to support these regulations. One point that is sure to be key in the 
issue of a chemical substance identification standard (and basically 
ranges across the entire range of toxic substance legislation and regula-
tion) is the issue of trade secrets. We recently had a challenge to the 
FIFRA amendments, challenging the exclusion of health and safety data 
from a proprietary status under the Freedom of Information Act. If 
that provision which excludes health and safety data from a proprietary 
status is overturned we will once again be in the position of being denied 
access to the supporting data base developed in the testing of chemicals. 
If you combine that decision with the benzene decision essentially 
what you have is public inaccessability to the type and nature of infor-
mation that is necessary to effectively participate in standard setting 
procedures. And so I can see the combination of those two decisions 
having a devastating effect upon our efforts to protect our membership. 
Two last points about regulation and issues which are sure to be 
heading, and are in fact now facing legal challenges, and those deal 
with provisions for lead standard. One is a provision within the lead 
standard which finally provides workers economic protection in cases 
where exposure has resulted in damage to the health of individual 
workers requiring removal from the job. It's called earnings protection, 
medical removal protection. It is a limited protection. But it essentially 
removes the burden from the worker for having suffered damage and 
have to suffer the economic impact of either firing or impediments to 
promotion. The provisions of the lead standard are in the midst of 
what I'm sure will be a bloody court battle to be decided some time 
in the next year. 
Many conflicts, legal issues and problems are being raised in the 
occupational safety and health areas involving the entire toxic substances 
area right now. It is clear to me that there is no easy way out. How-
ever, it is also clear that as complex as things are, that the bottom line 
to all these issues is still the same. It is basically who will pay and who 
will be protected. And that is whether or not it will be the health of 
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workers to be protected or the economic interests of companies. The 
bottom line and the end result of what we are talking about really isn't 
whether cost effectiveness analysis is more appropriate than doing a 
cost/benefit analysis in assessing regulation and whether regulations are 
inflationary. But really the bottom line is whether workers, their health, 
and their lives should be protected. Should workers have to sacrifice 
their lives and their health to earn a decent wage? Should companies be 
allowed to screen out susceptible individuals, or fire individuals who 
show signs of damage from exposure, rather than reducing exposure to 
safe levels? Should workers, women in particular, be forced to submit 
to sterilization to maintain their jobs? 
I think it would have been a good idea to invite some of the victims 
of Kepone poisoning, maybe some of the women from the Willow 
Island Plant at American Cyanimid who were forced to submit to 
sterilization to keep their jobs, and the disabled, unemployed byssinotics 
from the textile industry here today to give us some of the answers to 
these questions. These people are not here today and once more I find 
myself in the position of representing the interests of these individuals 
in a forum with heavy representation from industry. And so I must 
answer each of these questions with an unequivocal "No". And I submit 
that if we are to ever succeed in protecting the lives and health of 
American workers that everyone in this room must also answer "No" 
to these questions. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Our final commentator in this portion of the 
panel will be Richard Fleming, Executive Vice President of Air Products 
and Chemicals, Inc., of Allentown, Pennsylvania. 
Mr. Fleming: I guess I am part of that very extensive industry repre-
sentation you have heard about. As a matter of fact, I feel somewhat 
like Ms. Seminario does, in that it seems to me that at this meeting I 
may be among the very few. In any case, whether we are among the 
majority or not we should be speaking in moderate, well reasoned ways 
at meetings like this. 
Considering all that has gone on before at this meeting, I confess 
that I feel somewhat like the little boy who won a contest held by the 
local Cub Scout troop. The prize was to enter a candy store in which 
he was given a short period of time in which he could collect all the 
candy that his heart desired. The problem was he had no container to 
put it in, and so he could take only that which he could immediately 
grasp. I've heard a lot of things at this meeting that I'd like to pick up 
and eventually pour out of the container, but I'll limit myself to some 
comments on the paper presented by Mr. Voigt—three issues primarily: 
the new thrust of OSHA in toxics regulations, the question of economic 
feasibility, and some brief remarks on the meaning of the benzene 
decision. 
First, with regard to the new thrust of OSHA. OSHA has made much 
of its turn toward toxic regulation concerns, and there is no doubt that 
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toxics do represent a serious problem. Whether or not it is really the best 
strategy for the Agency to concentrate its efforts in this area is not so 
abundantly clear, however. As a matter of fact, there is serious question 
as to whether that degree of concentration that has characterized 
OSHA's recent efforts is really prudent. 
Here is what the Bureau of Labor Statistics report, issued in Novem-
ber, says about industrial accidents and disease. First of all, fatalities 
on the job were up twenty percent in 1977 over 1976. That increase 
followed a two-year decline, which totalled 13 percent. The injury rate 
in on-the-job occurrence increased for the third year in a row. And the 
number of lost work days from on-the-job accidents continued an 
historical gradual increase. 
Those are not pleasant statistics. And they certainly do reveal a 
problem of genuine concern. They are the kind of statistics that led 
to the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in the first 
instance. But it does appear that the passage of that Act has not yet 
accomplished the downturn in those numbers that we all might have 
hoped for. 
What about the relative importance in these statistics of occupational 
illness versus occupational accidents? Well, in 1977, 5.3 million people 
were injured in some way in the work place. To be sure, many of those 
injuries were very minor, but there certainly were others that were 
not-5.3 million people injured. Now with regard to illness, while 
the statistics, I'm sure, are not very precise, it is stated that nearly 
162,000 people were considered to have suffered an incidence of 
recognized occupational disease-162,000. In 1977 about 4,700 per-
sons died in the work place from accidents. We don't know how many 
persons died from occupationally caused illness, but I think it is quite 
evident that it is a much, much smaller number than accidental deaths, 
and a very, very small proportion of the total. 
What I'm saying here, I again want to emphasize, is not that concern 
about toxic materials and their safe handling is unimportant. It most 
certainly is. But whether OSHA is making the best decision, in terms 
of its overall effectiveness, in concentrating on toxics to the relative 
exclusion of these other matters is, I think, a serious question. 
trust we all agree that accidents in the work place are a serious 
problem. But in all fairness I think one needs to view them in the con-
text of our total human experience. Some comments have been made 
about this earlier today. 
The chemical industry in which I participate, for example, is readily 
recognized as a potentially hazardous industry. It handles materials 
of a hazardous nature, under a wide variety of difficult conditions. One 
might expect its safety record to be a matter of real concern to all 
involved in it, indeed, and it is. On the other hand, its comparative 
safety record is very, very good. That is so because of a very long-term, 
continuing, intensive effort to control hazard, to minimize risk, and to 
provide protection for the people involved. Now, one does not have to 
look to altruistic motives to find the reasoning for that, although such 
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motives certainly are involved. The reason is that to do otherwise is 
certainly inappropriate, not only in human terms, but in economic 
terms. The industry has long understood that and its safety record 
proves it. 
One might care to compare accidents in other areas of life to what 
goes on in the industrial scene generally, and in the chemical industry 
in particular. For example, duPont has published statistics which say 
that their workers are ten times as safe on the job as they are in their 
homes. (My own company's record is not quite that good, our people 
are only about five times as safe on the job.) I have no comment from 
duPont on the problem of getting to and from the job—that's a much 
more risky undertaking. Recreational pursuits outside of the home are 
much more risky, and you've heard some comments about that. And 
so it goes. So I think it is important that we put these matters in some 
reasonable perspective. 
Now you might ask why are all of these activities unsafe? Why is 
it that with the accumulated knowledge and experience that has char-
acterized the growth of humankind over many thousands of years that 
we still have this level of accidents? And why is it that the solution is 
not so simple? Well, I'd like to propose a novel idea to you. 
I'd like to propose that we seem to have forgotten that in safety 
generally the initial and primary responsibility rests with the individual. 
We can try to train him, but, if he refuses to be traned, he is unsafe. 
There is all manner of evidence that says that training is not 100% 
effective. Witness the warnings of the Surgeon General, and the growth 
of cigarette usage, the general utilization of seat belts and other re-
straining devices in automobiles, and a whole series of other things you 
can think of. 
The problem is really much more complex than we are recognizing in 
our discourses in this meeting. The problem in industrial safety is not 
likely to he, except in very rare cases, employer disinterest or lack of 
concern. The problem is that to teach people to be safe, to assure that 
they will act safely, and to enforce their personal attention to that 
matter is a very difficult problem which no regulatory process in and of 
itself can be expected to completely cure. 
Now let me turn from that to a discussion about economics and 
feasibility. And here I am going to read some pieces from a talk I gave 
some time ago. This is from a paper presented on "The Effect of Federal 
Regulation on How Chemical Companies Make, Move, and Sell 
Products" presented at a Chemical Week Federal Regulation Briefing 
in March, 1976. 
"Whenever a regulation, or a change in social standards, 
affects the business community of the nation or utilizes re-
sources there are economic consequences to be weighed. They 
may be favorable or unfavorable, but they are inevitable, and 
it is sheer folly either to deny or to ignore them. For this 
reason no regulatory process should fail to provide for the 
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careful assessment of economic impact. No one suggests that 
economics alone determines the answer to be accepted, or 
even that the economic effects will always be of great signifi-
cance. The point rather is that, until objectively studied, no 
rational assessment of this potentially relevant factor is possi-
ble. As obvious as this thought may seem to you (and I must 
confess it seems entirely obvious to me), we continue to see 
legislation drafted and regulatory decisions made without 
reference to economic impact. 
"Now industry has often been criticized for overstating the 
economic impact of proposed regulations. Usually the com-
ment is made that economic consequences have not proven to 
be as bad as industry predicted they would be in the early 
discussions of prior proposed regulations, so that industry's 
current comments on new regulatory proposals can be dis-
counted heavily, if not ignored entirely. This is the 'cry wolf' 
story. It is unfortunately true in the genesis of most regulatory 
proposals, either legislative or administrative, that they are 
prepared originally in haste and with a lack of detailed analysis 
or understanding of their economic ramifications. Only after 
they are proposed is it possible for those affected to estimate 
economic consequences, which is admittedly a difficult job 
in any case. Since economics have almost never been con-
sidered in any detail up to the time of proposal, it is almost in-
evitable that severe cost problems will be identified in the 
initial analysis. When the final rush to complete the legislation 
or regulation ensues, a number of substantive changes in the 
proposal are usually made. If the economic guidance provided 
has had any effect on the final rule at all, it might be ex-
pected that the economic dislocations would be lessened from 
the original version. That, after all, is the purpose of economic 
assessment. To whatever degree this happens, on balance, be-
tween proposal and finalization of the regulation, the original 
statement of economic impact will tend to be high for this 
reason. Industry critics, however, never seem to remember the 
changes that were made or the importance of the original 
regulatory assumptions on which the original cost analysis was 
based. 
"The most publicized example of this kind is the vinyl 
chloride regulations proposed by OSHA and the industry 
response to that proposal. In July of 1974 OSHA proposed a 
standard requiring a non-detectable amount of vinyl chloride 
in the work place air that would become effective on January 
1, 1975. That was a period of six months after proposal. The 
industry stated that this was unattainable, that it would cause a 
PVC industry shutdown at that time if it indeed was enforced, 
and then attempted to assess the economic consequences of 
such an event. The final regulation permitted industry, in a 
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practical sense (primarily through the free choice of the 
workers involved incidentally) to work at levels up to 25 parts 
per million until April 1, 1976—fifteen months behind the 
original proposal. At that time the regulation called for a re-
duction to one part per million eight-hour TWA personnel 
exposure with short term ceilings to 5 parts per million". 
That is the regulation that is now still in effect. 
Now, Mr. Voigt commented that the industry very easily and very 
quickly met this regulation. That isn't, strictly speaking, true. During 
that intervening time the industry had time to engineer and install a 
number of pieces of control equipment and systems, to train its people, 
devise technological changes, obtain many items of equipment and 
supplies such as breathing systems and monitoring systems that were 
not available in the latter months of 1974. In spite of all of that, it was 
still necessary for the industry to have workers operating in breathing 
masks a considerable percentage of the time after April 1976. 
During the last six months of 1975 NIOSH and OSHA were dis-
agreeing over what design of breathing apparatus would finally be 
approved by them and no approved design was available for purchase 
during that time interval because of that discussion. In fact, in March 
of '76 there was still no final approval on masks of a canister type 
that could be used below 25 parts per million, and the industry was 
then operating on its third extension of a temporary approval. Now 
make no mistake about it, the differences in timing are critical to the 
effects of the regulation and its costs. The difference between no 
detectable and one part per million is absolutely essential. For example, 
the EPA has now proposed levels of less than one part per billion in 
ambient air around plants and states that it has equipment to measure 
accurately well below such levels. What levels do you suppose will be 
non-detectable tomorrow? In spite of all of these facts, government 
people and others still promulgate the 'cry wolf' story on vinyl chloride. 
I submit that they should go and restudy their facts. 
Now, with regard to the benzene decision which has already drawn 
so much comment, it seems to me that the issue here really is whether or 
not we are to have more and more regulation and higher and higher 
costs, without any really discernable benefits. What the Court suggested 
was that it was an entirely reasonable procedure that, if OSHA felt it 
necessary to impose upon industry and the public at large a regulatory 
cost that was considerable, they should be able to provide some evidence 
that there would be a health benefit achieved. Now that to me, in 
contra-distinction to what our previous speakers have said, seems to be 
entirely reasonable. 
The difficulty of proving precise numbers in this entire area is well 
known. I myself have spoken from public podiums very frequently on 
that difficulty. I have participated personally in the setting up of a 
research institute aimed at trying to provide toxicological data needed 
for sound risk/benefit analyses which are not available for many of the 
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materials with which we deal. The problem is difficult. But how can 
we argue that the resolution of the problem is to continue to do what 
Mr. Hutt referred to? That is to say, to regulate on fear, on emotion, 
and in the absence of understanding. 
The benzene decision does not prevent OSHA from doing its job. 
What it does do is it points out to OSHA the means and the direction 
in which it must go to produce rational regulation. There is no argu-
ment between industry and labor that protection of the work force on a 
reasonable and rational basis is required. There is no discretion per-
missible about that. But to assert and to insist that we must set levels 
of exposure that arc at the threshold of, or below, the lowest levels 
which are reasonably attainable at whatever cost, for no demonstrable 
benefit, seems to me to be distorting a process to a degree that makes 
it a travesty of its original intention. We don't need to do that. We can 
regulate in good sense. And I urge that we try to do that in the most 
constructive fashion possible. That is the fundamental charge that has 
been given to OSHA and which should guide the actions and thinking 
of all of us. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Mr. Voigt, during your statement you referred 
to the recent Fifth Circuit decision. I would like to ask whether, in your 
opinion, Supreme Court affirmance of the Fifth Circuit benzene standard 
case would have the effect of seriously undercutting the OSHA cancer 
policy? 
Mr. Voigt: I interpret the question as "What is the effect of the 
benzene decision on the cancer policy?" 
Before I answer that, I just want to make a few brief comments on 
Mr. Fleming's remarks. Certainly I share with him the general concern 
about the costs of OSHA regulations and their impact and the benefits 
that are to be derived therefrom. With regard to carcinogens and toxic 
substances it should be emphasized that OSHA is not regulating for 
casual reasons. The basis for the regulations is that there is a scientific 
consensus that there is no known safe level for carcinogens, which 
makes the regulator's job much more difficult in determining where to 
set a permissible exposure level. I can't defend every decision that 
OSHA has made, because I am not acquainted with all the scientific 
information that was evaluated. But OSHA has made an attempt to 
take into account economic costs of regulations when setting standards. 
In fact, they have been challenged by the AFL-CIO for that very 
process. In the asbestos regulation, the standard was set above the zero 
limit in order to accommodate the cost of abatement. The same deci-
sion was made with regard to arsenic: to set the standard higher than 
the zero level in order to accommodate certain predicted economic 
difficulties associated with achieving the zero level. It is not as if OSHA 
is not making any effort to accommodate economic problems. 
Now, secondly, I would agree with Mr. Fleming to the extent that 
the fact that OSHA is concentrating some of its resources, and certainly 
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in a comparative sense a much greater percentage of its resources on 
regulating toxic substances, means that it is necessarily reducing its 
efforts with regard to other types of lesser hazards. OSHA is also, in an 
effort to avoid mistakes of the past, trying to redirect its efforts in the 
enforcement area of controlling safety hazards. They are trying to focus 
on the most hazardous jobs and conditions. They have tried to, in other 
words, set priorities for inspections. 
It is true that there are statistics indicating that the rate of occupa-
tional injury has gone up in the last year. Without going into a long 
discussion of statistics, I think it is sufficient to comment at this point 
that the explanations for this increase could be multiple. 
For example, one explanation may be OSHA's involvement. Before I 
am misinterpreted, I should explain OSHA has a requirement that 
fatalities be reported to OSHA. There are also reporting requirements 
with regard to non-fatal occupational injuries. Some people feel these 
requirements, in themselves, have produced a greater rate of reporting 
on injuries—so the rate goes up. Hence, OSHA's involvement has actu-
ally produced an increase in the recorded rate of injury. It is also 
generally believed that before OSHA became involved, industrial acci-
dents were notoriously underrecorded. In part, this was due to the fact 
that many employees were afraid that if they reported accidents, they 
would be fired for being accident-prone or would suffer other discipline 
resulting from their employer's unhappiness at having to pay higher 
insurance premiums. 
Mr. Fleming said that in comparison to the number of occupational 
injuries that we see, that occupational illness is not as serious a prob-
lem. Now I am not in a position to make that assessment. I would say 
simply at this point that the conclusion is probably vulnerable. In 1975 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which is not 
in OSHA, suggested that 31 % of the medical conditions found in the 
sample group of workers probably were caused by their jobs, and 
another 10% might have been. These medical "conditions" were con-
ditions like anemia, chronic respiratory problems, hearing loss and were 
distinguished from acute illnesses such as heart attack or infectious 
diseases. Admittedly, it is very difficult in many cases to make an 
assessment of the relationships between work conditions and employee 
disease because of the difficulties in documenting the exposure history of 
individual employees. Nevertheless, this difficulty does not support Mr. 
Fleming's assertion that occupational illness is not a serious problem. 
I'm sorry to have taken up those few minutes to respond, but I 
thought it was necessary. Reference has been made to the OSHA cancer 
policy. It is an effort by OSHA, and it's a bold effort, to streamilne the 
regulatory process. Here you have an act that's been in effect for eight 
years. I gave you a list of the new standards they've promulgated re-
lating to the control of specific carcinogens and it took me about fifteen 
seconds. Each one of those standards underwent prolonged litigation, 
frequently on the same issues. Each one of those standards had pro-
longed administrative hearings in which evidence was presented on a 
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variety of similar issues. The frequently redundant processes were con-
suming much time. 
Potential solution: Let's streamline the process. First, have a generic 
policy in which certain factual issues are foreclosed in order to stream-
line the process. Secondly, develop an efficient administrative process 
for identifying and classifying carcinogens. And thirdly to develop a 
model standard that can be applied in general form to all carcinogens 
that are identified through scientific procedures. 
I am going to give you an abbreviated idea of some of the issues that 
are foreclosed and then cut it off there. For example, if the cancer 
policy were implemented successfully, the following issues are some of 
those which would be foreclosed in terms of having to relitigate the 
issue in every carcinogen case by taking testimony on these issues in 
every standards hearing: 
1. There is no safe level for a carcinogen and that therefore per-
missible exposure levels for such a substance should be set at the 
lowest feasible level. 
2. Animal tests arc relevant to man. 
3. That the animals which can be used for testing and then in extra-
polating to man can be rats and mice. 
4, That the route of exposure for humans e.g., ingestion or inhala-
tion makes no difference as to the risk involved. 
While this list is not complete, it gives some idea of the type of 
issues involved. If the cancer policy were adopted, these issues, assuming 
that there is adequate support for these conclusions, would not be re-
litigated in each standards hearing. 
In addition, the cancer policy establishes categories for identifying 
carcinogens which warrant regulation. Under the proposed policy, a 
"category I" substance is one to which employee exposure must be 
reduced to the "lowest feasible level." Such a substance is one which 
has revealed carcinogenic properties in ( ) epidemiological studies of 
humans or (2) two properly done tests of different mammalian species 
or (3) properly done tests on a single mammalian species if the results 
have been replicated in another experiment or (4) properly done tests 
on a single mammalian species if the results are supported by short 
term test results. Again this summary of the proposed policy is neces-
sarily abbreviated and selective. However, it gives you some idea of the 
general scheme involved. 
The question has been asked: what would the benzene decisions do to 
the proposed cancer policy? In my opinion, the benzene decision seri-
ously undermines the policy. While time does not permit me to discuss 
all aspects of this conclusion, at least one basic point can be made 
here. In essence, the benzene decision suggests that before OSHA can 
limit employee exposure to a substance the agency must be able to 
show what the benefits of such a limitation will he, based on a projected 
does-response curve. The court suggests that such a curve for humans 
could be developed on the basis of animal studies. In contrast, the pro- 
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posed cancer policy provides for the use of animal studies as a basis for 
regulation even though these studies do not permit the plotting of a 
dose-response curve. For a variety of reasons, the agency feels that the 
use of a dose-response curve as a prerequisite for the setting of a per-
missible exposure limit is vulnerable on both scientific and practical 
grounds. Obviously, if the rationale in the benzene decision is applied to 
the proposed cancer policy, the policy will not survive in its present 
form. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you. Unfortunately we have exceeded our 
time allotment and in order that we not be unduly late to lunch, I now 
adjourn the meeting. 
INTRODUCTION BY 
VISITING PROFESSOR GRAHAM WAITE 
MARSHALL-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW 
CO-MODERATOR OF THE FEDERAL PANEL 
Professor Waite: I am pleased to introduce Susan B. King, the Chair-
man of the Consumer Product Safety Commission in Washington, D. C., 
who will continue today's examination of Federal efforts to cope with 
hazardous and toxic substances by addressing the important question, 
"How effectively are we protecting the Consumer?" 
Ms. King: Thank you, Professor Waite. I am delighted to be here on 
behalf of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which we call 
CPSC. 
Sometimes, for those of us who are honored with being the wrap-up 
speaker at a Conference such as this, it is appropriate to attempt to 
provide some answers, to sum up what the conclusions of the Con-
ference have been, and suggest where we are heading. I don't think that's 
appropriate this afternoon, partially because I have not heard the entire 
program, particularly last night's speakers. But I also think that toxic 
substances issues still beg as many questions as they answer. And I'm 
not sure that we've really even begun to squarely face all the questions 
yet. 
It's refreshing for me to be able to speak to a group of interested, 
positive and, I think, involved people. You know that many of us in 
Washington, and all the speakers that have been before you the last 
couple of days have had to devote a lot of their primary effort and a 
considerable amount of their skills recently to defending their agencies 
and their every action. There is a sizeable group of conservative and 
anti-regulatory spokesmen who have very effectively put us on the de-
fensive. Perhaps this is rightly so, but it must sometimes seem that we 
spend as much time justifying our existence as we do in seeking in-
creased public protection. These anti-regulatory forces are effectively 
exploiting a new awareness and a new irritation which has only recently 
come to be known: When Congress approved the tide of environmental 
and health safety legislation at the beginning of this decade, many 
people apparently expected the most significant costs to be those of 
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funding the regulatory agencies themselves. It was not widely recognized 
that if government was given the mandate to help change the way that 
American business does business, then there would have to be some 
economic ripples. But, as we all know, seldom do we get something for 
nothing. 
There have been costs, as we are all aware. Some of them have been 
and will continue to be passed on to consumers—an aggravating fact 
for those most frustrated by chronic inflation. We are in a period in 
which these costs are being stressed and heavily criticized. Unfortu-
nately, all too often it is with ignorance or outright misrepresentation of 
the benefits which these regulations are bringing to our society. Regu-
lators, for the most part, have been very shy. Either we think the bene-
fits are all too self-evident, or we have waited silently in the wings for 
others to dramatize the story of health and regulations for us. Clearly, 
we have said much too little publicly about the economic benefits of 
fewer injuries and diseases, of lives and limbs saved, of hospital and 
medical costs avoided. We have not stressed how, for corporations in 
particular, reduced absenteeism on the job will increase production, 
reduce workman's compensation awards and insurance premiums. 
Fewer injured consumers means fewer personal injury suits, fewer 
clogged court calendars, and fewer of those astronomical attorneys fees 
about which everybody complains. 
While it may or may not be appropriate for Federal regulators to 
spend much of their time debating the short-term and long-trem bene-
fits of health and safety regulation, I am confident on one point of the 
debate which continues to flare around us. And this is with regard to 
the so-called inflationary impact of health and safety regulations. I think 
it's a phony issue and I think a lot of regulators would agree with me 
on this point. Health, safety, and environmental regulation has con-
tributed only infinitesimally to our rate of inflation and the polls indi-
cate that the public clearly still wants this sort of regulation, whether 
or not it contributes to price hikes. Many commentators have pointed 
out that the highly touted Weidenbaum study of the aggregate costs of 
regulation neglected to factor benefits into the equation. Whether the 
net result of the Weidenbaum method would show higher costs or 
higher benefits, his study doesn't reveal. In response, those of us who 
are involved and responsible for health and safety regulation are very 
quick to point out the polls showing continuing support for regulation 
in the area of air and water pollution, workplace hazards, and consumer 
product safety. The public is overwhelmingly in favor of continued 
regulation—in our case by more than 3 to 1. 
I won't go into the economic and inflationary impact arguments. You 
are all very well aware of the numerous factors that are involved in 
inflation. It is a very complex issue and we could develop a long list of 
everything from oil prices to what many commentators are now calling 
business' regulation of business, to the anti-competitive effects of some 
forms of standard setting, of licensing and economic regulation of sur-
face transportation, for example. 
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I would say, however, that I think that most of you today, at least 
the many familiar faces in the audience, are feeling quite uncomfort-
able and are all too aware of why government regulation of health and 
safety has been selected by the conservative forces as a whipping boy 
for inflation. It is a very, very, visible subject. There is a lot of public 
irritation with government in general. And health and safety regulation 
simply doesn't have a strong economic constituency. 
You've heard a lot this weekend about the need for greater coop-
eration and coordination among federal regulators involved with toxic 
substances and carcinogens. There are a number of factors encouraging 
us to work more closely together. We're more often than not dealing 
with the same chemicals. We face common technical problems and 
common administrative problems. And perhaps most importantly, we 
all face agendas that are much larger than our resources. Common ap-
proaches and the sharing of research, of data, and facilities have be-
come increasingly important. This is being pursued through the Inter-
agency Regulatory Liaison Group, the IRLG. I don't know how much 
discussion there has been of this at the Conference. It is the CPSC, 
EPA, OSHA and FDA working together. We have the new Regulatory 
Council. And there is the Toxic Substances Strategy Committee of the 
President's Council on Environmental Quality. There is a recently 
released IRLG risk assessment document which I understand has not 
been widely discussed in the last couple of days. This is unfortunate 
because it is very important. It was a year-long effort by the four 
IRLG agencies working together with the scientists from the National 
Cancer Institute, Environmental Health Service, and other government 
research agencies to develop the best scientific judgments as to identi-
fying carcinogens and evaluating risks they pose. It is a scientific docu-
ment. I would urge all of you to obtain copies of it if you haven't seen 
it. I don't think I have a full copy with me, but Ihave some addresses 
that you can write to and get a copy. That is one of the most significant 
and conspicuous examples of intergovernmental cooperation in our 
effort to work together to avoid duplication. 
There has been a lot of discussion, here probably also, about the 
need for a single governmental approach for controlling the prolifera-
tion of toxic substances and addressing environmentally-caused cancer. 
If we are going to pursue this theme, then we must also have a realistic 
understanding of the regulatory scheme. The prevailing assumption 
seems to be that the complexity of the regulatory system is a product 
of piecemeal legislation, reflecting as much Congressional carelessness 
and special interest lobbying as sound decision-making. But I believe 
that the conventional wisdom really is overly simplistic. It misses the 
mark. 
There are very good reasons for much of this complexity, in terms 
of purposeful expressions of Congressional intent, and indeed, current 
realities. The fact that there are 19 individual pieces of legislation 
covering various aspects of toxic substances control does not necessarily 
mean that Congress is at fault, or even that there IS fault, and, there- 
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fore, that there is blame to be spread around. To understand this re-
quires something of a broad perspective, and I would like to try to 
sketch it out for you. 
First, we should remember why the operative sections of the various 
federal statutes covering toxic substances are so different. There are 
different media in which these toxic substances are found, and each 
compels a different urgency in government response. Toxics are found 
in the air and in our drinking water, in our food and in other products 
we buy in stores, and in workplaces all across the nation. The medium 
defines the mode and significance of exposure—for example, daily in-
gestion of a toxic substance versus an occasional swim in a polluted 
lake. Also critical are the duration and the intensity of exposure. There 
is a difference between chemical plant workers exposed 40 hours a 
week, and the downstream recipients of a one-time spill which con-
taminates drinking water for only a few days. 
Secondly, it must be remembered that the various federal agencies 
also are accountable to distinct and disparate units of the House and 
the Senate, and of the Executive Branch; they also oversee and are 
scrutinized and pressured by a variety of outside interest groups with 
equally disparate viewpoints. EPA, for example, promulgates far-
reaching regulations often affecting big business—the oil, gas, and coal 
companies, the auto makers and the chemical manufacturers. On the 
Hill EPA is responsible to the House Commerce Committee for toxic 
substances but to the House Agriculture Committee for pesticides. The 
special interest lobbyists which try to influence EPA policy include not 
only the corporate interests but also the Environmental Defense Fund 
and Ralph Nader's Health Research Group. OSHA has different over-
seers in Congress, the Labor Committee and has a unique need to 
maintain vital ties to the labor community, as well as keeping open the 
channels of communication to businesses of all sizes. CPSC had a dif-
ferent constituency. We have jurisdiction over some 10,000 consumer 
products, and we deal with many issues beyond those of toxic sub-
stances and carcinogens. We deal very closely with a lot of small busi-
nesses and single item manufacturers. We also interact with industry 
trade associations, with public interest groups and consumer organiza-
tions. We, in turn, are responsible to the Commerce Committee of the 
Senate and the House. 
There is a third complicating factor when we come to the agency 
program itself, the information gathering and decision-making process. 
Each agency must consider how the toxic substance entered the en-
vironment. Was it used intentionally to produce a desired effect? Did 
the government approve that use? Or, is it naturally occuring? Or, is it 
a result of prior neglect resulting in a now unavoidable contaminant? 
The CPSC, of course, and other regulatory agencies also must con-
sider a variety of factors in decision making. One very important and 
quite delicate one is the regulatory impact of the affected industry. 
This is a topic that I am sure is generating much discussion at the Con-
ference. Should our regulatory response to a hazard be a retroactive 
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one, such as a recall or a seizure of the product—which are costly to 
a corporation? Or should we take the prospective approach, usually 
the lesser of the two evils for the corporation, whereby CPSC would 
ban or limit future exposures. What does the hazard require? What can 
the marketplace bear? 
Each agency, furthermore, must consider the structure of the indus-
try being regulated. OSHA's regulation of cotton dust to reduce brown 
lung affected the cotton textile industry, which is characterized by a 
few large corporations and many hundreds of smaller companies. This 
requires quite a different approach than NHTSA or EPA dealing with 
the Big Four auto producers in Detroit and Kenosha. 
Another important factor is the proximity of the consumer to the 
responsible link in the economic chain. This influences the choice of 
regulatory tools. For example, publicity and warnings by CPSC have 
different implications for the regulated industry than publicity by EPA. 
Consumers can readily identify the manufacturers of name brand prod-
ucts that are very widely advertised. By contrast, it's much less mean-
ingful for the consumer to hear that chemical plant "X" produced 
dangerous chemical "Y". Here the particular uses are not clearly known 
and are not easily identified by the consumer. With CPSC's power in 
terms of publicity goes a very special statutory obligation. We must 
verify the information that we put out in notices to consumers. But the 
trade off, however, is a good one for us. We have an extraordinarily 
high rate of voluntary recalls and other corrective programs that are 
taken by industry. 
There is another question fundamental to the complexity surrounding 
toxic substances: How does each agency determine which substances in 
which situations should be selected as priorities? Everyday there are 
situations in which there is widespread exposure to a substance at low 
levels, and others where a more limited population is exposed to high 
levels of the toxic substance. 
I raised all these various questions regarding the regulatory process 
not to apologize for the government's record or to try to frustrate 
meaningful discussion, but to try to place our ambitions and our good 
intentions within the proper perspective. Toxic substances in our en-
vironment—whether they threaten us in the air or in the workplace or 
in our homes—cannot elicit a single unified response from different 
federal agencies. There are two basic reasons for this: Because there are 
different laws behind each agency, and because it simply does not make 
sense. I also raise these issues because, if you give them serious con-
sideration, I think it will show the folly of those who have hastily argued 
that we should impose a genuinely monolithic government approach to 
toxic substances control and environmental cancer. 
I think we should take a look at the record which regulators have 
achieved so far in regulating toxic substances which are known or sus-
pected of causing cancer in humans. The performance so far, in fact, 
has been rather anemic, and while I probably could explain it to you, I 
don't think I could justify it. 
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Although most substances tested so far have shown no evidence of 
carcinogenicity—despite the fact that many were selected for testing 
because they were suspect—there still remain a good number of sub-
stances that have shown carcinogenic potential—by any estimate at 
]east several hundred. 
How many of these have actually been regulated by those federal 
agencies which, to listen to some sources, have been running roughshod 
with sharpened cleats through corporate laboratories and board rooms? 
Well, CPSC, I can tell you, has regulated only a handful. All told, 
EPA, OSHA, and FDA have banned or mandated reduced exposures 
to only a few dozen known or suspected carcinogens. 
The crux of the question of how to protect people from toxic sub-
stances is this: Is a further increment in reduction of exposure worth 
the consequent increment in increased cost to industry? We increasingly 
are using cost-eflectiveness  as an analytical tool to determine the least 
costly way to achieve the desired level. And we are repeatedly urged and 
I would say, occasionally bludgeoned into using cost/benefit analysis. 
They are not the same thing. In cost/benefit analysis, the question be-
comes should the desired health levels which the government is seeking 
be achieved? Here the driving force of the argument becomes dollar 
costs, not the health effects likely to result. And if I may venture a 
digression here, a recent U. S. Court of Appeals decision in a case up-
holding CPSC's architectural glazing materials standard affirmed that 
while the cost impact of its regulations is a material consideration for 
the Commission in determining the reasonableness of the rule, this 
cannot be the only factor. Cost is only one of the considerations. 
In any case, the success of the current approach so far has been less 
than impressive. Industry and government commonly have engaged in 
tag-team wrestling matches in which each grunts and groans about the 
validity of the other's cost data and benefit estimates. While I don't 
need to remind this audience that we live in a litigious era, you may 
be unaware that toxic substances litigation has brought us to new levels 
of high art and low comedy. The regulations invariably get tied up in 
court, where the outcome (or lack of one) depends too often on who 
gets to the friendly courthouse first, the proponents of the stricter regu-
lation or those for the more lenient standards. In this endless litigation, 
the losers are the consumers, the workers and the public. 
The rational regulator is tempted to ask whether the fight sometimes 
is worth it on such terms, to ask whether the infrequent "victories" after 
years and years of litigation are not pyrrhic in terms of public protec-
tion, manpower and budget expenditures. I can assure you that most 
regulators feel extraordinarily frustrated that they can't move more 
quickly to remedy this very serious national problem. 
But it is regretably true that this is a most adversarial era, a time in 
which counter-productive defensiveness tends too often to be the rule 
rather than the exception. Our confrontations lend authenticity to our 
cartoon caricatures: beady-eyed, green-visored, venal bureaucrats 
squared-off against the obese Uncle Scrooges who are guarding their 
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money vaults. Neither caricature, obviously, is really representative. 
And surely the great majority of regulators are quite sincere in their 
commitment both to maximum protection AND cost-effective ways to 
achieve such protection. And many businessmen across the country—
although I would say that often times not those who are most vocal 
on the subject, are equally sincere in their efforts to comply with health 
and safety regulations and to acknowledge the government's qualifica-
tions and even-handedness in setting protective standards. 
In the last analysis, the burden probably remains on us, as it should, 
the regulators. There are, however, some thoughts to consider and 
maybe some ideas and areas where concerned citizens and concerned 
representatives of industry can help us. First, it is clear that this whole 
issue to toxic substances control demands purposeful leadership and 
unwavering commitment from our elected officials . . . from the White 
House to Capitol Hill. Not until the scientific and policy issues of public 
health and welfare are firmly separated from the frantic political search 
for a scapegoat for inflation, can rational discussion resume. Secondly, 
I think all of us in government have an overdue obligation to explain 
to the people just what we do know and don't know about the hazards 
of toxic substances, from cancer and birth defects to the rogue's gallery 
of other chronic and genetic hazards. People are very alarmed by the 
"cancer of the week" scare. We all know that. They don't, in fact, 
understand the relationship of animal testing to human risk, much less 
the significance of high-dose testing, benign versus malignant tumors, 
and other significant and sophisticated issues. The government made a 
big contribution toward this public dialogue last week with the docu-
ment that I mentioned to you, the IRLG risk assessment document, 
setting forth our best scientific judgments about carcinogen identifica-
tion and risk evaluation. 
Finally, since we seem to be unable to extricate ourselves from the 
cost/benefit calculation game, I believe it is time the government itself 
undertook development of the best possible methods for fully identify-
ing, assessing and, where possible, quantifying the benefits of health and 
safety regulation. It is simply ridiculous to try to use as a decision-
making tool any equation which is as functionally lopsided as is the 
current one. This should be an immediate task for the Regulatory Coun-
cil or the IRLG. 
These are suggestions I make, as we hear and read in the press this 
week that the White House is finishing work on what is described as the 
new Regulatory Reform Act. This is a response to pressures from the 
corporate community and the stated purpose of the legislation will be 
to reduce the burdens on industry and promote the use of economic 
incentives to achieve regulatory goals. The new Director of the Regula-
tory Council, Peter Petkas, was quoted in the Washington Post last 
week as saying "Unless we go to Congress with concrete proposals, 
there will be efforts to take the teeth out of environmental and health 
and safety legislation. The perception in Congress is that regulations are 
burdensome, and we better do something about that quickly." 
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The clear danger with this whole climate is that we throw the baby 
out with the bathwater—that is we do the wrong thing for the wrong 
reason, or even that we do the wrong thing for the right reason. We are 
attempting to address many of the legitimate complaints about duplica-
tive regulations and excessive paperwork. I think that anyone who has 
worked with regulators in the last nine, ten or twelve months knows this. 
We at CPSC, not surprisingly, will continue to have an exceedingly 
difficult task in protecting people from toxic substances. We always have 
had difficulty in measuring precise exposure levels, and very likely we 
always will. The unfortunate consequence is the potential always for 
underestimation of the health threats. We are, of course, limited to 
toxics which actually appear in consumer products which get into the 
hands of consumers; we cannot become involved in issues involving 
substances found only in the workplace, the food and drug supply sys-
tems, or the general environment. This limits us, but it also frees us to 
focus where we are most needed, on substances posing risks primarily 
in consumer products. We have deferred in areas where other agencies 
should take the lead. 
There can be no denying that CPSC and the other health and safety 
regulators place certain burdens on industry; that's part of the price-tag 
for improved protection through regulation. The federal regulators 
were not created to be money saving institutions. Don't misunderstand 
me—I agree that we have a very serious responsibility not to squander 
money. But the laws that were passed to remedy abuses that the market-
place proved itself incapable of correcting—and this is a point which 
should not be lost in the debate. As I said before, as we have recognized 
the seriousness of the need and the legitimacy of certain of the com-
plaints from the business and industrial community, we are working 
harder to more fully assess the impact of our regulations. Very simply 
stated, what we need to know now is more about which of these burdens 
can be justified in terms of significant contributions to health and safety, 
and those which perhaps cannot be justified. 
The theme of this session this afternoon, at least nominally, has been 
to assess how effectively government has been protecting consumers 
from toxic substances. I know with certainty that people are receiving 
much more protection than they were six years ago when CPSC and a 
number of other agencies were created. And I think we would do an 
even better job if we were not pressured so much into being so de-
fensive and reactive. We should be and we are concentrating on clean-
ing up our acts and tackling the biggest issues facing us; we should be 
reaming out the waste and the duplication and the nit-picking and begin 
to make some genuine serious accomplishments on which to build a 
toxics program for the future. 
With regard to the so-called corporate offensive against regulators 
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, I think we are very 
much still in the name-calling phase of all this; it was not much more 
than a year ago that a few spokesmen for the business community 
sensed their first real political opportunity to launch a counter-attack 
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against the wave of progressive health and safety legislation which was 
passed in the early 70's. It is my hope, and I think that of many of the 
people with whom I work in Washington that we will all settle down 
soon and work with the facts to provide greater protection for people. I 
think that would be the appropriate and proper way to end this decade 
which started out with such noble intentions, and we still think attain-
able objectives. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite: Thank you. Our first commentator will be Mr. 
Samuels of the AFL-CIO. 
Mr. Samuels: If Ms. King doesn't have a doctorate after that mar-
velous presentation, I can only say that we should try to make sure she 
gets one. I think we have seen and heard a marvelous display of an 
element of our democracy that we don't pay much attention to: the 
ability of leaders within the Executive Branch, particularly in the regu-
latory agencies, to take issue with the White House. As a matter of fact, 
every environmental and health regulatory agency director has done 
just that, a fact about which we should all be very pleased. 
Now, in my response to what the soon to be Doctor King has stated, 
I am going to emphasize the problem of criminality. But I want to 
issue a warning in advance. I don't think that is the major problem of 
regulation, although I am sure it is a major problem. I choose to focus 
on it because in this, as in most other conferences, it is an element of 
regulation that we, being nice people, don't want to talk about. 
The problem of regulation seems to be governed by the assumption 
of innocence to the point of the absurd. Now, it is true that most of us, 
perhaps 99% of us, obey the law. But there are a few who con-
sciously flaunt the law. Unfortunately, environmental criminality occurs 
among those about whom conventional wisdom would teach us, or tell 
us, you would not want to find or could not find criminals. Most dis-
turbing is the frequency with which these are the people (scientists, 
engineers, technicians) who generate the information on the basis of 
which regulatory decisions are made. In general, the regulatory struc-
ture that we have—the rules, regulations, and standards—are aimed at 
most people. They are not aimed at these and other kinds of criminals, 
and yet these criminals are treated in the same manner as the innocent. 
I think this is terribly unfair. Equally important, it is one reason why, 
if we appear to be bogged down with regulation, and in fact that may 
be the case, it may be because we are trying to stretch the assumption 
of innocence to cover those it really can't cover. 
One of the things we find ourselves doing when we talk about the 
failure of our system of regulation is talk about the stereotypic corpora-
tion. I think this also is bad. I don't think we can get very far fighting 
stereotypes. 
We don't seem to appreciate what a corporation is. In one sense, a 
corporation is a community of workers and pensioners, stockholders, 
suppliers, contractors, customers, managers and members of the board. 
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Now, coming from someone from organized labor this may shock you, 
but we can identify with these corporations. We are concerned about 
getting at the heart of the regulatory issue, and this cannot be achieved 
by ignoring reality. 
Another thing that may shock you, because I come from organized 
labor, is that I agree with Milton Friedman when he says "The business 
of business is business." What that means is that this nonsense about 
corporate responsibility has got to be dropped. It is a myth. It is a 
charade. It is nonsense. Let's not talk about the responsibilities of a 
piece of paper (one aspect of a corporation). You may assume for some 
legal purposes that a corporation is a "person", but it is not a person, 
and only people have responsibilities. 
Part of this view of the regulatory problem is derived from our ex-
perience with the diseased corporation. In some cases, not in every case, 
corporations become collectives that tend to create a state of serfdom, 
especially among the professional members of the corporation. And if 
the result is a coterie of indentured scientists, whipped into a state of 
moral submission, then the presence at any level of authority of a 
criminal mind can easily direct or generate "data" and policies that 
result in environmental assault and murder. And that is precisely what 
often occurs. Our regulatory apparatus cannot really deal with this 
criminal. The favored alternative, liability suits against corporations, 
tend to be somewhat impersonal with the awards paid by nearly every-
one in the corporate community, but usually not the criminal. 
Now what about criminal law? We have a little project. We are look-
ing at the Pinto case, the Firestone case, even Watergate because in that 
case (I'm told) when they really decided to do something, it was done 
on the basis of a general prohibition against lying to Federal officials. 
It may be that our lawyers will tell us that we have to redefine assault 
and homicide. But at least in these cases the law is beginning to under-
stand the importance of dealing with the fundamental issue of crim-
inality. It is our intention to widen the application of this approach. 
There are other related issues of redefinition. For example, the as-
sumed definition that Peter Hutt used this morning of cause. Essentially 
the definition is taken from Newtonian physics. Newtonian physics fruit-
fully explains the rules by which people built this building. But New-
tonian physics doesn't explain the source of twenty percent of the 
energy for this building (which comes from nuclear energy). And yet 
we seem to believe—without examination—that this one cause, one 
effect over-simplification of Newton's concept somehow or other is 
heuristic in understanding everything, including disease. In most en-
vironmental regulatory issues, the "but for" language used in law is 
inapplicable. 
There are other issues of definition or meaning: risk assessment, cost-
benefit analysis, etc. I could go through a whole list of terms and con-
cepts that require some straightening out, if you will, in the law. For 
example, assuming the invalidity of the application of cost-benefit 
analysis in the case, the moral and logical implications of fallacious or 
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forced quantification is at the heart of our objection to the recent 
benzene decision. Forced comparison of incommensurables is at the 
heart of the broader concept of "acceptable risk," which we find un-
acceptable, as well as being a difficulty of cost-benefit analysis. The 
forced development of common values, putting dollar values on life to 
enable a contrived, meaningless calculus is another common fallacy. 
Mr. Hutt mentioned the name of someone who was a witness for in-
dustry at the recent OSHA carcinogens hearings: Richard Wilson. He 
ignored all of these fallacies when he compared the ratios of risk of 
sports fatalities to risks of death from cancer. But he also made the 
arithmetic error of calculating fractions which had no common de-
nominator. These distortions of basic scientific method are common-
place in regulation. But the moral problems are equally distressing. 
The cost-benefit analysis finds itself with a problem of equity. That 
is not solved with liability awards to the consumer, or hazard pay to 
the worker. These are simply forms of cannibalism. It is an historically 
persistent answer, it is true, but not one that is morally acceptable. 
I prefer the answer of a Virginian whom some of you may have 
heard of. His name was Jefferson. He located natural rights in the 
need to exist. And from this very basic principal there is another de-
rivable concept which some of us are trying to develop which we call 
necessary risk analysis. It would replace dependence on acceptable risk 
analysis and its counterpart in the economic considerations of regula-
tory issues: cost-benefit analysis. 
None of these intellectual gyrations or definitions deal with crim-
inality per se, but their proper use depends upon the honesty of the key 
users, who generally are the generators of information or data. For this 
reason, in the future, we are going to concentrate on this issue. If you 
look at some of the problems we faced in the last few years in the 
workplace—a perpetuated epidemic of silicosis in shipyards in Louisi-
ana, the Kepone incident, phosvel (which was very similar to the 
Kepone incident) in the Houston channel area, vinyl chloride, DBCP, 
the routine drugging of workers with chelating agents, cotton dust and 
asbestos—you find an interesting kind of pattern. In each one of these 
cases we have been able to identify a dishonest or an unethical physi-
cian or scientist or technician. And a "corporation" has had to bear the 
burden of this dishonesty. 
Now, I'm not saying that the dishonesty does not often occur at the 
top, and asbestos is a good example of this. An attorney who lives only 
a few hundred miles south of here, in a discovery proceedings, found 
that in the thirties the president of the Raybestos-Manhattan Corpora-
tion and the general counsel of the Johns-Manville Corporation con-
spired with unethical scientists to bottle up information on the effects of 
asbestos. He uncovered the letters that detailed the mechanisms by 
which they would censor the kind of information given not only to 
workers, but to the general public, the scientific community and the 
government. 
I realize this is not the largest part of the problem of regulation, but 
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I submit to you that this is the most neglected part. It may be the 
most important part. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite.. Thank you. Our next commentator is Dr. Ashford 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Dr. Ashford.. I must say I was overjoyed with the thoughts presented 
by Susan and it offers me an opportunity to make some remarks which 
do not repeat hers, but perhaps build upon some of the things which 
she has said. Please forgive the somewhat unstructured nature of my 
remarks, they were developed between sweet potatoes and something 
called ice cream. 
First. I think it is clear to most of us that most chemicals are prob-
ably not terribly dangerous and carcinogenic. But there are a lot of 
chemicals out there. I think it is important to take scope of what we 
are really dealing with. 
The per capita use of petro-chemicals since 1945 has increased by a 
factor of four every ten years. So that in 1975 you have 64 times the 
per capita use of petro-chemicals that you did in 1945. Even if a small 
percentage of those chemicals in use end up causing a problem, there 
may be a significant problem. Couple this with the fact that the long 
term chronic effects for which there is a great deal of concern in the 
toxics area don't appear until twenty or thirty years after the initial ex-
posure. I don't need to draw a graph for you from here that the in-
creased use coupled with the long latency period mean that the delay 
effects of this exposure are yet to come. This is the basis for the com-
ments about the "cancer epidemic" which may be upon us in the next 
few years. You don't need to indicate every chemical to be feeling 
strongly about that problem. 
And I think this brings an important point. You see, there is an 
important difference in time between the adjustment costs of benefit 
and regulation and the longer term costs of benefits and regulation. The 
adjustment costs, the cost of getting our industrial house into order, are 
being felt right now. We want to put money into capital equipment now, 
ino redesigning industrial plants now. When do we expect the benefits 
to emerge? Twenty years, thirty years from now? So you see, the ad-
justment costs are felt now, very strongly, the benefits very much later. 
You don't need to be an economist to realize what that difference in 
time does to planning and political processes. 
The one key statement that Susan made in her presentation here had 
to do with the nature of the industrial process. I am paraphrasing, but 
the name of this game is, I'm afraid, changing the nature of industrial 
production in the United States. It is not regulating benzene. It is not 
regulating flurocarbons. These are examples. These are symbols. These 
are symbols of signals being given slowly and deliberately that we must 
change and plan changes in the nature of industrial production. 
It might interest you to know that in chemical production 87% of 
the development cost of a chemical comes after the applied research 
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phase. And if we anticipate the problems these adjustments cost in the 
future, which come from not having paid attention earlier, will not be 
borne by the corporation. Yes, there will be some costs. You should 
note further that the adjustment costs occur as a one time phenomenon 
with small maintenance costs thereafter. The benefits of providing a 
safe environment accrue year, after year, after year. If you wait long 
enough in anybody's cost-benefit calculation, the costs of regulation can 
generally be justified by the benefits. It depends upon the matrix that 
you deal with. 
There are benefits of regulation to firms. There are economic benefits 
in terms of factors that Susan talked about. They directly accrue to 
firms and to the productive capacity of their workers. They are gen-
erally not appreciated. In some cases we have really a knee-jerk re-
sponse of people in the regulated position which, I'm afraid, still 
emerges from the concept that all environmentalists are concerned 
about the hair on the top of the bald eagle. I'm not going to argue the 
importance of that hair, but I think the environmental movement by 
virtue of the fact that it is for example, given firm support by the labor 
movement which is not characteristic of the past shows that the move-
ment itself has really changed its characteristics. 
What about the benefits of regulation? Must we be constrained to 
take a regulation like benzene and calculate the benefits in terms of 
the lives saved? Or is there something else going on here? A key word 
occurcd in this morning's presentation by Fred Anderson, and that is 
the word leveraging. Leveraging is what it is all about. You provide the 
signals so that generally we begin to produce products in a different kind 
of way. If we were to judge the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue 
Service by all the fines it collected for violation of the Internal Revenue 
Code, we wouldn't be terribly impressed with the collection. But we 
know, don't we, that there is a good deal of voluntary compliance 
generated by the auditing system. 
Let me suggest that the environmental regulatory agencies are just 
now starting to be effective. And the measure of effectiveness is the 
intensity of the political opposition and the fact that people can no 
longer ignore the signals because their chemical might be next. It is this 
systemic concern that is the payoff, not the benefits that you trace to 
benzene and to flurocarbons and to solid waste pollution regulation. 
We can never be policemen any more than the Internal Revenue Service 
can entirely police all the tax returns that they audit. 
Inflation is a phony issue. Charles Schultz himself in a book with 
Neese called Pollution, Prices and Public Policy cautioned us, and I am 
almost quoting: We must be careful not to regard all price rises as in-
flationary. For those price rises which include the internalization of 
social costs are not necessarily inflationary. What happens to that 
message of Professor Schultz? 
The effects of regulation on technological change is a phony issue. 
There are two kinds of innovation: that for what is called main busi-
ness compliance and that for a main business innovation, and that 
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which is called compliance technology or the generation of better prod-
ucts. Where are the gainers and the losers in this issue? Why are public 
goods any more different and contribute any less to the quality of life 
than private goods which are calculated through the GNP? The answer 
is simple. Who appropriates the benefits of clean air? In other words, 
I'm afraid we can't get away from the fact that we are talking about 
whose ox is gored. It would be better if we were honest and stopped 
using deceptively neutral methodology such as cost-benefit analysis to 
come out with a bottom line. 
I'm concerned about two developments that are happening. One is 
that the alternatives to regulation, or reform, that are being offered 
may in fact not be in the interests of those who are advocating them 
very loudly. Small business is a major force in trying to bring about 
regulatory reform, because they have a lot of regulations that apply 
and they really don't understand very often what they need to do. I 
don't think it is being too cynical to say they are prompted into writing 
their Congressmen. 
But let me point out to you, for example, that the suggestion of an 
effluent tax, which is supposed to leave each firm with the ability to 
choose between paying a tax and seeking an economically efficient 
solution to the pollution problem, will benefit who? When a small 
businessman is confronted with either paying a tax or abating, is it the 
small businessman or the large firm that has the economies of scale, 
the access to technological information? In other words, even if it is in 
the small businessman's economic interest to comply with regulation by 
abating, by buying technology or developing it, he doesn't know that. 
So he gives up and says, "Well, I'll pay the tax." I would caution you 
to look very carefully at these theoretically attractive solutions which 
may have a remarkable and perhaps worse effect on industry structure 
vis-a-vis the small firm than the already existing regulatory mechanisms. 
I'm further and terribly concerned about the undemocratic process in 
which the present regulatory reforms are being suggested. I thought that 
the Council on Environmental Quality which is in the Executive Branch 
was the advisor to the President on environmental matters. I thought 
that the National Environmental Policy Act required an environmental 
impact statement which required the consideration of economic and en-
vironmental issues. Somehow it seems that the Council on Economic 
Advisors has become the principal advisor on environmental matters, 
and that the Presidential directives, started by President Ford, which 
require accountability for the environmental agencies are being required 
not by the Council on Environmental Quality but by a handful of 
quasi-cabinet people around the White House. 
Now, I don't have to agree with you about cost-benefit analysis. And 
I don't have to agree about issues, other than to hope that I can get you 
to agree with me that it is an undemocratic process that is occuring. I 
don't want scientists or lawyers or economists or any one political party 
dictating to society on how to make these decisions. The cost-benefit 
analysis, if you want, has already been performed by the Congress. 
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The imposition of a formalism by cost-benefit analysis really begs the 
question because either under cost-benefit which requires that cost be 
less than the benefits or the marginal costs be less than the marginal 
benefits, or cost effectiveness criteria which demands that we get the 
mcst health for the bucks, begs the question that we are seeking cost 
effective solutions. Who says we arc seeking cost effective solutions? 
If you are faced, for example, with the decision to do away with 
asbestos brake lining and as a result, (I'm not recommending this) let's 
say you kill 2000 people on the highway because the brakes weren't so 
good, but you would save 1500 workers. A cost benefit or cost effective 
analysis would say that is an insane decision. You are going to save 
1500 workers and you are going to kill 2000 workers in the highway. 
Well, maybe that decision isn't so crazy if you begin to look at the 
population of risk and their options out of the work situation and so 
forth. 
We do countless of things which don't maximize our output. What 
we really do is minimize our maximum regret. We try to avoid fairly 
large and obvious catastrophes. And that is done through political 
process, not through a methodology. So an imposition, let me submit to 
you, of a formalism is really trying to get us to try to change our 
philosophy. Now it we should do that, let's do that. But let's not do it 
mechanically. 
I want to comment upon a solution that has twice been offered here 
and that is the solution of compensation of the victims of toxic sub-
stances as a way out of some of our problems. Be very careful with this 
solution. In the worker's compensation area it has proved to be a dis-
asterous result. 
You see, compensation can have two purposes. Let's compensate 
some losers and make them more whole. Or let's have a deterent effect 
so that people are afraid to produce bad products, to provide unsafe 
work place, and so forth. While compensation systems which make it 
easier for victims to get compensated do have the advantage of some 
losers being compensated, they also have the characteristic that it re-
duces the risk to the firms of doing something better. 
Any insurance system which will emerge from a compensation statute 
reduces the risk that firm feels. The strongest risk that a firm feels, and 
let them tell you, is in the area of product liability suits. The chemical 
industry is becoming uninsurable in this area. And when the suits begin 
to reach to supervisory chemists who do not own the company because 
they were the ones with superior knowledge, you will begin to see some 
real behavioral changes. 
I've talked to the American Chemical Society meetings frequently 
and this is their concern. Can I who am heading this laboratory be sued 
by one of my workers who gets cancer? The chance of losing their 
house, not the assets of the corporation, is the thing that is going to 
change behavior, and is changing behavior. So, without taking a firm 
position on the compensation solution be very careful about quick fixes. 
They may not do what you want them to do. 
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I only want to state one remark in closing, and that is that we have 
heard a lot about freedom here, free choice and so forth. If you analyze 
our historical position on freedom, there is nothing inconsistent about 
regulation. Regulation may give us freedom from birth defects, freedom 
from the results of toxic materials, freedom from not knowing harmful 
substances to which we are exposed. There is nothing inconsistent with 
our concept of freedom. Yet, we are a long way from knowing the risks 
to which we are exposed. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite: Thank you. Our next commentator will be James 
Rogers of the Water and Solid Waste Division of the EPA in Wash-
ington, D. C. 
Mr. Rogers: I certainly appreciate the opportunity to be here today. 
I always welcome the opportunity to come to Williamsburg. 
I want the record to note that we just received Susan King's speech 
about an hour and a half ago, and for that reason we are not as or-
ganized as the previous responsive speakers have been. I was very im-
pressed this morning at the logic and coherence of the presentations. 
I'm afraid I'm unintentionally about to lower the level of this discussion. 
There are two points that came through very strongly to me as a 
result of listening to this morning's and this afternoon's talks. The first 
was that there is a great display of knowledge about the more intellectual 
aspects of controlling carcinogens—cost-benefit, no dose, dose-respon-
sive curves, and the various other, I guess. "buzz words" of the pro-
fession. I certainly can't participate very well in that game. But I 
believe I'm one of the few people at this Conference that works day by 
day in water and solid waste pollution control. 
The second point I want to make is that in my opinion emphasizing 
the one-chemical analysis, emphasizing the one-chemical toxic sub-
stances problem, is a little unrealistic, because that really isn't the most 
effective avenue of attack with respect to toxic chemicals. Let me give 
an example close to home. A good friend of mine is a chief analytical 
scientist at our laboratory in Florida, doing work on Kepone. I was 
having dinner with him one night and he was describing the gas 
chromatograph-mass spectrograph analyses of the James River sedi-
ments. He said, "Here's Kepone. It shows a peak and we're very 
worried about it. The peaks are not going down. They seem to be 
going up for the various parts of the sediments. But," he said, "what 
worries me even more arc all these other peaks that go on and on. We 
don't have names for those things. We don't know what they are." 
And that is true in other water bodies. We have a vast amount of 
individual organic compounds. Probably we do have names for them if 
we were able to separate them out and get the right substrates in the 
gas chromatograph. But we have so many chemicals coming out of so 
many facilities in a mixed stream that it is unrealistic, and this again 
is in the context of water pollution and solid waste pollution control 
to deal only with analysis of single substances. I think the Bell, West 
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Virginia plant of duPont produces some 600 substances at any one 
time. That can vary from week to week depending on what type of 
paint people want, what kind of national and international demands 
there are on the chemical market. It is very hard for us to anticipate 
from week to week what some of the large chemical concerns are going 
to put out. 
The other problem I have with looking at toxic chemicals from a 
one-chemical perspective is that if you take the famous carcinogens—
let's say benzene, vinyl chloride, benzidine (I think this is a dye), a 
few of the others, where you have some idea of the people exposed, and 
some idea of how many cancers are being caused—if you take the big 
ones and you add them up, there really aren't a lot of people each year 
that are supposed to get cancer from them. Let's say 10,000 at the 
outside. There are 350,000 people, I think, each year who get cancer—
something like that. A quarter of Americans die of cancer or have some 
type of cancer operation in their life. These are staggering statistics and 
we probably don't have the numbers correct because of statistical 
problems. But it is a huge number. 
And what are we going to do now to examine and to control those 
other chemicals that we don't have names for, or that we don't have 
data for? I guess this gets me to the approaches and the practical prob-
lems we have in controlling toxic chemicals under the Water Pollution 
Control Act and under the new RCRA (Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act). 
(Before I get into the practical problems of regulating mixed waste 
versus specific chemicals, let me give some of my personal history on 
this. I was involved in the aldrin-dieldrin trial that was referred to 
earlier today. I found it a very frustrating way to resolve a dispute. 
Millions and millions of dollars in legal fees and expert witness time 
and debate. And I'm not sure going through that very painful 
adjudicatory trial made it any more feasible for the government to make a 
difficult decision on whether to get rid of that chemical.) 
EPA has been one of the most aggressive agencies in the history of 
the government controlling pollution, yet we have a lousy history of 
controlling single chemicals. We were sued to cancel the registration of 
DDT. We were sued to do it to aldrin-dieldrin. And we were sued to do 
it to heptachlor and chlordane. Eventually, we would have gotten 
around to cancelling these, but we were dragging our feet in the minds 
of some environmental groups. We have, I think, two or three other 
"chemical notches" on our belt, but there are very few. There are 
55,000 registered pesticides, something like that. We have just scratched 
the surface. We have to go through these adjudicatory hearings every 
time we want to do something. I'm afraid that we may have a similar 
history under TSCA although people believe that we can draft regula-
tions that speed the process. But we have a terrible history of controlling 
pollutants on a one-chemical basis. 
There are great unknowns in the water pollution and solid waste 
pollution fields and this makes regulation of single substances on the 
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basis of environmental effects, very difficult. Let me give you two other 
stories from scientists at EPA. One has been studying Lake Michigan 
for many years. He has studied the perch in Lake Michigan for many 
of those years. The perch is a sport fish and a commercial fish, as you 
know. A lot of people have interest in it. He says after all this work by 
all the federal and state agencies, it would take a 50% increase or de-
crease in population for them to know that anything happened. 
We had a hearing two years ago on a toxic substance, mercury. I 
asked one of our scientists to come up and testify as to everything he 
knew about mercury in the water, what happened to mercury. He had 
been working on it for four years and had been getting a lot of money 
from the Agency for this research. It took two pages for him to sum-
marize all his work about what happened to mercury in the water. He 
simply didn't know. There were too many other factors. There was a 
tidal flushing that was unusual in the area. Sediments were doing 
strange things. He just couldn't tell what was going on with that mercury. 
So, every time we go to the Hill and testify in response to requests 
from industry for changes in the laws—essentially saying don't regulate 
us, don't put controls on our plant unless you can tell us there is some 
environmental damage—we have to say that is impossible in most situa-
tions. We just can't tell in most situations what is happening in the 
environment. There are too many factors. There are too many un-
knowns. The state of science just isn't up to answering these questions. 
And so in the Water Act, and in the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act to a lesser extent, what we call toxicity-based standards have 
been a total failure. They don't work. I don't think we should rely on 
them. I think people who try to rely on them to get away from the more 
rigid technology-based standards are kidding themselves. 
So, as you can tell, I'm an advocate of the technology-based stand-
ards at this point. Those essentially are regulations based on what an 
industry can do. We have to push industry a lot of the time. We have 
to push technology because they will rely on age-old equipment. The 
biological treatment plant was designed to treat domestic wastes in 
England back in the nineteenth century. (The whole BOD5 test ap-
parently was a test that was designed to measure how much oxygen 
would be taken out of the Thames by the time it hit the Channel.) All 
these old treatment techniques have historic significance but not really 
much scientific significance. But we still rely on them. 
What we have to do is design a system that has some relation to 
receiving water benefits and will push technology and that can be ap-
plied across the board to an industry. In the Water Act, fortunately, 
there are sections that allow us to promulgate regulations based on 
technology. We are under many court orders. The records in these 
court cases can be 100,000 to 200,000 pages. When you walk into the 
Court of Appeals you just see on the Court's face that they don't want 
this case. Their clerks don't want this case. And they don't know why 
Congress ever made us go directly to the Court of Appeals to review 
these regulations. 
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But the point I want to make, and perhaps I've been a little too 
dramatic, is that we can talk about dose-response curves and risk-
benefit analysis and we can talk about all these other subjects, but 
while we are doing that, time passes. And some agencies, state and 
federal, have to issue permits to people that allow or don't allow 
things to happen, such as whether they are going to be allowed to dis-
charge Kepone. And that there are so many unknowns still in the water 
pollution field especially that we can't get carried away with intellectual 
discussion about toxicity and the benefits of specific-chemical regulation. 
There is no question right now that there are Kepone-like catastro-
phes occuring. The chlorinated hydrocarbons and these long chain 
chemicals were developed just since World War II. We have very little 
idea where they are, what's happening to them in water. So we can be 
confident, I think, that we are right now experiencing similar unknown 
pollution catastrophes. I think we have to rely on technology-based 
standards to provide us with some gross check against this type of 
pollution until we really can focus intelligently on toxicity-based prob-
lems. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite: Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Our next commentator is 
Charles O'Conner of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Sellers, Conner 
and Cuneo. 
Mr. O'Conner: Good afternoon. I would like to bring us back for 
just a moment to the Chairman's excellent and, I thought, very balanced 
presentation at the outset of this session and pick up on a couple of her 
observations on the regulatory process as it affects consumer products in 
particular. She observed that regulators are too shy in articulating their 
points of view in their regulation of toxics substances and consumer 
products, in particular; and that this has led to a defensiveness on the 
part of the agencies and in some cases endless litigation. While I think 
her observations with respect to the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission in particular are well placed, I would suggest that one area 
where CPSC might benefit is in more careful compliance with the rules, 
regulations and statutes administered by the Commission. Indeed, more 
careful compliance here might well eliminate the defensiveness of the 
Commission, if not the litigiousness of the regulated, and should curb 
some of the endless litigation that has beset many agencies and, to a 
large extent, the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
Let me illustrate. In 1974 the Commission set out to obtain product 
formulary information on many thousands of consumer products, most 
of which were regulated under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act. 
It did this in order to ascertain what sort of chemicals there are out 
there in the market place and what sort of risks might attend on them. 
What the Commission did in this case was seek that information by 
special order (40 Fed. Reg. 36617 (I975)) rather than by rule-making, 
another option available to the Commission. By going after this infor-
mation (vital to it, no doubt) without the benefit of prior notice and 
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public comment through a rulemaking, however, the Commission lost 
valuable public input, particularly from the regulated industry. Perhaps 
had the Commission known at the outset as the result of comment by 
industry that the formulation information sought was down to the level 
wherein lies trade secrets (0.1% ), the Commission might have antici-
pated the loud reaction from the industry. Ultimately litigation arose out 
of this. (SCMA v. CPSC, (1978) CPS Decisions r  75, 177.) 
The problem here is perhaps an unwillingness to use the rule-making 
process available to the Commission as a means of anticipating the 
ramifications of a particular regulatory initiative. In this case, for ex-
ample, industry would have pointed out, as it did subsequently, that the 
Commission had no security procedures for handling the trade secrets 
that it was gathering. There were no mechanisms for insuring against 
losses of this trade secret information. What is more, this sensitive in-
formation was to be handled and analyzed by an outside contractor, 
not an employee or a member of the Commission who was therefore 
not bound by the criminal statutes that applied to trade secret handling 
within the Commission. (CPSA § 6(a) (2); I8 U.S.C. 1905.) 
A rule-making at the outset might have brought this point home, 
promoted a sensitivity toward these industry concerns and ultimately 
might have rectified a problem that did in fact result in litigation. Were 
it not for the constant prodding and over-sight of a District Judge the 
Commission might have delayed still longer in putting into place its 
security procedures. More importantly, through prior use of rulemaking 
procedures the problem could have been identified and rectified at a 
much earlier stage and litigation perhaps averted. Rulemaking in this 
case would have provided an opportunity for public comment and 
opened up a dialogue between the Commission and the regulated in-
dustry. 
This case illustrates the Commission's lack of sensitivity for trade-
secret protection. The competitive edge among companies marketing 
consumer products often lies in ingredients present in minute quanti-
ties. Had the Commission provided for notice and comment in rule-
making before undertaking this initiative, the Commission thereby 
alerted to the problem, I suspect, would have rectified its lack of pro-
cedures for trade secret protection and in all likelihood avoided this 
protracted and unfortunate litigation. An opening of communication, in 
other words, might have resolved the problem at a very early stage. 
Now apart from the failure to utilize the rule-making process as a 
method of openng communication and gaining information, the Com-
mission, I suggest, has a less than sterling record in observing procedural 
prerequisites when regulating. Take, for example, the case involving 
aerosols containing vinyl chloride. We know from the Goodrich ex-
perience that there has been fairly clear association between angiosar-
coma and vinyl chloride. On the basis of this information, the Com-
mission undertook a regulatory initiative to ban vinyl chloride as a 
hazardous substance. (39 Fed. Reg. 18815 (I974). But the statute, in 
this case the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, prescribes a two stage 
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procedure in the event that the Commission seeks to ban a hazardous 
substance—a notice followed by a comment and then an order. (15 
U.S.C. § I26I-1274). If there are objections to the order, there is a 
right to a hearing. 
Well, in this situation an aerosol paint distributor/manufacturer re-
quested a hearing to oppose the retroactive effect of the Commission's 
ban. What the manufacturer wanted in this case was an opportunity to 
produce evidence showing that the vinyl chloride exposure in the case 
of his aerosol product was not like the exposures that had given rise 
to the correlation evidence in man. The exposure was not continuous 
as with the vinyl chloride workers. It was intermittent and in minute 
quantities. The aerosol manufacturer requested a hearing on this basis. 
What the Commission did, however, was decide that the manufac-
turer's case was of insufficient merit to warrant a hearing. I was most 
interested in the Chairman's remarks about the distinctions that are 
appropriately and reasonably drawn by regulatory agencies between 
the magnitude and duration of exposures in regulating different prod-
ucts. What the company sought to do in this case was merely to produce 
this kind of evidence at a hearing. Even if the Commission ultimately 
were not to act upon the exposure evidence or ultimately to change its 
point of view, the law provided for the hearing. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the recall provisions which was part of the 
hazardous substances ban simply because the Commission had denied 
the hearing that had been requested by PACTRA Industries in this 
case. (PACTRA Industries, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, 555 F. 2d 677 (1977)) 
A more scrupulous compliance with law might have avoided this 
litigation—not that the regulatory result ultimately would have changed, 
not that the ban of vinyl chloride in aerosol products might have been 
affected, but that the end would be achieved by a means which would 
have avoided unnecessary litigation. The idea incorporated into the law 
and procedures that apply give the regulated an opportunity here for a 
hearing to develop that kind of evidence. Unfortunately, the hearing 
was denied. 
You are no doubt aware that the Commission has announced an 
interim cancer policy. (43 Fed. Reg. 25658 (1978) withdrawn in 43 
Fed. Reg. 60436 (1978).) One of the Commission's observations in 
publishing its cancer policy was that it wanted to get more experience 
in regulating potential carcinogens. The PACTRA case would have 
provided a perfect opportunity to gain that experience by hearing evi-
dence and making a judgment (a) whether there was any basis for 
distinguishing the chronic risk between low and high levels of exposure 
to vinyl chloride and (b) whether the low level intermittent exposures 
of the product manufactured by PACTRA posed an unreasonable risk 
to the consumer. In other words, PACTRA presented an opportunity 
which the Commission really did not avail itself simply because it had 
overlooked and failed to afford the procedures that are required by law. 
Another illustration of that is the Spring Mills case (Spring Mills v. 
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CPSC, 434 F. Supp. 4I6 (1977)) which involved the product in 
sleepwear, IRIS. The District Court in South Carolina in a fairly long 
opinion recited at some length the Commission's procedures in deter-
mining that TRIS in sleepwear constituted a hazardous substance as a 
matter of law rather than simply by regulatory decisionmaking. The 
Spring Mills Court overturned that decision, which was upheld in the 
Fourth Circuit on the grounds that the Commission's action was in 
effect a regulation. The Spring Mills decision, I think, is worth reading 
if only to make clear what the Commission ought to avoid in the future. 
I commend it to the Chairman, if she is not aware of it already, and to 
any new commissioners that happen on the Commission. It was a case 
where the Court fairly methodically laid out the whole flawed proce-
dural process that preceded the Commission's decision; it emphasized 
the ex parte communications which preceded the initial regulatory de-
cision. These ex parte contacts constituted a substantial violation of the 
very commendable "sunshine policy" that the Commission has followed 
since its inception. They provide another instance in which the failure 
to comply with law caused unnecessary litigation. Ultimately the regu-
latory result might not have changed, but the litigation that followed 
and the resultant defensiveness of the Agency necessarily generates a 
lack of respect and confidence among the regulated industries and con-
sumers alike. 
As a last example, let me refer to the cancer policy itself. As you 
know, it was enjoined by the District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana on the grounds that it is in effect a regulation but published 
without the required notice and comment. (Dow Chemical, USA v. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 459 F. Supp. 378 (1978)). The 
Commission has disputed that its policy is a regulation, but a District 
Court has held that its substantive impact makes it a regulation. The 
classification of products in Category A (which is like the primary cate-
gory in the proposed OSHA cancer policy) results in, or will result in, 
Commission action to either ban the product or reduce it to its lowest 
feasible level. Hence, the Court found a substantive impact and de-
termined the policy in this respect to be in effect a rule. 
This result, it seems to me, could readily have been avoided had the 
Commission allowed for notice and comment prior to adopting its 
policy, knowing, as it must have, that the policy would have a sub-
stantive impact on the regulated industry. My point again is that the 
Commission cannot hope to be its most effective in achieving its impor-
tant mission—regulating consumer products against the reasonable 
hazards—unless its compliance with law, with its rule-making proce-
dures, with its generic statute, and with Administrative Procedure Act 
is, indeed, scrupulous. 
Let me end with the observation of Justice Frankfurter that "(T)he 
history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of proce-
dural safeguards." McNabb v. U.S., 3I8 U.S. 332, 347 (I943).) Re-
call here the exchange between Thomas More and his son-in-law Roper 
in A Man For All Seasons. (Bolt, Robert. A Man For All Seasons, 
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Random House (1960), p. 38.) Roper was complaining why More 
gave these villains the benefit of law. "So now you would give the devil 
benefit of the law." (I make apologies to any of my clients that might 
be within earshot of this analogy.) And More replied, "Yes, what would 
you do? Cut a great road through the law to get the devil?" Roper 
answers him: "I'd cut down every law in England to do that." And 
then More makes this important statement: "Ohl And when the last 
law was down, and the devil turned round on you—where would you 
hide Roper, the laws all being flat. This country's planted thick with 
laws from coast to coast—man's laws, not God's—and if you cut them 
down—and you are just the man to do it—d'you really think you could 
stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I would give the 
devil benefit of law for mine cwn safety's sake." And safety, of course 
is our mission here. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite: Are there any questions? 
Q: I am Warren Braun with the State Water Board. Ms. King, would 
it not be a suitable role for the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
to provide a listing, an advisory listing, to the public—more particularly 
workers—as to the hazard of certain environmental conditions condi-
tioned upon even the fact that it was an imperfect knowledge so that, 
for instance, women who were of child-bearing age could avoid certain 
environmental conditions which might be hazardous either because of 
the mutagenic problems or they're carcinogenic? 
The thing that comes to mind here is young ladies working on lines 
doing various repair and manufacturing that involves the use of lead 
and tin-based solder materials which most certainly would be suspect 
in at least a mutagenic situation. And where we would inform consumers 
that albeit it is their choice, that certainly for child-bearing women, 
that they should assiduously avoid cigarette smoking, alcohol, various 
consumer products of different kinds that might be hazardous for them, 
that might be less hazardous for others and such things like that? 
Ms. King: That goes very much to the point that I was trying to 
make: I think the government, not just CPSC—a number of the ques-
tions that you have raised fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies—
has an affirmative obligation to get out information in an understand-
able form so people can begin to make choices. I agree with you. I 
would add that the Commission's interim carcinogen policy was an 
effort to classify chemicals on which there is some data giving rise to 
at least a preliminary conclusion that there may be a problem. The 
publication of a provisional classification was to be based on informa-
tion which was available to the public, but which was not widely dis-
tributed and not widely in focus. This was the beginning of an effort 
to seek public information in order for the Agency to set priorities. As 
Mr. O'Conner has pointed out, the Court set the interim policy aside 
because it was deemed to have the impact of a substantive rule. I don't 
want to quarrel with the Court's opinion. The effort and interest of the 
Commission at that time was to begin to address just what you are 
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saying. How do we get information in to us so that we can begin to 
make rational judgments, set rational priorities, and get information out 
to the public? Not just for the purposes of regulating but for making 
some sense out of what is to the public a very confusing situation. 
Mr. Braun: This is the particular thing that I am addressing here. It 
is not with the idea that it has the force of law. Perhaps to avoid the 
legal problem it should be done through independent, non-profit en-
vironmental organizations that act as the disseminators of this in-
formation based upon imperfect knowledge so at least people could be 
informed about hazards and of the variable hazards depending upon 
the population. Obviously women of child-bearing age are much more 
susceptible in the environmental concerns. 
Ms. King: A lot of this is knowledge that is in the public realm at 
this point. I have seen the galley print of a book now being put together 
by the Environmental Defense Fund which is a guide for the lay con-
sumer to this whole question of possible cancer causing agents. It 
differentiates the serious problems and exposures from the less serious 
ones. I hope the book will be available soon. 
Mr. Braun: If I may amplify my concern, my very concern would be 
that we would have a book because I have considered that our knowl-
edge at this point is so imperfect that what we need is an on-going 
current state of what really is the problem. 
Dr. Ashford: May I make a fast comment because it is possible that 
there could be some misinformation perpetuated. And Devra Davis 
would shoot me if I didn't make this point. It is true that there may be 
some differences because of sex in effects. However, we don't know of 
any. For example, lead. The effects of lead on males occur at lower 
levels than they do on females. 
Mr. Braun: I'm talking about the damage to a fetus. 
Dr. Ashford: The same principal would evolve. You could affect a 
fully developed person in many cases more easily (radiation is a good 
example) than the fetus. So we have to be very careful. But I realize, 
and I'm not blaming you for not having this information, what we are 
dealing with is the problem of conventional wisdom which is often 
wrong. 
Barbara Bitters: What everyone seems to ignore is the fact that when 
Betty Bly or John Joe is working or living in a town that has one small 
industry and it is the only job he can get anywhere around, he has no 
choice but to be exposed to whatever he is exposed to unless we pro-
tect him from it! He may know it or he may not know it. 
Mr. Braun: That is the very kind of reasoning that I wish would pass 
from existence, because there is a real problem. In the production of 
electronic equipment there is no feasible way of protecting people from 
that type of exposure because of the necessity to pick up these elements 
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in your hands. The very fact that you cannot assure yourself that that 
person is going to wash their hands sufficiently to remove the residue 
and actually ingest the materials. Now that kind of person . . . I refuse 
to hire girls who are of possible child-bearing age for that very reason. 
I tell them absolutely, point blank, there is absolutely no way any of 
those girls is ever going to work on any of our lines because of that 
potential hazard. I can't get anyone to tell me what the hazard is, and 
in the absence of that I'm not going to take a chance. Because I do 
know that semi-conductors have very exotic and, unfortunately, from 
what I can hear there are chemicals that are possibly mutagenic, maybe 
some even possibly carcinogenic. I'm not going to take the chances. 
There is no way I can protect them. 
Professor Waite: Let's have just two more comments, and then we'll 
suspend for the summation. Dr. Davis. 
Dr. Davis: Thank you. Since my name has been invoked, let me try 
to clarify this discussion. Something which is a mutagen affects men and 
women. There are substances which have a stronger mutagenic effect 
on men than on women. For instance, exposed vinyl chloride workers, 
exposed anesthetic gas workers, that is, people who work in operating 
rooms, have shown very much increased rates of miscarriages and birth 
defects in the offsprings of men who were exposed. In other words, 
their wives who get pregnant subsequent to their exposure, have shown 
increased rates of birth defects and miscarriages which strongly suggests 
that if you are worried about mutagens, you better protect men and 
women equally. Nick Ashford has indicated that men appear to be 
more vulnerable to adverse health effects at lower levels of exposure to 
lead than are women. And if anything, we do know from the work on 
"TRIS-BP" that men's so-called testicular barrier is 100 times more 
sensitive than any site in women. This means that men may be more 
susceptible to exposure to potential mutagens than are women. Bruce 
Ames reports that between 1972 and 1977, 50 million children wore 
sleepwear that contained TRIS-BP as a flame retardant at about 5 per 
cent of the weight of the fabric. 
The questions raised here indicate a concern not with women but 
with unborn children. The fetus and embryo are of course most suscepti-
ble to genic effects, being in the state of most rapid cell proliferation of 
any human organism. But in fact, the effect that they are most suscepti-
ble to is not mutagenicity but teratogenicity. We can differentiate be-
tween teratogens, things which can affect growing embryos and fetuses; 
mutagens, things which can affect the reproductive capacities of this 
and future generations as well as their own life histories; and car-
cinogens, which affect organisms in their lifetimes. 
When mutagens are considered, there are two possible effective 
mechanisms of concern which can cause damage to DNA: things which 
mutate germ cells, or the cells with which humans reproduce themselves, 
including sperm and eggs; and things which mutate somatic cells, or the 
cells in a given body which may change the normal cellular mechanisms, 
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coded for in the DNA, that control and prevent cell multiplication, in-
creasing risks of neurological and cardiovascular lesions, premature 
aging and the production of cancerous cells. 
Folk literature is replete with references showing that people have 
appreciated for some years that alcoholic men and women make less 
healthy babies. It seems that it will take the scientific community some 
time to get the full measure of such folk sense. 
Concerning teratogens, Sergio Fabro has catalogued teratogens as 
producing nine different mechanisms by which they can impinge on 
developing systems to initiate abnormal development, ranging from 
chromosomal mutation and breaks to severe alterations of the fetal 
environment. The final expressions of abnormal or teratogenic develop-
ment are death, malformation, growth retardation and functional 
disorder. 
Keep in mind that most women are not pregnant most of the time. 
And that men may be more susceptible to mutagenic effects than are 
women. All of this suggests that the most prudent policy for occupa-
tional health and safety is the protection of all workers against repro-
ductive harm. As Assistant Secretary of Labor Eula Bingham has 
argued, workers should have the right to produce healthy children. 
IV 
A CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF FEDERAL LAWS REGULATING HAZARDOUS 
AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
INTRODUCTION BY DR. WILLIAM J. HARGIS, JR., 
DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA INSTITUTE OF MARINE SCIENCE 
LUNCHEON, FEBRUARY 10, 1979 
I hate to interrupt your intelligent, stimulating, perhaps even titilating 
luncheon conversations, but today's program is running a little behind 
time. That, plus the fact that Charter Day ceremonies are nearly upon 
us, makes it necessary for us to proceed. 
I'm Bill Hargis, Director of the Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
which is affiliated with the College, and Dean of the School of Marine 
Science, which is a part of the College of William and Mary. I am 
pleased to be able to introduce the head table to you. Since we at 
William and Mary are not only cognizant of the past, but are also 
usually relatively conservative, I shall start on the right and move to 
the left. 
All of you are familiar with Mr. Voigt, who made the presentation 
just before lunch. Mrs. Whitney, Professor Scott Whitney's lady. Judge 
MacKenzie, a trustee of the foundation supporting the program today 
with William and Mary. We are going to hear from the gentleman on 
my left, Mr. Velde, in a moment, and I'm going to ask Scott Whitney 
to introduce Mr. Velde when the time comes. But Mr. Velde is with 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, the United States Senate, and will 
speak to us briefly in a few moments. Dr. King, Susan King, who will 
speak this afternoon is from the Consumer Products Safety Commission. 
Next is an old friend of mine, Admiral Ross Bullard of the U.S. Coast 
Guard. I've had lots of business with him, including having our ships 
towed in from sea after breakdowns at the end of tow lines from his 
cutters. Next are Professor Scott Whitney, Mrs. Voigt, and Mr. William 
B. Cummings, trustee of the Virginia Environmental Endowment. 
Now Scott, I'd appreciate it very much if you would introduce "Pete" 
Velde and go forward with the luncheon ceremonies while I slip out and 
go to the Charter Day ceremony. 
I have enjoyed being with you all. Thank you very much for coming 
to William and Mary today. 
Professor Scott C. Whitney: Thank you, Bill. Congressman Eck-
hardt, who was originally to be the luncheon speaker, recently under-
went very serious surgery involving his heart, and apparently, although 
he's not had a serious relapse, is not up to the journey in the particular 
weather we were having yesterday. Congressman Eckhardt's prepared 
statement will be published in the proceedings of this Conference for 
those interested in his expert evaluations of the effectiveness of federal 
toxics programs. Fortunately, Mr. Richard "Pete" Velde was attending 
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the Conference and has consented to make some remarks germane to 
our proceedings. 
"Pete- is an old friend of mine. He is presently Minority Counsel, 
for the Senate Judiciary Committee. He was formerly the head of the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and during that period 
had the dubious distinction of being one of the more famous environ-
mental defendants. He was sued by Mrs. Ely in the now famous land-
mark case of Ely v. Velde. So he has had his encounters with the 
environment. 
At this point I turn the matter over to "Pete" Velde. 
Mr. Velde: Scott, thanks very much. I appreciate the opportunity of 
sharing a few random thoughts, and I have to confess that's all they'll 
be, because my presence here was on very short notice. I have to admit 
right off the bat that I am not going to give you confessions of an 
erstwhile bureaucrat, but more reflections, I hope, of an administrator, 
and now of someone who is involved again in the legislative process 
that will be considering some issues that I think will be of some relevance 
to your discussions here today. 
Scott mentioned my role as a defendant in the Ely case. He should 
also have mentioned that I am still a defendant in another case, called 
the Black Patrolman's Association v. Velde, in which the former 
Attorney General, Mr. Levy, and I are being sued personally for $20 
million each for failure to enforce the LEAA Civil Rights Compliance 
Regulations effectively enough. And I hope that will not be another 
landmark case. But it could well be. And it could well have a chilling 
effect on any individual who has responsibility for enforcement of any 
kind of federal regulations. So I speak to you with some conviction 
today—and trepidation. I will not comment further on that case since 
it is currently on appeal. 
I was involved first as a legislative aid in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in the mid-sixties with the enactment of the omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of I968 which established the LEAA program: 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Then I had the privilege, 
and I consider it a privilege in spite of the litigation attendant with it, 
of having the opportunity to attempt to administer the program for 
some eight years. And I am now back on the Judiciary Committee. 
Just yesterday we had the first day of LEAA reauthorization hearings. 
So I'll have a chance to look at the legislation again in the light of 
experience in administration. And that experience has some bearing 
on your discussions here today, perhaps an analogous situation. Scott 
had mentioned the way in which, or one of the ways in which, the 
LEAA program was touched by those concerned with protection and 
improvement of our environment. 
LEAA's primary mission was the improvement of the justice system 
of this country, and particularly the criminal justice system, although 
the civil justice to a lesser extent. This is a system that currently em-
ploys about a million people, spends about $22 billion a year, and 
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probably significantly touches more of our citizens directly and mean-
ingfully than any other aspect of our government. About 12 million 
people pass through our court system one way or another, and I don't 
mean minor traffic offenses, every year. Now almost a million are 
incarcerated in our correctional institutions during the course of the 
year. And about half of those for a long period of time. We are trying 
to improve the quality of life and of government (I say we, LEAA) in 
a very real sense. And that's a high mission. That is an important pur-
pose of government. And yet, LEAA certainly was not acting in a 
vacuum. And it had to be concerned with, in fact, not just the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, but about twenty other major 
federal laws which conditioned and limited the way in which LEAA 
did its business. And I'd like to mention three of those ways right now. 
The case of Ely v. Velde (and that case has been finally resolved by 
the courts, so I can comment and talk about it) came about when LEAA 
embarked on a program to try to provide conditions of incarceration fit 
for human beings rather than animals in the steel cages which were 
common types of zoo construction in the late 1800's but were abandoned 
shortly thereafter but really continue, in fact, to the present time as far 
as incarcerating human beings. LEAA had a mission to try to change 
all that. Our legislation imposed a standard of employing advanced 
architectural practices in trying to improve correctional housing condi-
tions—not just prisons and jails, but community based programs and 
the like. LEAA was involved in about 2500 such projects from large 
state institutions to very small community based programs for juveniles. 
And I'd say the impact of these other federal priorities, not just en-
vironment and historical preservation, but all the rest, really compli-
cated our lives very significantly. Not just in Greensprings, but in down-
town Manhattan and in San Diego and about 400 other localities 
throughout the country. 
And today, federal judges are finding all over the country that con-
ditions of incarceration in our prisons and jails still are subhuman and 
still are declaring them unconstitutional. In fact, the entire State system 
of Alabama was declared unconstitutional six years ago and just last 
week the federal judge appointed a court receiver for the whole State 
system and took it out of the hands of the Department of Corrections. 
So you had folks trying to administer a program who didn't have the 
financial resources who were trying to comply with federal and state 
imposed legislative and judicial standards, but were having a very 
difficult time in the face of increasing inmate populations, higher costs 
and this increased concern that they meet a lot of federal and state 
regulation requirements. 
Now we are considering whether that legislation should be renewed. 
The Administration has proposed that the work LEAA has done to 
improve corrections should be abolished because there was too much 
regulation on the part of LEAA of state and local corrections. I'm not 
sure where that's all going to end, but we have found that we got into 
an area of trying to make reforms and improvements that were not 
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simple at all—a lot of competing values, objectives of society, con-
stitutional provisions, statutory requirements. And, as we look at this 
legislation again, it is not an easy problem for solution. 
LEAA was also involved in the energy crisis in 1974. We found that 
the police fleet of black-and-white patrol cars, about some 150,000, 
were standing in line, at the end of a very long line, to try and get an 
allocation of gasoline during that shortage. LEAA had to intervene to 
try and get another sister federal agency to provide gasoline so the 
police cars could run. And that developed into what LEAA called the 
Police Patrol Car Project. 
We found very shortly, although our first and principal objective 
was to try to improve the gasoline economy of the patrol car, that the 
way a police officer drives a patrol car you get about 45% of the EPA 
ratings for the fuel economy. We also found that police cars were in-
volved in about three times the normal accident rate of the average 
driver which resulted in a lot of liability on the part of state and local 
governments. Also, we found that the family sedan, which is essentially 
what a police car is with a few minor modifications, was not really 
suited to the law enforcement or the criminal justice environment. So 
LEAA embarked on a project to design a vehicle and encourage in-
dustry to manufacture one. 
We ran into two problems. One, government regulations and, 
secondly, really not enough market to justify the industry making any 
heavy investment in an improved patrol car. LEAA got for its efforts 
Mr. Proxmire's Golden Fleece Award. It also made Jack Anderson's 
column six different times. 
But, what we are facing today is that the 1980 models of standard 
American cars will absolutely not be suitable for police use. They are 
under-powered. They're undersized. They're not fast enough. I guess the 
police will have to go back to their 1970 and '71 models, get them out 
of the junkyard somewhere, and try to rebuild them, because there are 
simply not suitable cars that are going to be offered next year for 
police use. 
I don't believe LEAA will get back in that business. The present 
Attorney General has been very critical of that project and so, as I 
understand, a number of the municipal governments are now trying to 
develop some kind of a replacement for the black-and-white car. 
Well, so much for LEAA. I did want to mention a bit about my 
present activities on the Senate Judiciary Committee. There are some 
things going on there that I think are relevant to the purposes of this 
meeting today. 
First, of course, we have a new Chairman and, in fact, a whole new 
ballgame. We will be processing legislation in that Committee at a 
record pace. We are, indeed, already. There is a great jurisdictional 
battle going on now between Senator Kennedy and Senator Cannon 
over who has jurisdiction over the trucking deregulation bill and I can 
assure you that that is really round two in a very major Congressional 
effort to deregulate as much of American business and American 
activity as is humanly possible. This is a movement that has a very 
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strong taxpayer and grass roots base of support, and one which will 
have major impact on the way the federal government regulates what-
ever it regulates. 
One of the subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the 
Administrative Practices Subcommittee, will shortly receive an Ad-
ministration bill to generally reform the federal regulatory process. 
Already last year the Committee passed out favorably what 1 would 
consider very drastic bills—not passed totally by the Congress, but 
which will be considered again—to reform and eliminate, wherever 
possible, federal regulatory activity. 
Now, in addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee in the upcoming 
weeks will be considering a Constitutional Amendment which I would 
predict (although it is always a risky business to predict what Congress 
will do) at the very least is going to get very serious attention. And 
that is to impose an overall ceiling on federal spending of some kind—
either a limitation on the federal debt, or federal spending as a rela-
tionship to gross national product, or there are a number of possibilities. 
But the combination of the regulatory reform and limitations on federal 
spending is going to have a very major impact on federal regulatory 
activities and federal programs that are designed to improve the quailty 
of criminal justice, or the quality of air, or the quality of water, or 
what have you, because there are going to be some very harsh fiscal 
realities that have to be faced. There are already. 
Well, I guess that's really about all I had to say, but I wish I could 
bring you cheery news for whatever your perspectives are here. But, in 
conclusion, I want to say that there is a new mood in Congress. And 
there is a new mood in Washington. They are listening to the com-
plaints of the taxpayers, and the average citizens, and the small business-
men, and the big businessmen, and many, many others who don't like 
what is happening now. They don't like to be over-regulated and over-
taxed, and they don't like to see the quality of their life decline as it 
has. I guess we are all seeking for that appropriate balance where we 
can trade off all these values and still have a place which we like to live 
and work and play in. But it is a time of change and transition in Wash-
ington. And I think this group here can focus on a lot of issues that 
there is going to be some action on, that I hope can channel this energy 
and this drive and this need into some constructive and meaningful 
changes. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: Thank you very much, "Pete". If anybody has 
any questions, I'm sure that "Pete" would be happy to undertake to 
answer them. If not, I think we should finish lunch and this afternoon 
we will resume at 2:15 and will examine the question under the co-
moderator, Professor Graham Waite, "How Effectively Are We Pro-
tecting the Consumer?" from the point of view of exposure to hazardous 
and toxic substances. So, I think as soon as you finish your lunch the 
buses will be here and we'll return and get back to work. 
Thank you. 
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Dr. Hargis, Dean Spong and members of the audience, it is a pleasure 
to be here today. I was delighted when Dean Spong invited me to the 
Conference. I worked with him when he was the floor manager on the 
toxic substances bill in the Senate in 1971, and I knew that coming 
down to the Conference would give me a chance to renew our friend-
ship. Of course. his presence is a two-edge sword because it means I 
also have a real expert in my audience, I can only ask that if he finds 
that my memory of the sequence of events in the toxic substances area 
is a little faulty, he'll grant me what some people might call a poetic 
license, but what might be called more appropriately "Congressional 
license." 
I think Dean Spong and the others who planned this Conference 
have selected an excellent topic for our discussion today. They have 
asked me to give a Congressional assessment of the effectiveness of the 
federal laws which regulate hazardous substances. I could not have 
selected a more timely topic. 
In light of the very visible and apparently growing concern about 
the effects of federal regulation on our economy I think it is time to 
sit back and evaluate these laws. 
It is virtually impossible to pick up a major national newspaper or 
other publication these days and not find an article or an editorial 
expressing views about big government and the costs of federal regula-
tion. Industry groups and trade associations have mounted a major 
attack on regulation in general. and our environmental health laws in 
particular. Just recently major oil, chemical and automobile firms an-
nounced tbey were forming a coalition to work to obtain repeal of 
some of the main provisions of the clean air amendments of I977. 
On the other hand, a number of health and environmental groups 
claim the public wants strong environmental laws. A recent poll by 
Resources for the Future showed that the public's support for our 
environmental health laws is strong and enduring. When asked to 
choose between the option of higher prices to protect the environment 
or lower prices but more pollution. the public chose the environmental 
protection option by three to one. 
In light of the on-going public debate, it seems like an awfully good 
time for us to assess where we have been, where we arc now and where 
we ought to be going to protect the public and the environment from 
hazardous chemicals. 
The last decade has been one of tremendous activity. Congress has 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 135 
established major programs to clean-up the air, the water and our 
general environment. 
The present framework for air quality protection was first defined in 
the federal clean air amendments of I970. These amendments provided 
a system for achieving federal air quality standards through state en-
forcement of regulations. The 1977 amendments to the federal clean 
air act reaffirmed this system. 
The 1977 amendments set new deadlines for cleaning up polluted 
areas. They added protection for existing clean areas by prohibiting 
significant deterioration in those areas. The 1977 amendments also re-
quired review of existing air quality standards. 
There is no question that the Clean Air Act provisions have resulted 
in major improvements in the quality of the air which we breathe. A 
recent analysis by the council on environmental quality shows that the 
number of days when people living in our densely populated urban 
areas are breathing unhealthy air is declining. The severity of pollution 
has also declined, resulting in an overall 29 improvement. 
Although we have made significant strides in improving our air 
quality, much more remains to be done. We are still quite far from 
meeting the primary ambient air quality standards designed to protect 
human health. The most widely violated standard continues to be the 
oxidant standard and our congested urban areas continue to suffer 
from excessive carbon monoxide pollution. 
To complement the Clean Air Act, the Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act in 1972. The progress under the act over 
the last years has been noticeable. Just recently there were reports 
salmon had returned to the Connecticut River, once one of the dirtiest 
in the United States. And there is the promise that there will be con-
tinued improvement in our water quality as investment in pollution con-
trols for industry and municipalities begins to pay off. 
Although it looks as though it may be feasible to attain the goal of 
having swimmable and fishable waters by 1983, many water pollution 
problems remain. One of the most troubling is the presence of toxic 
pollutants in ground and surface waters. This is a significant problem, 
one which we are just beginning to understand and control. 
The Water Pollution Control Act establishes a national policy that 
the discharges of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited. Un-
fortunately, we are a long way from achieving this goal. Although the 
1972 amendments to the water act gave EPA authority to regulate toxic 
pollutants, EPA has been slow to use the authority. EPA's initial efforts 
focused on the more traditional water pollution problems, such as bio-
logical and chemical oxygen demand and suspended solids. Given the 
agency's limited resources, and the overwhelming tasks assigned to it, 
this was certainly not unreasonable. 
Unfortunately, EPA failed to undertake the necessary R&D to de-
velop a data base for future regulation of toxics. And as a result, now 
that regulatory attention is being turned to control of toxic pollutants, 
the data is often inadequate to accurately assess the hazards and the 
potential control technologies. 
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When EPA did begin to undertake regulation of toxics in the water, 
certain statutory provisions in the Water Pollution Control Act created 
difficulties. The pollutant-by-pollutant approach anticipated in the law 
posed serious problems, as did certain procedural time requirements. 
Congress responded by amending the law in 1977, but it is too soon 
to assess the effects of those changes. One thing is certain: we arc a long 
way from achieving the goal expressed in the 1972 statute of prohibiting 
dangerous discharges of toxic pollutants. 
The Clean Air and Water Act; were our first major responses to the 
growing recognition of the hazards posed by chemical substances in the 
environment. Although much was being achieved under these laws, we 
came to the realization that they were not adequate to fully respond to 
the threat posed by chemicals in the environment. 
Back in 1971, the Council on Environmental Quality issued a report 
on toxic substances. The report indicated that the then existing au-
thorities for dealing with dangerous chemicals were fragmented and in-
adequate. That report recommended enactment of a new statute to 
create a systematic and complete approach to the problem presented 
by chemicals in the environment. 
The report noted that the federal government had the power to regu-
late food additives, drugs and pesticides, but the government had no 
power to directly regulate the literally thousands of chemicals used for 
other purposes. While the Clean Air Act and the Water Pollution Con-
trol Acts provided authority to control emissions, such control often 
proved infeasible or came too late to adequately protect against a risk. 
Particularly critical was the fact that the government had no mech-
anism to require chemical manufacturers to test their existing chemicals 
to determine safety, and no way of checking to make certain that new 
chemicals had been adequately tested before they were released into 
the marketplace. 
The Congress, acting with glacial-like quickness, responded to the 
1971 recommendations by enacting the Toxic Substances Control Act 
in I976. As Dean Spong can attest, the reason for the delay was not 
due to lack of trying. Both the House and Senate passed toxic sub-
stances legislation in the 1971-72 session. Bills were also passed in 
both Houses in I974. But the House and Senate approaches, par-
ticularly with respect to premanufacture screening, were so different 
that we were unable to resolve our differences and agree upon a single 
approach. Fortunately, in the 94th Congress the two Houses were 
finally able to agree upon an approach and legislation was finally signed 
into law. 
The Toxic Substances Control Act has two basic objectives. First, 
because of the irreparable nature of the harm often done by dangerous 
chemicals, Congress wanted to provide a practical mechanism to pre-
vent harm, Other laws had put the government in a position of reacting 
to harm after its effects became visible, rather than preventing harm. 
Given the long latency period and the very serious nature of the damage 
done by dangerous chemicals, society can no longer afford the luxury of 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 137 
waiting to act until the damage is manifested. Thus, the new law places 
a strong emphasis on prevention through testing requirements and pre-
market notification requirements. 
In addition, the law recognized that prevention will not always be 
possible. Thus, the second basic objective of the statute is to improve 
our "reaction capabilities" when a harmful chemical does get into the 
marketplace or elsewhere in the environment. 
The Act has been in place only two years. Thus any assessment of the 
law's effectiveness would be highly premature. To an outside observer, 
there seems to have been little activity by EPA toward implementing 
the statute. Although I have been disappointed in some of the delays at 
the agency, I don't think the number of regulations an agency issues is 
an adequate yardstick of its progress. 
I hope that the building process which has gone on within EPA the 
first two years will result in significant visible activity in the near future. 
EPA's inventory of existing chemical substances is expected to be pub-
lished in April, so the pre-manufacture notification requirements will 
go into effect shortly thereafter. The agency's first four testing standards 
should be out in the near future, and the first rule applying the standards 
to specific chemicals is expected in July. The results of these activities 
and others which should be coming within the next few years should 
provide us with a good basis to judge whether the new law is going to 
be effective. 
Some of EPA's efforts these last two years have highlighted a prob-
lem of major concern to me. It is a problem with far reaching implica-
tions for our entire federal effort to regulate hazardous chemicals. I am 
referring to the shortage of toxicologists, pathologists, epidemiologists 
and other persons with the technical skills essential to implementing our 
environment and health protection laws. The General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) has recently submitted a report to me showing that there 
are not enough of these scientists to go around. Our demand has out-
stripped the supply, and current training programs appear to be grossly 
inadequate in their attempts to supply the number of people needed. 
Without adequately trained scientific personnel, the effectiveness of our 
environmental health programs will he severely jeopardized. I am 
hopeful that the new Congress will take a hard look at this problem and 
see that action is taken to alleviate a potentially devastating shortage. 
The same year it passed the Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress 
also enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to address 
the problems of hazardous wastes. The need for protection from 
hazardous waste materials has been highlighted by the recent disclosures 
of the problems in Love Canal in New York and the so-called Valley of 
the Drums in Kentucky. 
Although the Love Canal landfill has been closed for more than 25 
years, homes bordering on the site now have chemical leachate and 
fumes present in their basement. Disturbing scientific evidence suggests 
that persons living in the area run a greater risk of having spontaneous 
abortions or bearing children with birth .defects. Persons in the area also 
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run a greater risk of developing chronic health problems. 
Unfortunately there are thousands of closed and abandoned sites 
similar to Love Canal throughout the United States. There are also an 
estimated 20,000 dumps currently in use. Thus, the importance of an 
adequate hazardous waste law becomes very clear. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act anticipates a compre-
hensive system of standards covering the generation, transportation and 
disposal of hazardous wastes. This regulatory scheme is to be effected 
through a federal-state partnership. In addition, the Act gives EPA the 
power to go to court to abate imminent hazards to human health or the 
environment. 
Hearings conducted by the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee 
last year showed that RCRA is far from being implemented. Budget 
problems and inadequate staffing at EPA coupled with inadequate plan-
ning and foresight by the Agency have resulted in significant delays in 
implementing the law. 
Even if it is fully implemented, RCRA will not be able to prevent 
the serious problems which may just be surfacing because of inadequate 
disposal of harmful chemicals many years ago. 
This brings us to one of the major gaps in our environmental laws: 
the problem of how to compensate innocent victims of toxic substances 
pollution. The people living in the Love Canal area in New York are 
just one example of such innocent victims. The Michigan farmers who 
lost livestock due to PBB contamination and the commercial fishermen 
in the James River who lost their livelihoods because of Kepone con-
tamination provide other examples of the harm suffered by innocent 
third parties when someone else releases a toxic chemical into the 
environment. 
Thus far the federal response has been merely a patchwork of stop 
gap remedies. For example, the Department of Agriculture has some 
authority to help certain kinds of farmers who suffer due to chemical 
contamination. Such programs are limited both in who they cover and 
the kind of compensation they offer. Our Workman's Compensation 
program is available for injured workers, but many people feel the pro-
gram does not provide adequate compensation, in part because injuries 
are often longterm and difficult to measure. 
Private damage actions against the person responsible for contamina-
tion provide another possible remedy. However, a number of problems 
exist which prevent private suits from providing totally adequate solu-
tions. The latency period between the exposure to the harmful chemical 
and the manifestation of the harm can be 20-30 years. By this time the 
party responsible for the pollution may no longer exist, or it may not 
have sufficient resources to adequately compensate all those injured. 
Further, some states have held the statute of limitations begins to 
run when the plaintiff is first exposed to the chemical. By the time the 
plaintiff becomes aware of the injury, the statute of limitations bars 
suit. Another particularly troublesome problem in using tort law arises 
from the fact that more than one company may have been responsible 
ENvIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 	 139 
for causing the exposure to the chemical or more than one chemical 
may be implicated. This raises serious proof problems in a traditional 
tort action. 
Congress will soon have to confront the problem of the proper 
response to the problems of toxic substances injury. There are a num-
ber of issues Congress will have to address. The threshold question is 
whether we need to develop a general compensation system? Or should 
we respond to poisoning incidences on an event by event basis? For 
whom should we seek to provide compensation and for what losses? 
All of these are questions which are going to have to be answered. 
Under my chairmanship the Consumer Protection and Finance Subcom-
mittee began hearings on these difficult questions last year. Our hearings 
highlighted that the problems are extremely difficult and there are no 
easy solutions. Frankly, I doubt that the questions will all be answered 
in this new session of Congress, but I think we must continue our efforts 
to resolve them. 
Much has been said lately describing the new Congress as one 
which is likely to be far more interested in conducting oversight of 
existing laws rather than enacting new ones. I think this is very true. 
Some commentators have implied that all the references to oversight 
are simply a cover-up for a do-nothing Congress. Such commentators 
have, I think, failed to see the importance of oversight. Thorough 
oversight of our existing laws plays an extremely important role in our 
future planning. Because I am convinced of the importance of Con-
gressional oversight, I recently sought and was elected to the chair-
manship of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House 
Commerce Committee. 
Our present programs have got to be made to work if the public is 
going to be willing to continue its support for such programs. I think this 
is particularly true in the environmental health areas. As I noted earlier, 
public support for our environmental and health protection laws is very 
strong. However, that support will weaken if the laws don't seem to be 
working. In a time of budget cutting, our environmental health pro-
grams may get short changed if they don't prove effective. 
Congress, by serving as a watchdog, can provide an incentive to the 
agencies to act with speed and planning in carrying out Congressional 
mandates. Congressional oversight can help point up the deficiencies in 
agency implementation efforts, and it can highlight instances of agency 
inaction, lack of planning and poor coordination. 
However, such Congressional oversight must be conducted in a way 
which does not destroy the morale in an agency. Congress sometimes 
tends to give an agency an overwhelming task and inadequate re-
sources and then blame the agency when the statute is not fully imple-
mented. Such congressional action only frustrates the dedicated public 
servants, and there are many of them in our agencies,—and it makes 
it more and more difficult for the government to keep these kinds of 
people within the public sector. 
In addition to pointing out deficiencies within the agencies, good 
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oversight can also determine when lack of results from a program stems 
from inadequacies or deficiencies within a statute. A statute may not 
have given the agency adequate authority to fully deal with the problem, 
or it may have been unrealistic in structuring the approach to the 
problem. This, an oversight Congress which lays bear the deficiencies 
in existing statutes and builds a foundation for correcting those de-
ficiencies will be a Congress which will have accomplished a great deal. 
I think this heavy emphasis on oversight in the next Congress means 
that in a year or two years, we will be in a position to assess with much 
greater sophistication and understanding just how effective our en-
vironmental health statutes are. I think we will also have laid the 
foundation for needed improvements and will be in a position to pro-
vide better, more efficient protection to the American public. 
V 
SUMMATION OF CONFERENCE 
Professor Waite: We have now reached the point of Summation of 
this Conference. Our first speaker will be Dr. Donald F. Hornig of 
Harvard. 
Dr. Hornig: In the last two days we have heard a variety of discus-
sions concerning the adequacy and administration of both state and 
federal laws relating to toxic substances. It must be plain to everyone 
here that the topic of environmental law and toxic substances em-
braces a whole series of very diverse concerns—water resources, clean 
air, wetlands, the workplace, consumer products and environmental 
health, among others. We have been talking about many different prob-
lems which affect different classes of people and include many different 
classes of cost. They affect the wellbeing of various communities and 
geographic areas in differing ways. It is doubtful whether there are any 
simple answers to how one can deal with all of these problems. None-
theless, we have heard that the problems will not go away and must be 
coped with somehow. 
Yesterday we heard about the State situation and today about the 
Federal one. I must say that it is not yet clear to me how the two 
interface and what the division of responsibilities and enforcement au-
thority is. I am not sure it is to anyone else either. 
What emerged in yesterday's discussion is that the State problem is 
much closer to communities and people. It must deal with Chesapeake 
Bay, streams and rivers and wetlands. It must be responsive to local 
economic effects and must find ways to bring people into decision mak-
ing and enforcement. The speakers seemed to share a feeling that the 
general legal framework, in terms of the scope and basic adequacy of the 
legislation, was in place. The problem of patchwork and fragmentation 
was raised on both days. I was a little startled yesterday when it was 
pointed out that there was a framework for joint action and that it was 
possible in the State of Virginia to hold a hearing in which 40 agencies 
and the Federal government could simultaneously be represented. I 
don't know whether I should be cheered because they can be brought 
together or bothered by the number of agencies involved. 
What emerged in the discussion yesterday was that if the laws are 
adequate and the framework is adequate there was real concern as to 
whether, in fact, money was available to do what the laws made possible 
and whether enforcement was achievable. The question was raised 
whether in fact the Toxic Substances Information Act was a successful 
tool for assembling the needed information or whether, by having a 
Class I danger list, it in fact discourages people from supplying in-
formation because the Class I list has become an action list rather 
than an information list. This is a question that applies to potential 
Federal actions, too. 
There was general concern that there were no clear principles by 
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which penalties could be enforced. Clear chains of cause and effect 
could not be traced. There were only Common Law remedies which 
were inadequate, and then there was no means of compensating victims. 
The original feeling that things were well in hand in Virginia was modi-
fied when near the end it was stated that yes, oil spills could still hap-
pen without being satisfactorily resolved and that a Kepone situation 
could occur again. 
I am going to be very brief in my further discussion because I have to 
catch an airplane. Today we were much more involved with some very 
basic principles. We saw again the picture of a very diffuse, generally 
adequate, legal base but great controversy over the mode and mechanism 
of the rule making procedures or enforcement procedures. We saw 
sharp differences of view concerning the relation between questions of 
risks and social and economic costs. There seemed to be agreement, 
though, that there is a new and major problem for which new legal 
tools must be fashioned. Since World War II the volume of biologically 
active materials that we have to deal with has grown so rapidly, and 
most of it has not been through the ordinary evolutionary biological 
screen, that there is little dispute that effective means of dealing with 
it is needed. 
It seems to me that an issue that ran through the whole day's dis-
cussion was how to deal with the problem of inadequate scientific 
knowledge and the constantly changing character of what is thought to 
be known. Ms. King said enough information was available. If so, 
I do not know where to find it. The fact is that most of the epidemiology 
available is inadequate. Test data is being improved rapidly, largely 
under the stimulus of the new laws, but most of the carcinogenic test 
data available in the literature is inadequate, too. Of course, for most 
substances it doesn't even exist. The problem that all the agencies face 
is how to proceed from very inadequate knowledge to any kind of 
action. It is a very difficult question when the economic and human 
costs involved may be substantial. 
Another related issue is how to deal with risk quantitively. Alter-
natively, the question was raised whether risk should be dealt with 
quantitively. Should one say I will accept no risk at all as we heard in 
the OSHA presentation? Should we say a worker should be exposed to 
no risk from a toxic substance? Or alternatively, even if one skips 
words like acceptable risk, should all risk be treated in the same way, 
even when we know there is a range of a million in potency between 
saccharine and aflatoxin. Surely all risks can't be covered by exactly 
the same phrases. Buried in all these discussions was how much risk 
should produce what kind of action. Buried in that question was another 
one. How should the risk from toxic substances relate to other risks 
that are taken, either in life, in the workplace, or whatever? To what 
risks should the hazards from toxic substances be compared? It was 
pointed out that risks which are inflicted involuntarily are quite dif-
ferent from risks that are assumed voluntarily, but how they should be 
related still needs to be faced. 
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There has been repeated reference to cost-benefit analysis and to 
some degree that may be a red herring. I have just come from a three 
day conference on risk assessment and it is plain that risk assessment at 
the moment can be worked at but can't be done. Risks can be identified, 
illuminated and to some degree quantified but that is all. Similarly, some 
of the costs can be assessed but usually, as has been pointed out, many 
of them can't. And so in the end you can compare those parts of both 
problems that can be translated into dollars or some common currency. 
Otherwise the cost and benefits, the risks and benefits, can only be 
compared in terms of values or general political principles. My first 
comment about either risk-benefit or cost-benefit analysis as a formal 
decision-making device is that since it can't be done one shouldn't 
spend too much time on it. 
On the other hand there is a general issue which cannot be ignored, 
which is how do you relate the effect—the lives saved, if there are lives 
saved, or the degree to which is health improved to the other con-
sequences of one's action. Moreover, it usually isn't a simple weighing 
on a single scale. Many of the questions in our society relate, and this 
came up many times, to who is helped and who is hurt and what kind 
of incentives you provide to the system to do things better. 
I didn't hear any resolution of those questions. I heard a general 
feeling in our discussion that the routes we have adopted thus far, in 
the adversary process, in lengthy item by item litigation, seem to be 
unsatisfactory to everyone concerned. It was said and well said that 
generic approaches would be much more satisfying if only one knew 
how to move soundly. This gets back to the matter of inadequate 
knowledge. If one could establish the principles on which to make a 
sound generic approach, it is the only way to deal with thousands on 
thousands of substances. 
I believe these are the main factors that arose, but I'm sure the 
other summarizers will add more. 
In closing, I would like to say that I think this conference was 
eminently successful in bringing onto the floor, most of the time in a 
very reasonable and reasoned way, the most salient issues and the most 
pressing problems. 
What has been pointed up is the general legal question of how you 
relate present events and present risks to damages which occur twenty 
years down the pike when there is no direct chain between the causer 
and the effector. If I do something which produces a weak carcinogen 
which may have some effect on some people, how should that be re-
lated in law to a person who gets a cancer who might have derived it 
naturally or from my carcinogen? I have the impression that we have 
not come to anything like an effective legal framework in which to deal 
with that kind of question. 
Thank you. 
Professor Waite: Thank you. Our next summation speaker will be 
Dr. Devra Davis of the Environmental Law Institute. 
Dr. Davis: Thank you. 
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Introduction 
I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I want to 
thank Dean Spong, the College of William and Mary and the Virginia 
Environmental Endowment for making this conference possible. I found 
this conference on environmental law interesting, stimulating, and a 
little frustrating because more questions were raised than can possibly 
be resolved in this format. The interdisciplinary mix of the participants 
here, ranging from science and engineering through economics to law, 
reflects the complex array of expertise which toxic substances issues 
require. This mix of expertise also explains why there may always be 
unanswered questions in this field. 
Toxic Substances, the Philosophy of Law and Popular Beliefs 
Many of the remarks at this meeting belie the fact that environmental 
science and economics constrain laws governing toxic substances. In 
fact, the philosophy of law and common beliefs about hazards are also 
limiting. 
According to some philosophers of law, law is a properly con-
servative institution evolved to legitimate basic institutional and con-
stitutional relationships of society—in a sense literally to remove those 
relationships from constant challenges as to their legitimacy. To this 
extent laws can be said to reflect social values rather than to create 
them. And that is something that might be worthwhile to keep in mind 
as we consider the topic of this conference, namely, "Are the Federal 
Laws and State Laws Adequate and Are They Administered Ade-
quately?" 
Some critics of federal regulations may be distressed with what stu-
dents of administrative law and discretionary justice readily acknowl-
edge, namely, there are widely ranging discretionary authorities in those 
laws. This may be exactly as it should be given scientific and economic 
uncertainties. 
Chart I, prepared by Gregory Wetstone of the Environmental Law 
Institute, notes the diverse assortment of legislative measures dealing 
with environmental hazards. No less than fourteen statutes and six 
federal agencies have authority for these. These statutes offer a variety 
of approaches, and they differ as to their specific guidance in determining 
what is a "reasonable" action for a particular substance or situation. 
Speakers here have alluded to the difficulties of tightening the network 
of existing laws in Virginia and at the federal level. Regulation of 
hazardous transport, changes in riparian rights for water, changes 
perhaps in the duty to warn, better citizen access and participation have 
been suggested as important improvements. On the statutory side, the 
need for deterring risk and compensating for harm was well docu-
mented, as was the need for sanctions against those who withhold in-
formation about hazards. Also, modifications were suggested in the 
Common Law tort system. 
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It can be argued that problems posed by the two-year statute of 
limitations in Common Law tort reflect an earlier time when public 
health problems were quite different. While the statute of limitations 
in Virginia runs five years for property damage, it runs only two years 
for personal injury and accident. Gerry McCarthy told me this recently, 
noting that one might infer that the state of Virginia values property 
damage more than it does damage to humans. The differential in the 
statute of limitations reflects public health problems that predominated 
when the statute of limitations was first drafted. At that time, infectious 
diseases and accidents characterized by rapid onset, acute manifestation 
and quick resolution, comprised the most serious health problems. 
Given the common low level exposures to toxicants, which can cause 
chronic degenerative diseases, compensation statutes will have to be 
revised to acknowledge the more complex etiology of those diseases 
which are now the leading causes cf death and disability in this country. 
While all toxic substances may not require at least twenty years of 
latency until onset of disease, for occupationally associated cancers this 
is a reasonable expectation. Of the I00 different diseases that cancer 
comprises, most arc now thought to occur following long latency periods. 
Cardio- and cerebro-vascular and reproductive failures which may be 
occupationally related can also reflect long exposure times. Previously 
it was not at all unusual to find a law with a two-year statute of limita-
tions for determining that a person had been injured due to any en-
vironmental or occupational factor. 
However, today's causes of death and disease are quite different. 
The leading causes of death and disease are chronic, degenerative 
diseases. Accidents are still a factor, but no less significant in their public 
health impact than diseases such as heart disease, stroke, reproductive 
failures, and various cancers. Given the fact that we have this change in 
the public health picture, we should expect to find, as we will in fact 
require, changes in the statute of limitations and in other parts of the 
Common Law torts system to acknowledge the complexity of the lead-
ing causes of death and disability in this country today. 
I think we face a related stress in developing environmental law 
beyond these philosophical limits. We are suffering from a credibility 
problem. Even in Virginia many people don't believe in toxic sub-
stances hazards. It is hard for people to realize that they are at greater 
life-time risk from disease which cannot be seen and felt here and now 
than they are from, say, accidents, with their immediate and acute 
impact. People show enhanced environmental consciousness in the 
wake of catastrophes. Indeed many of us here have been personally 
touched by accounts of suffering reaped by toxic substances hazards. 
But consider what reports you all recall most vividly about toxic 
substances. Deaths, poisonings, inhalation of toxic fumes during fires, 
sterility, birth defects and other relatively acute, immediate and horrid 
events stand out; as do those rare cases that we hear of with people 
suddenly developing a cancer or suddenly developing a heart problem 
soon after a major occupational exposure. It is understandable then 
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that people are skeptical about less sensational toxic substances hazards. 
You don't sec, touch or feel them for the most part. 
With radiation we had a similar situation which has changed some-
what. Radiation's adverse effects were known by some of its discoverers. 
X-rays were the first scientific discovery to be published in the news-
papers. And almost as soon as they were announced, both scientists and 
laypersons started to say they were also a hazard. Some of the early 
scientists who worked with it developed burns and bone cancer. Madame 
Curie, who won the Nobel Prize for her work with radium as well as 
another prize, died of cancer. During the 19th century, people who 
painted the radium on watch dials had noted increased lip cancer. They 
used their mouths to sharpen the paint brushes when painting the 
dials. However, debates on the effects of radiation and radium con-
tinued until Horoshima. Only the biological atrocities following Hiro-
shima finally changed the character of the discussion on the effects of 
radiation, although recent events suggest that much can still he debated. 
Today it is safe to say that little Hiroshimas play comparable roles 
in public understandings of toxic substances and in the laws that have 
been crafted to control the use of those toxic substances. Unfortunately, 
once the mushroom clouds subside, the event and its effects are given 
less attention. The problems easily slip away as though they don't 
exist. 
Limits in Environmental Economics 
These credibility and philosophical constraints are in turn exacer-
bated by the limits in scientific, technical, and economic information 
about environmental hazards. For instance, in the area of evaluating 
cost of regulation or cost of environmental control, we've heard a lot 
of discussion that reflects the lack of well developed methodology for 
understanding and assessing economic costs and benefits. I would argue 
that we are paying now for not having had preventive policies in the 
past. 
Let me note what the lack of prevention now costs for only two 
diseases. According to the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 
Fact Book for Fiscal Year 1977, for heart disease, direct costs such as 
hospitalization, drugs and medical care ran $16 billion in 1975. The 
total cost for heart disease was $50.4 billion, and that total cost only 
includes hospitalization, worker days lost, and some notion of pre-
mature death with a discount rate. The cost of cancer totaled almost 
$23 billion in 1975 for hospitalization, worker days lost, and some 
notion of premature death. Often, when people consider industrial 
costs for environmental control, health benefits such as the reduction 
in health care costs are not taken into account. 
We have serious problems in calculating cost because of the inade-
quately developed methodology in health economics. Problems abound, 
such as those economists call inter-temporal equity and fairness, which 
mean among other things that you have people experiencing cost cur- 
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rently, while benefits accrue in the future. It is not possible for economic 
analyses to estimate the value of irreversible effects that may be in- 
troduced into the environment. Traditional analysis is not designed to: 
• compare risks borne by workers with the benefits received by 
consumers; 
• account for the present value of preventing future diseases; 
• balance the savings of lives against chemical innovation or restric-
tions. 
A recent study by the Environmental Law Institute, "Three Case 
Studies in Environmental Regulation" (1979), prepared for the De-
partment of the Interior, underscores some of the problems of cost-
benefit assessment as applied to environmental regulations. In an 
analysis of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's stand-
ard setting for coke oven emissions, the Institute noted that the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act does not require any direct assess-
ment of economic effects as standards are established. 
When OSHA promulgates a standard involving toxic materials the 
OSHA Act directs the agency to: 
.. set the standard which most adequately assures, to the 
extent feasible, on the basis of best available evidence, that 
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity .. . 
Clearly, the agency is to focus on workplace health risks rather than 
environmental or other types of risk. Furthermore, benefits, i.e., reduc-
tion in adverse health effects, are to be given greater emphasis than 
costs although feasibility does imply that costs are to be considered. 
Recognizing that health impacts are difficult to quantify, few policy 
makers are willing to attach explicit values to health risks; and the coke 
oven decision was no exception. Only if complete data were available 
on the expected costs of regulation and the expected benefits from the 
standard could the valuations implicit in policy decisions be derived. 
The OSHA coke oven standard is unusual in that parts of both pieces 
of information are provided in the Inflationary Impact Statement (IIS) 
prepared for OSHA. Using this partial information the costs of the 
regulation were estimated to range from $240 million to $1.2 billion 
per year. The benefits, measured in terms of worker lives saved from 
lung cancer per year, were estimated to range from 26.6 to 240 lives 
saved per year. 
OSHA avoided explicit determination of the value placed on en-
vironmental risk by declining to accept any one estimate of benefits. In 
addition, they decided not to apply cost-benefit techniques to the 
standard, stating that there was no agreement among economists as to 
the proper method for valuing human lives and that is is inappropriate 
to "establish a dollar value on the benefits of the standard." 
Despite OSHA's assertions about economic uncertainty, the Council 
148 	 ENvIRONMENTAL LAW-TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) in oral and written comments 
to OSHA argued that the existence of the numbers and the fact that 
OSHA was going to promulgate the standard implied a valuation of 
the health risks from coke oven emissions. By dividing alternative esti-
mates of workers expected to be saved from lung cancer by a range of 
cost estimates, CWPS calculated that the coke oven standard could 
cost between $4.5 million and $158 million per life saved per year. 
Based on what CWPS considered to be extremely high costs relative to 
the implicit value of lives assumed by other government regulatory 
programs (for example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration uses an estimate of $240,000 per life saved per year), they 
requested OSHA to consider alternatives to the standard that might 
achieve the same effect at lower cost for OSHA. Using this partial in-
formation the costs of the regulation were estimated to range from 
$240 million to $1.2 billion per year. The benefits, measured in terms 
of worker lives saved from lung cancer per year, were estimated to range 
from 26.6 to 240 lives per year. 
Several problems can be noted with the IIS and CWPS determi-
nations: 
• These determinations understate health benefits, because they do 
not include estimates of other cancer deaths (of which prostate, 
pancreas and large intestine cancers are significant), deaths from 
other chronic disease, or sickness rates (morbidity) for exposed 
coke oven workers. All of these health effects from coke oven 
exposure can be expected to be reduced once the standard is 
implemented; and none of these has been quantified to date, 
• Estimates of these health risks for coke oven construction and 
repair workers, coal gas workers, exposed neighboring populations, 
and the general population are omitted. There are major difficul-
ties in obtaining all of these health risk data. 
• Economic analyses to date have been framed around limited 
epidemiological studies on coke oven worker risks of lung cancer. 
Having not been quantified, estimates of the standard's non-cancer 
health benefits for other affected groups have not entered into these 
economic assessments. As a result, the figures generated overstate 
the ratio of costs to benefits. 
Limits of Environmental Science 
What does it mean to estimate an average risk in environmental health 
where the average exposure for a coke-oven worker is taken, divided by 
an estimate of the total U. S. population, to come up with an average 
for the exposure of the total U. S. population? This is then divided by a 
factor that takes into account the lower dose in order to determine an 
average figure of expected cancer death. It tells you only that either 
you're a statistician or that you are being silly, because you cannot 
expect those averages, in fact, to occur. 
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Averages don't tell us much when you take into account a duck 
hunting story recently told by an eminent bird watcher. The hunters 
fired two shots. The first shot was a foot behind the duck. The second 
shot was a foot in front of the duck. On the average, the duck was dead. 
We have some real problems in quantitative analysis in the entire 
area of risk, economics and health. We tend to focus on the costs that 
we bear now because we pay for them now, unless we are the federal 
government—in which case we borrow and then other people pay for 
them. But basically, the costs are paid now and are felt now. Presenta-
tions here have made quite clear, and certainly the residents of the 
James River and the fisher people of the James River can tell you, the 
clean-up costs far exceed the costs of any original control strategies. 
Students of environmental health have been confounded for years by 
the scientific requirements that likely causal links be established between 
specific environmental pollutants and particular health effects. Because 
no environmental pollutants occur in isolation from other pollutants 
this demand has had the effect of forcing reliance on supposedly de-
finitive animal tests that show that such and such a substance causes 
such and such a disease. Well, such and such a substance probably does 
cause such and such a disease in animals, but humans are not ever 
exposed to single substances. They are exposed to multiple substances 
and they have genetic backgrounds that are different as well. 
So we tend to rely on human epidemiological studies. And as Peg 
Seminario pointed out, if we were to rely on epidemiological studies we 
would wait another twenty or forty years for more definitive findings 
before we could take any action at all. These studies are frequently 
vulnerable to criticisms that some other phenomenon than the one 
you've studied really explains the results. Toxicological data from 
animals may be faulted in terms of a variety of criticisms, species 
specificity, homogeneity of the animal population, inappropriateness 
of the route of exposure or because once you get the final results it is 
necessary to extrapolate from the high dose exposure of mice that only 
live two years, to lower doses to which humans are exposed throughout 
their lifetimes. 
Conclusion 
With what do all tbese caveats leave us? They bring us back to 
reasonableness. As a general matter, determining reasonableness re-
quires evaluations of available economic and scientific data. As an 
ongoing project of the Environmental Law Institute makes clear, in 
many cases the determination of reasonableness confronts regulatory 
agencies with a broad assortment of potentially relevant factors. Before 
a decision on reasonableness may be reached it is necessary to determine 
which factors should be considered, what importance should be attached 
to each, how conflicting priorities should be resolved, and how best to 
deal with the diffuse, uncertain, and/or unquantifiable scientific and 
technical information which may lie at the heart of the issue. 
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It is in this context that we have had unfair expectations of our laws. 
Given the limits of economic analysis and the limits of scientific 
analysis with their focus on time constraints, markets and the epistemo-
logical and methodological dilemmas of environmental science, we 
should lower our expectations of controlling toxic substances. We've 
got problems and one of our biggest problems is that people don't be-
lieve that we've got problems because the things that are of concern 
cannot be seen. 
Environmental law can be expected to be no better than the quality 
of information from which they were crafted. Right now we face a 
situation perhaps best characterized as the balkanization of laws and 
regulations protecting public health and the environment. This patch-
work, this network as it has been called by various speakers, reflects 
the absence of a unified, consistent understanding of the science and 
the economics of environmental health. 
We've got a complicated role for all of us to play. It points up the 
importance of more elaboration of the basic methodologies in economics 
and in science and in the law, so that ten years from now conferences 
like this may not be necessary. 
Thank you. 
Professor Whitney: I personally deeply appreciate the input that 
everyone has made to what I personally regard as a very successful 
meeting. I don't think you measure the success of a meeting by whether 
you have come up with completely formulated answers. It is unrealistic 
to expect that. 
I particularly want to express appreciation, and to remind everyone, 
that this program was financed by the Virginia Environmental Endow-
ment. It is the first of what I hope will be a promising series. 
The two preceeding speakers have done a very complete job of 
summarizing. I would like to make two points, though, which I think 
might be constructive. 
The first is what I call the "impossible burden of proof" dilemma 
that we have here. Dr. Hornig, Dr. Davis and others have repeatedly 
made the point that the scientific data, or the data that would con-
clusively satisfy a scientist as to causality, simply isn't available and 
that the alternative of waiting the twenty to forty years to obtain such 
evidence is intolerable as a regulatory and public health alternative. I 
think that is perfectly valid. I would he surprised to encounter serious 
dissent on that proposition. 
But this doesn't exhaust the problem, because the alternative is not 
to adopt regulatory action to protect the public health and environment 
that has no discernable rationale or support. There has to be some kind 
of showing, or to put it another way, a factual underpinning that is not 
demonstrably nebulous or unprobative. There has to be some inter-
mediate basis of predicating regulation on the best available data, care-
fully considered in the specific situation, that can be done within an 
acceptable time frame. I personally believe that is what the Fifth Cir- 
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cuit was talking about in this case that was discussed this morning, by 
Mr. Voigt in particular. 
Now all the Court really said was that you can't just assume that 
reducing exposure from 10 to 1 parts per million as to benzene is a 
worthwhile achievement regardless of cost. You have to demonstrate 
there is some relationship of an identifiable public health benefit to 
justify the cost, justify the loss of product that is entailed in such a 
regulatory action. I think that is an important point. I personally will 
be surprised if the Supreme Court overrules it. I think it is in the 
essence of our system of law that there has to be some kind of sub-
stantial evidence to support regulatory action that has farreaching 
economic consequences. It cannot be, we all agree, the perfect, the 
scientific, the fully satisfying evidence. But it has to be more than 
simply a presumption in favor of purity. 
A very good example of this came up recently in which the EPA 
advanced a new and more stringent photochemical oxident standard. 
The EPA estimated it would cost on the high side approximately $9 
billion to achieve the standard. The whole matter was reviewed by the 
Office of Wage and Price Stabilization which has a regulatory sub-
division that analyzes the economic impacts of proposed regulatory 
action. They disagreed with the EPA estimate and said it would cost, 
on the high side, $18.4 billion. But the thing that was really critical was 
that EPA had not advanced any quantification of the public health 
benefit that would result from or justify this tremendous cost. It was 
again a presumption that purity is worth whatever it costs. 
Now this gets into the other point that I want to make, and that is 
this business about the economic factors. I think that where you are 
talking about human suffering, human lives, and so forth that the 
society should pay as much as it can to protect public health so long 
as the money is well spent. I think regulatory systems that waste limited 
resources are counter-productive to the objectives we all want. 
I ask you to consider another specific example involving the EPA. 
I think everyone here knows that the Congress recognized last year 
that EPA was not doing an adequate job with respect to pesticides. 
EPA itself admitted that they weren't. Mr. Costle testified at great 
length and he requested several amendments that were part of the Ad-
ministration's bill to reform pesticide registration. The Congress duly 
enacted them. One provision was generic registration and simplified 
registration procedures, a method Congress enacted to enable EPA to 
register the basic 1,400 or 1,500 active ingredients rather than 55,000 
end-use products. Very sensible. The other provision recognized that 
the data base even for those 1,400 or 1,500 were not really adequate be-
cause of data gaps, obsolete data and the progress that Dr. Davis has 
talked about in more sophisticated testing procedures. To solve that 
problem without just putting pesticides out of business, the conditional 
registration provisions were enacted which said that if you were on a 
compliance schedule which would effectively meet all the data gaps, 
that under certain controls and restraints, you would be permitted to 
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have conditional registration for this basic chemical. There was also 
the discretion that I always thought EPA had before, but which they 
didn't seem to think they had, to waive efficacy data, particularly with 
regard to agricultural pesticides. Well, EPA got that authority, too. 
What has happened? The law became effective on September 30, 1978. 
Since approximately 1975, the Agency has been working on guidelines 
on the registration of pesticides and of course those were all drafted 
under the terms of the prior law that did not have these three improve-
ments that I have just described. Did the Agency tear them up? No. 
They continued, after the passage of the Act, to publish these, to re-
quire comments on obsolete regulations or run the risk of waiving the 
opportunity to comment. EPA did an economic impact analysis based on 
what was by definition obsolete, unrevised regulation. Now that is a 
serious waste of resources, and there are countless examples of this. 
That is the kind of thing we can take away from a meeting like this 
in the way of reform. In just plain professional football terms, reform in 
the execution of what I think to be perfectly adequate laws. Un-
fortunately, these laws are not really in all cases being implemented in 
the fashion that is possible to achieve effective regulation. So at the 
bottom line I think there is a dimension of economic accountability that 
is vital. 
One final thought and then I will pass on to Professor Brion who has 
some thoughts about yesterday's presentations. The final thought is, and 
Dr. Hornig alluded to this, how do we get some kind of generic approach 
to this whole matter of toxic substances? The OSHA cancer policy is one 
effort to do that. Now, in that connection one of the reasons that I 
think the OSHA cancer policy probably will never really fly, in its 
present form at least, is that it really attempts to do too much and to do 
things which do violence to our system of law. Now take for example, 
the assumption that, if the cancer policy becomes final, there would be 
foreclosed from any consideration the issue of "no threshold" for a 
standard once the determination is made that a substance is a "suspect 
carcinogen". Now, there simply is no such power in the OSHA. The 
Act does not give OSHA this power to ban a substance. There is no 
Delaney Clause in OSHA. Yet, by what has to be viewed, by third 
persons who have no financial interest, as a kind of an Agency arroga-
tion of statutory power that OSHA was not given, the Agency is seek-
ing to exercise power that Congress has not delegated to it. Now that 
is a mistake and it is counter-productive to the achievements of legitimate 
goals: some kind of generic, effective regulation. 
Those are my reflections after what, I repeat, I think was an excellent 
meeting. Again I express my appreciation to all of you. 
Professor Brion: I'd like to look briefly at a slightly different aspect 
of what came up as a general theme in yesterday's presentations and 
how it carries over into the discussion today. The viewpoint yesterday 
was more structural, that is, looking at institutions and their jurisdic-
tions, rather than the substance of regulation, which is more in the 
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forefront today, by which I mean such matters as values to be protected, 
the technological problems of measurement, cost of regulation, and 
other such considerations. Two general points are Worth addressing: 
The first has to do with some of the themes that came out of the 
description yesterday of the specific Virginia institutions. First of all, 
as Dr. Hornig brought out, the range of laws having to do with toxic 
substances in Virginia is quite broad. They are extremely complex in 
their structure, in some cases overlapping and in other cases having 
large loopholes. Certainly it is a difficult system to coordinate under 
any circumstances, and, of course, with no mandatory and very few 
formal coordination mechanisms, a structure that is in fact very 
uncoordinated. 
Another point that was brought out and focused on was the complex 
administrative process, especially in terms of a permit applicant seeking 
to carry out some new activity but having to run the gauntlet of 
regulatory agencies each requiring its own permit. I think it is clear 
that, in Virginia today, if any kind of political trend can be identified 
regarding toxic substance regulation and really environmental regula-
tion generally, there is increasing sensitivity in Virginia government 
toward those political forces favoring more of a balance between en-
vironmental concerns and the more intensive use of our resources. Of 
course, that kind of trend is going to have tremendous potential effect, 
not only on the initiatives that the legislature undertakes in getting into 
new areas and new problems, but also on the funding that will be 
made available to and the initiative that will be allowed in the existing 
regulatory processes. 
I think it also became clear, and Dr. Hornig puzzled a bit about this, 
that there is a separate phenomenon of attenuation of initiatives at the 
state level, more of a tendency to defer to Federal initiatives. It is not 
surprising, given that the nature of the toxic substances problem tran-
scends state political boundaries and state legal jurisdiction. Also, most 
Federal bureaucrats would say that their resources are extremely limited, 
but, by comparison to the resources available to state government, they 
have quite a bit more in terms of talent, money, expertise, and informa-
tion to bring to these toxic substance problems. 
I think it is going to be interesting that institutionally what is going 
to happen in the area of toxic substance regulation may well be part 
of a much larger trend in our political institutions today. I am referring 
here to the kinds of things that I summarize, for lack of a better term 
(it is probably economically incorrect), as a vertical integration of 
government. By that I mean this: take for instance, the 1972 Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the tremendously large maze of categorical Federal grants. There 
is a strong trend today that Federal policy more and more is being 
implemented, at the working level, through the local level of govern-
ment, whicb is immediately directed by State government, which state 
government is in turn directed by the Federal government. It will be 
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interesting to see if regulation of toxic substances follows the same 
general pattern. 
The second major theme I'd like to look at is to pick up on a com-
ment that Jim Rogers of EPA made on the unknown substances that 
showed up on the gas chromatograph reading of sediment from the 
James River. I was a member of the Virginia State Water Control 
Board when the Kepone disaster first became public and the first regula-
tory problems started with it. At that time I was, and still am, really 
more concerned and more scared about what is out there in our en-
vironment that we don't know about yet than I am about Kepone, 
which is of course a matter of deep concern. 
This leads me to the thought that Nicholas Ashford made (to para-
phrase it perhaps poorly)—the goal of our regulatory processes is not 
to be cost effective. Now, in dealing with toxic substances, one point 
became clear during the discussion over the last two days and that is, 
factually, we don't know very much about these substances. But I think 
the Kepone disaster tells us that the magnitude of the risk of this ignor-
ance is extremely great. And I think I am not too far off base when I 
say that in the regulatory process (and here I'm referring not only to the 
broad idea of attempting to impose public interest on private activity, but 
more narrowly the process by which someone who wants to undertake 
a new activity, a new refinery, a new product on the market, goes 
through the permission-granting procedures) the entrepreneur, the 
permit applicant, has all the initiative on his side, and perhaps a near 
monopoly on the relevant information that is available. I agree, as 
Sheldon Samuels of the AFL-CIO said in the last panel, that the 
entrepreneur's business is business and not the public interest. 
It is too easy to overlook the fact that our complex, much vilified, 
multi-permit approval process at least has the advantage of giving both 
government and the public a chance to overcome the headstart of the 
applicant in both initiative and information. Our regulatory decisions 
are often much too important to be made in a hurry. Our institutions, of 
course, can be made more efficient, but I submit that the genius of our 
democratic processes is that they are deliberately messy, if you will, 
so that instead of reaching fast efficient decisions, we muddle our way 
through to much more equitable decisions. I think there is too much 
temptation to glorify the speed at which we get to our destination over 
the more important choice of the destination we want to reach. 
Thank you. 
